Graph usage in financial reports: Evidence from Portuguese listed companies

When assessing investment options, investors focus on the graphs of annual reports, despite lack of auditing. If poorly constructed, graphs distort perceptions and lead to inaccurate decisions. This study examines graph usage in all the companies listed on Euronext Lisbon in 2013. The findings suggest that graphs are common in the annual reports of Portuguese companies and that, while there is no evidence of Selectivity Distortion, both Measurement and Orientation Distortions are pervasive. The study recommends the auditing of financial graphs, and urges preparers and users of annual reports to be wary of the possibility of graph distortion.

Comprehensive income: evidence from Portuguese listed companies on reporting choices and value relevance

This work project aims at analysing choices related to Comprehensive income (CI) of Portuguese listed firms and understanding the reasons behind them. Additionally, it studies the relevance of CI versus Net Income (NI). It was found that firm’s size and volume of Other comprehensive income (OCI) are positively related with the choice for separate statements while smaller firms with positive NI and negative OCI tend to disclose less information about taxes. The value relevance of CI proved to be superior to that of NI but OCI seems to have no incremental value relevance.

Le développement normatif et institutionnel relatif aux peuples autochtones en droit international au regard des fondements de leurs revendications politiques : le droit à l'autodétermination comme théorie unificatrice?

Le présent mémoire se consacre à la question des revendications normatives des peuples autochtones en droit international. On y constate que la reconnaissance de ces dernières représente un défi important autant pour les institutions internationales que pour la philosophie libérale qui en constitue le fondement. Cette reconnaissance sera graduellement admise par les institutions internationales majeures préoccupées par les droits humains. Un corpus normatif international spécifique et exclusif aux autochtones sera ainsi développé pour répondre à leurs aspirations et besoins. La définition de l’identité autochtone permet d’exposer cette particularité de traitement des autochtones en droit international. Elle se fonde sur deux axes. Le premier est culturel, suggérant une différence autochtone fondée sur une conception holistique du monde, laquelle est intimement liée au territoire. Le deuxième axe est historique; il fait appel à une longue présence sur un lieu, parfois qualifiée d’immémoriale, en tous les cas antérieure au contact avec un envahisseur qui mènera à leur situation actuelle de marginalisation. Ces fondements identitaires se trouvent à la source des justifications des revendications normatives autochtones. Cependant, ces fondements posent des problèmes de qualification difficiles à concilier avec la diversité des bénéficiaires des droits des autochtones. Ils entraînent également des difficultés importantes au regard de la théorie politique, laquelle s’efforce de réconcilier les revendications autochtones avec le libéralisme et les structures politiques actuelles. Une réconciliation entre les peuples autochtones et les États soulève en effet de délicates questions de légitimité et de justice. Afin d’éviter les pièges d’une autochtonie confinée dans un paradigme culturel et historique, S. J. Anaya propose le concept d’autodétermination comme fondement unique des revendications autochtones. Ce concept doit cependant lui-même faire face à un défi de conciliation avec les structures politiques existantes. Nous verrons que s’il permet de poser les jalons d’une nouvelle relation politique, le droit à l’autodétermination des peuples autochtones semble cependant incapable de dépasser les fondements de la culture et de l’histoire inhérents à l’identité autochtone.

