Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Ecological sustainability and urban form

One controversial idea present in the debate on urban sustainability is that urban sprawl is an ecological stressing problem. We have tested this popular assumption by measuring the ecological footprint of commuting and housing of the 163 municipalities of the Barcelona Metropolitan Region and by relating the estimated values with residential density and accessibility, the fundamental determinant of residential density according to the Monocentric City Model.

Airline competition and network structure

This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Effects of competition over quality-adjusted price indexes: an application to the Spanish automobile market

Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.

Species distribution models reveal apparent competitive and facilitative effects of a dominant species on the distribution of tundra plants

Abiotic factors are considered strong drivers of species distribution and assemblages. Yet these spatial patterns are also influenced by biotic interactions. Accounting for competitors or facilitators may improve both the fit and the predictive power of species distribution models (SDMs). We investigated the influence of a dominant species, Empetrum nigrum ssp. hermaphroditum, on the distribution of 34 subordinate species in the tundra of northern Norway. We related SDM parameters of those subordinate species to their functional traits and their co-occurrence patterns with E. hermaphroditum across three spatial scales. By combining both approaches, we sought to understand whether these species may be limited by competitive interactions and/or benefit from habitat conditions created by the dominant species. The model fit and predictive power increased for most species when the frequency of occurrence of E. hermaphroditum was included in the SDMs as a predictor. The largest increase was found for species that 1) co-occur most of the time with E. hermaphroditum, both at large (i.e. 750 m) and small spatial scale (i.e. 2 m) or co-occur with E. hermaphroditum at large scale but not at small scale and 2) have particularly low or high leaf dry matter content (LDMC). Species that do not co-occur with E. hermaphroditum at the smallest scale are generally palatable herbaceous species with low LDMC, thus showing a weak ability to tolerate resource depletion that is directly or indirectly induced by E. hermaphroditum. Species with high LDMC, showing a better aptitude to face resource depletion and grazing, are often found in the proximity of E. hermaphroditum. Our results are consistent with previous findings that both competition and facilitation structure plant distribution and assemblages in the Arctic tundra. The functional and co-occurrence approaches used were complementary and provided a deeper understanding of the observed patterns by refinement of the pool of potential direct and indirect ecological effects of E. hermaphroditum on the distribution of subordinate species. Our correlative study would benefit being complemented by experimental approaches.

Nest distribution varies with dispersal method and familiarity-mediated aggression for two sympatric ants

Dispersal mechanisms and competition together play a key role in the spatial distribution of a population. Species that disperse via fission are likely to experience high levels of localized competitive pressure from conspecifics relative to species that disperse in other ways. Although fission dispersal occurs in many species, its ecological and behavioural effects remain unclear. We compared foraging effort, nest spatial distribution and aggression of two sympatric ant species that differ in reproductive dispersal: Streblognathus peetersi, which disperse by group fission, and Plectroctena mandibularis, which disperse by solitary wingless queens. We found that although both species share space and have similar foraging strategies, they differ in nest distribution and aggressive behaviour. The spatial distribution of S. peetersi nests was extremely aggregated, and workers were less aggressive towards conspecifics from nearby nests than towards distant conspecifics and all heterospecific workers. By contrast, the spatial distribution of P. mandibularis nests was overdispersed, and workers were equally aggressive towards conspecific and heterospecific competitors regardless of nest distance. Finally, laboratory experiments showed that familiarity led to the positive relationship between aggression and nest distance in S. peetersi. While unfamiliar individuals were initially aggressive, the level of aggression decreased within 1 h of contact, and continued to decrease over 24 h. Furthermore, individuals from near nests that were not aggressive could be induced to aggression after prolonged isolation. Overall, these results suggest that low aggression mediated by familiarity could provide benefits for a species with fission reproduction and an aggregated spatial distribution.

Is sociality driven by the costs of dispersal or the benefits of philopatry? A role for kin-discrimination mechanisms.

The role of ecological constraints in promoting sociality is currently much debated. Using a direct-fitness approach, we show this role to depend on the kin-discrimination mechanisms underlying social interactions. Altruism cannot evolve under spatially based discrimination, unless ecological constraints prevent complete dispersal. Increasing constraints enhances both the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals and the level of altruistic investments conceded in pairwise interactions. Familiarity-based discrimination, by contrast, allows philopatry and altruism to evolve at significant levels even in the absence of ecological constraints. Increasing constraints further enhances the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals but not the level of altruism conceded. Ecological constraints are thus more likely to affect social evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities, large group size, and/or limited period of associative learning force investments to be made on the basis of spatial cues.

Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual market hypothesis

This paper empirically analyses the hypothesis of the existence of a dual market for contracts in local services. Large firms that operate on a national basis control the contracts for delivery in the most populated and/or urban municipalities, whereas small firms that operate at a local level have the contracts in the least populated and/or rural municipalities. The dual market implies the high concentration and dominance of major firms in large municipalities, and local monopolies in the smaller ones. This market structure is harmful to competition for the market as the effective number of competitors is low across all municipalities. Thus, it damages the likelihood of obtaining cost savings from privatization.

Productivity growth and competition in Spanish manufacturing firms: What has happened in recent years?

This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between productivity and market competition. In comparison to the economies of other European countries, the Spanish economy has been growing, while productivity growth has stagnated. Here we provide empirical evidence about the relationship between productivity and market competition from Spanish manufacturing firms at firm level between 1994 and 2004. Correcting for selection bias, our study pays special attention to the patterns of productivity growth between openness and non-openness firms. When market competition increases the effect on firms operating in domestic markets is positive but when the level of competition is high incentives to invest in innovation and productivity gains disappear. The empirical relationship between competition and productivity is an inverted U-shape, where productivity growth is highest at intermediate levels of competition. The productivity growth of firms operating in international markets is higher than that of non-openness firms, but when market competition rises they moderate their productivity growth. Our empirical results suggest that the correct competition policy in the Spanish economy should remove the barriers to competition in internal markets in order to increase the incentives for manufacturing firms to invest in innovation and productivity growth.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.