The history of creation, or, The development of the earth and its inhabitants by the action of natural causes : a popular exposition of the doctrine of evolution in general, and of that of Darwin, Goethe and Lamarck in particular / from the German of Ernst Haeckel ; the translation rev. by E. Ray Lankester.

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The evolution of man : a popular exposition of the principal points of human ontogeny and phylogeny / From the German of Ernst Haeckel.

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The evolution of man : a popular exposition of the principal points of human ontogeny and phylogeny / From the German of Ernst Haeckel.

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The evolution of man: a popular exposition of the principal points of human ontogney phylogeny / From the German of Ernst Haeckel.

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Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy / Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

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Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy / Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

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Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy / Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

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Travels in the Confederation, 1783-1784. From the German. Translated and edited by Alfred J. Morrison.

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Travels in the Confederation, 1783-1784. From the German. Translated and edited by Alfred J. Morrison.

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On games corresponding to sequencing situations with precedence relations

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

The Politics of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Argentina

The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.