Le rôle des États-Unis dans le maintien des pratiques d’opacité financière

Notre recherche vise à vérifier s'il existe un lien entre l'intérêt des Américains pour les investissements étrangers et le maintien des structures opaques de la finance internationale. Les pratiques d'opacité financière (utilisation abusive du secret bancaire, faibles mesures d'identification du client, faible règlementation bancaire, absence d’échange d’information fiscale, absence d’obligations d’enregistrements de compagnies et de fiducies, possibilité d’établir la propriété d’une société avec des prête-noms, utilisation de bons au porteur, manque d’encadrement des fiducies, etc.) semblent accommoder les États qui les dénoncent. Utilisant les théories des jeux à deux niveaux de Putnam, de la règlementation et de l’équilibre de Nash, nous faisons le lien entre le niveau national et international. Notre recherche consiste en deux études de cas. La première traite d’un projet de règlement de l’Internal Revenue Service visant à assurer la déclaration de revenus d’intérêt sur les dépôts bancaires des non-résidents. La seconde traite d’une série de projets de loi déposés au Sénat et à la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis. Ils cherchent à assurer la transparence du processus d’enregistrement de compagnies de manière à faciliter l’accès des agences d’application de la loi à l’information sur les bénéficiaires effectifs des compagnies formées en sol américain. Notre recherche ne permet pas de confirmer notre hypothèse avec certitude. Cependant, nos données tendent à indiquer que les groupes d’intellectuels et les groupes de pression financiers incitent le gouvernement des États-Unis à freiner la mise en application de certaines mesures prévues par le régime antiblanchiment (particulièrement l’identification du client et le partage d’information avec des pays tiers) pour attirer l’investissement étranger.

Le droit international localement pour et par les femmes indiennes : la protection contre la violence domestique à Mumbai, Inde

Le droit international véhicule des principes de droits des femmes dits universels. Pourtant, ces droits prennent un tout autre sens lorsque confrontés aux réalités locales. En Inde, le droit hindou entretient la notion de devoirs par opposition aux droits individuels. Ainsi, la femme est définie selon ses relations à la famille et au mariage plutôt que selon ses libertés sociales. Toute dérogation dans les devoirs de la femme envers sa famille ou son mari est une raison valable pour punir la délinquance et discipliner. Cette étude s’intéresse aux tensions entre les standards internationaux et locaux à partir de l’étude de la Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act de 2005 (PWDVA). Cette loi se trouve au confluent de l’universalisme du droit international des droits humains et du pluralisme culturel en Inde. La PWDVA semble remettre en question le statut de la femme et de la famille dans la société. Les idéaux du droit peuvent-ils être adaptés aux diverses réalités nationales et locales? Comment les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) s’inscrivent-elles dans la conjugaison du droit vivant et du droit international pour contrer la violence domestique? Cette recherche étudie le rôle des ONG dans l’adaptation et la traduction des normes internationales dans le contexte culturel et social indien. Une analyse approfondie de documents théoriques et juridiques, des observations participatives et des entrevues au sein d'une ONG à Mumbai en 2013 ont permis d’observer la transition des normes internationales vers le local. Un tel séjour de recherche fut possible à l’aide d'une méthodologie suivant le cadre théorique du féminisme postmoderne et de l’anthropologie juridique. L’analyse des résultats a mené à la conclusion que les ONG jouent un rôle de médiateur entre les normes appartenant au droit international, au droit national indien et au droit vivant. Celles-ci doivent interpréter les droits humains intégrés à la PWDVA en reconnaissant ce qui est idéaliste et ce qui est réaliste à la lumière des réalités locales, faisant ainsi l’équilibre entre le besoin de transformations des communautés et le respect des valeurs à préserver. Cette recherche offre donc une ouverture quant aux solutions possibles pour contrer les tensions entre droits des femmes et droits culturels dans un contexte de développement international.

The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability

These articles evaluate using financial statement insurance (FSI) to reduce the frequency and magnitude of audit failure. The FSI concept was pioneered by Josh Ronen, NYU Accounting Professor, who has modeled its economic aspects. My paper examines FSI’s efficacy from policy and legal perspectives. I conclude that while the model is not perfect, it promises considerable advantages over the current model. While some of the existing system’s imperfections are sustained or reappear in different guises, none of the existing imperfections appears to be aggravated and the rest likely are mitigated significantly. So I prescribe a framework to permit companies, on an experimental-basis and with investor approval, to use FSI as an optional alternative to financial statement auditing backed by auditor liability.

