Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal repression

This article examines the debt history of two contenders for European hegemony: 16th-centurySpain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their fiscal behavior using measures of overborrowingand fiscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain ssuccess in avoiding default. Instead, fiscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrowat below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals.

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of the Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2007

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2008 (July 1, 2007 - June 30, 2008)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2007 (July 1, 2006 - June 30, 2007)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2005 (July 1, 2004 - June 30, 2005)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2006 (July 1, 2005 - June 30, 2006)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2004 (July 1, 2003 - June 30, 2004)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2001 (July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?

A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorshipsor communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.

Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamicsof deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not.