Tratamiento de la ulcera venosa con escleroespuma versus manejo conservador

La úlcera venosa es una revelación clínica severa de la insuficiencia venosa crónica. Es la causa del 54-76% de las úlceras venosas de miembros inferiores. La ciencia médica ha generado diversos procedimientos en el manejo de esta patología, es así como a partir de conocimientos en fisiopatología de la ulceración venosa, se han aplicado procedimientos como opción de tratamiento. Objetivos: Valorar si el uso de rutina de la oclusión endoluminal con espuma guiada por ecografía del sistema venoso superficial insuficiente, en adicción al manejo convencional de la ulcera venosa (vendaje no compresivo, gasa vaselinada y curaciones) podría mejorar la tasa de curación a las 24 semanas de tratamiento. Diseño: Estudio clínico aleatorizado prospectivo de pacientes de la consulta externa de cirugía vascular del Hospital Occidente de Kennedy-Bogotá, durante el 01 de junio del 2011 hasta el 30 junio del 2012. Métodos: Un total de 44 pacientes con ulcera activa que cumplieron criterios de selección ingresaron al estudio, correspondientes a 48 extremidades con clasificación CEAP (C6), los pacientes fueron a aleatorizados a manejo convencional (control) o con manejo adicional de oclusión endoluminal con espuma eco-guiada. El objetivo principal fue el cierre de la ulcera a las 24 semanas. Resultados: La Curación de la ulcera a las 24 semanas de la aleatorización fue de 20 (83.3%) extremidades del grupo de oclusión endoluminal con espuma eco-guiada Vs 3(12.5%) para el grupo de control P: 0.0005 Discusión: Las tasas de curación de la ulcera luego de la oclusión endoluminal con espuma eco-guiada es muy superior al manejo convencional con curaciones y vendaje no compresivo, las tasa de curación son tan altas como las reportadas con sistemas de alta compresión y cirugía a las 24 semanas. La oclusión endoluminal eco-guiada es segura, mínimamente invasiva y clínicamente efectiva.

Valor relevante da apresentação dos ativos não correntes detidos para venda e unidades operacionais descontinuadas

Os ativos não correntes detidos para venda e unidades operacionais descontinuadas fazem parte de um projeto conjunto que levou o International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) e o Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) a tentarem uma convergência das normas contabilísticas. Na sequência deste projeto comum, quer o IASB, quer o FASB, procederam a alterações nas respetivas normas. No caso do IASB, duas alterações importantes foram a introdução dos conceitos de ativos não correntes detidos para venda e de unidades operacionais descontinuadas, e a apresentação separada dos ativos e passivos não correntes detidos para venda e das unidades operacionais descontinuadas e respetivos resultados nas Demonstrações Financeiras. No presente estudo investiguei se a apresentação separada dos ativos não correntes detidos para venda e unidades operacionais descontinuadas têm valor relevante. Os resultados obtidos não permitem concluir que o preço das ações varie em função da apresentação destes ativos de forma separada, uma vez que que o coeficiente da variável não é estatisticamente significativo. Este tema é controverso, no sentido em que existem estudos sobre a apresentação de acontecimentos ocasionais nas demonstrações financeiras, em que alguns concluem que a sua apresentação não tem valor relevante para o investidor, enquanto outros concluem que tem.

Las limitaciones de los mecanismos de aproximación jurídica para el diseño de la nueva arquitectura financiera internacional (Tema Central)

A nivel internacional existe consenso respecto a la importancia que tiene el marco institucional para el funcionamiento eficiente del sistema financiero y para la generación de incentivos correctos para mantener la disciplina de mercado. Por eso mismo, durante los últimos diez años, se ha estado discutiendo, especialmente a nivel técnico, respecto de las condiciones de una nueva arquitectura financiera internacional que se ajuste a la realidad de un sistema financiero globalizado, y se han generado políticas, lineamientos y mínimos estándares para los sistemas financieros que han sido recogidos fundamentalmente por normas informales conocidas como softlaw y por órganos igualmente informales. La Declaración de la Cumbre del G20 en Washington de noviembre de 2008 estableció cinco principios comunes para reforma del sistema financiero que deben ser considerados en esta nueva arquitectura, a la que se puede definir como ""el establecimiento e implementación, a nivel nacional e internacional, de reglas, principios y arreglos institucionales que aseguren la estabilidad del sistema financiero internacional, previniendo las crisis y estableciendo los mecanismos institucionales para enfrentarlas o mitigarlas"". Sin embargo de esto, no existe una conciencia clara de que el problema de la nueva arquitectura financiera internacional es un problema ante todo jurídico: los órganos informales creados y el softlaw son insuficientes para crear las condiciones necesarias para asegurar el obligatorio cumplimiento y la aplicación general de este marco de regulación financiera global. Además, el principio de la soberanía de los Estados, base de los ordenamientos y sistemas jurídicos actuales, de naturaleza fundamentalmente nacional, y norma fundamental para las relaciones entre Estados, en el Derecho público internacional, vuelve complejay demorada la creación de un nuevo sistema de gobernanza global que viabilice esta nueva arquitectura financiera internacional y permita devolver rápidamente la confianza perdida y la estabilidad de este nuevo sistema financiero global.

Real estate investment in global financial centers: risk, return and contagion

Global financial activity is heavily concentrated in a small number of world cities –international financial centers. The office markets in those cities receive significant flows of investment capital. The growing specialization of activity in IFCs and innovations in real estate investment vehicles lock developer, occupier, investment, and finance markets together, creating common patterns of movement and transmitting shocks from one office market throughout the system. International real estate investment strategies that fail to recognize this common source of volatility and risk may fail to deliver the diversification benefits sought.

Impression management, myth creation and fabrication in private social and environmental reporting: insights from Erving Goffman

This paper explores the nature of private social and environmental reporting (SER). From interviews with UK institutional investors, we show that both investors and investees employ Goffmanesque, staged impression management as a means of creating and disseminating a dual myth of social and environmental accountability. The interviewees’ utterances unveil private meetings imbued with theatrical verbal and physical impression management. Most of the time, the investors’ shared awareness of reality belongs to a Goffmanesque frame whereby they accept no intentionality, misrepresentation or fabrication, believing instead that the ‘performers’ (investees) are not intending to deceive them. A shared perception that social and environmental considerations are subordinated to financial issues renders private SER an empty encounter characterised as a relationship-building exercise with seldom any impact on investment decision-making. Investors spoke of occasional instances of fabrication but these were insufficient to break the frame of dual myth creation. They only identified a handful of instances where intentional misrepresentation had been significant enough to alter their reality and behaviour. Only in the most extreme cases of fabrication and lying did the staged meeting break frame and become a genuine occasion of accountability, where investors demanded greater transparency, further meetings and at the extreme, divested shares. We conclude that the frontstage, ritualistic impression management in private SER is inconsistent with backstage activities within financial institutions where private financial reporting is prioritised. The investors appeared to be in a double bind whereby they devoted resources to private SER but were simultaneously aware that these efforts may be at best subordinated, at worst ignored, rendering private SER a predominantly cosmetic, theatrical and empty exercise.

Impression management, fabrication and myth creation in private social and environmental reporting: insights from Erving Goffman

This paper explores the nature of private social and environmental reporting (SER). From interviews with UK institutional investors, we show that both investors and investees employ Goffmanesque, staged impression management as a means of creating and disseminating a dual myth of social and environmental accountability. The interviewees’ utterances unveil private meetings imbued with theatrical verbal and physical impression management. Most of the time, the investors’ shared awareness of reality belongs to a Goffmanesque frame whereby they accept no intentionality, misrepresentation or fabrication, believing instead that the ‘performers’ (investees) are not intending to deceive them. A shared perception that social and environmental considerations are subordinated to financial issues renders private SER an empty encounter characterised as a relationship-building exercise with seldom any impact on investment decision-making. Investors spoke of occasional instances of fabrication but these were insufficient to break the frame of dual myth creation. They only identified a handful of instances where intentional misrepresentation had been significant enough to alter their reality and behaviour. Only in the most extreme cases of fabrication and lying did the staged meeting break frame and become a genuine occasion of accountability, where investors demanded greater transparency, further meetings and at the extreme, divested shares. We conclude that the frontstage, ritualistic impression management in private SER is inconsistent with backstage activities within financial institutions where private financial reporting is prioritised. The investors appeared to be in a double bind whereby they devoted resources to private SER but were simultaneously aware that these efforts may be at best subordinated, at worst ignored, rendering private SER a predominantly cosmetic, theatrical and empty exercise.

International civil society actors in Genetically Modificied Organisms as a field of struggle: a neo-gramscian study in Brazil and the United Kingdom

Since the international financial and food crisis that started in 2008, strong emphasis has been made on the importance of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (or “transgenics”) under the claim that they could contribute to increase food productivity at a global level, as the world population is predicted to reach 9.1 billion in the year 2050 and food demand is predicted to increase by as much as 50% by 2030. GMOs are now at the forefront of the debates and struggles of different actors. Within civil society actors, it is possible to observe multiple, and sometime, conflicting roles. The role of international social movements and international NGOs in the GMO field of struggle is increasingly relevant. However, while many of these international civil society actors oppose this type of technological developments (alleging, for instance, environmental, health and even social harms), others have been reportedly cooperating with multinational corporations, retailers, and the biotechnology industry to promote GMOs. In this thesis research, I focus on analysing the role of “international civil society” in the GMO field of struggle by asking: “what are the organizing strategies of international civil society actors, such as NGOs and social movements, in GMO governance as a field of struggle?” To do so, I adopt a neo-Gramscian discourse approach based on the studies of Laclau and Mouffe. This theoretical approach affirms that in a particular hegemonic regime there are contingent alliances and forces that overpass the spheres of the state and the economy, while civil society actors can be seen as a “glue” to the way hegemony functions. Civil society is then the site where hegemony is consented, reproduced, sustained, channelled, but also where counter-hegemonic and emancipatory forces can emerge. Considering the importance of civil society actors in the construction of hegemony, I also discuss some important theories around them. The research combines, on the one hand, 36 in-depth interviews with a range of key civil society actors and scientists representing the GMO field of struggle in Brazil (19) and the UK (17), and, on the other hand, direct observations of two events: Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, and the first March Against Monsanto in London in 2013. A brief overview of the GMO field of struggle, from its beginning and especially focusing in the 1990s when the process of hegemonic formation became clearer, serves as the basis to map who are the main actors in this field, how resource mobilization works, how political opportunities (“historical contingencies”) are discovered and exploited, which are the main discourses (“science” and “sustainability” - articulated by “biodiversity preservation”, “food security” and “ecological agriculture”) articulated among the actors to construct a collective identity in order to attract new potential allies around “GMOs” (“nodal point”), and which are the institutions and international regulations within these processes that enable hegemony to emerge in meaningful and durable hegemonic links. This mapping indicates that that the main strategies applied by the international civil society actors are influenced by two central historical contingencies in the GMO field of struggle: 1) First Multi-stakeholder Historical Contingency; and 2) “Supposed” Hegemony Stability. These two types of historical contingency in the GMO field of struggle encompass deeper hegemonic articulations and, because of that, they induce international civil society actors to rethink the way they articulate and position themselves within the field. Therefore, depending on one of those moments, they will apply one specific strategy of discourse articulation, such as: introducing a new discourse in hegemony articulation to capture the attention of the public and of institutions; endorsing new plural demands; increasing collective visibility; facilitating material articulations; sharing a common enemy identity; or spreading new ideological elements among the actors in the field of struggle.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.