Critical point and scale setting in SU(3) plasma: An update

We explore a method developed in statistical physics which has been argued to have exponentially small finite-volume effects, in order to determine the critical temperature Tc of pure SU(3) gauge theory close to the continuum limit. The method allows us to estimate the critical coupling βc of the Wilson action for temporal extents up to Nτ∼20 with ≲0.1% uncertainties. Making use of the scale setting parameters r0 and t0−−√ in the same range of β-values, these results lead to the independent continuum extrapolations Tcr0=0.7457(45) and Tct0−−√=0.2489(14), with the latter originating from a more convincing fit. Inserting a conversion of r0 from literature (unfortunately with much larger errors) yields Tc/ΛMS¯¯¯¯¯=1.24(10).

Localising moralities: power and temporality in Southeastern Europe

Introduction to a special issue

Amygdala response to self-critical stimuli and symptom improvement in psychotherapy for depression

Background: Cognitive–behavioural therapy is efficacious in the treatment of major depressive disorder but response rates are still far from satisfactory. Aims: To better understand brain responses to individualised emotional stimuli and their association with outcome, to enhance treatment. Method: Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were collected prior to individual psychotherapy. Differences in brain activity during passive viewing of individualised self-critical material in 23 unmedicated out-patients with depression and 28 healthy controls were assessed. The associations between brain activity, cognitive and emotional change, and outcome were analysed in 21 patients. Results: Patients showed enhanced activity in the amygdala and ventral striatum compared with the control group. Non-response to therapy was associated with enhanced activity in the right amygdala compared with those who responded, and activity in this region was negatively associated with outcome. Emotional but not cognitive changes mediated this association. Conclusions: Amygdala hyperactivity may lessen symptom improvement in psychotherapy for depression through attenuating emotional skill acquisition.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Executive Power and the People: Does the President Care What You Think?

I sought to examine the relationship between public approval of the president and his subsequent behavior. Specifically, I looked at the relationship between public approval and signing statement usage along with their usage following the 2006 outcry against President Bush's use of them.

The critical role and regulation of transcription factor FoxM1 in gastric cancer development and progression

The mammalian Forkhead Box (Fox) transcription factor (FoxM1) is implicated in tumorgenesis. However, the role and regulation of FoxM1 in gastric cancer remain unknown.^ I examined FoxM1 expression in 86 cases of primary gastric cancer and 57 normal gastric tissue specimens. I found weak expression of FoxM1 protein in normal gastric mucosa, whereas I observed strong staining for FoxM1 in tumor-cell nuclei in various gastric tumors and lymph node metastases. The aberrant FoxM1 expression is associated with VEGF expression and increased angiogenesis in human gastric cancer. A Cox proportional hazards model revealed that FoxM1 expression was an independent prognostic factor in multivariate analysis. Furthermore, overexpression of FoxM1 by gene transfer significantly promoted the growth and metastasis of gastric cancer cells in orthotopic mouse models, whereas knockdown of FoxM1 expression by small interfering RNA did the opposite. Next, I observed that alteration of tumor growth and metastasis by elevated FoxM1 expression was directly correlated with alteration of VEGF expression and angiogenesis. In addition, promotion of gastric tumorigenesis by FoxM1 directly and significantly correlated with transactivation of vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) expression and elevation of angiogenesis. ^ To further investigate the underlying mechanisms that result in FoxM1 overexpression in gastric cancer, I investigated FoxM1 and Krüppel-like factor 4 (KLF4) expressions in primary gastric cancer and normal gastric tissue specimens. Concomitance of increased expression of FoxM1 protein and decreased expression of KLF4 protein was evident in human gastric cancer. Enforced KLF4 expression suppressed FoxM1 protein expression. Moreover, a region within the proximal FoxM1 promoter was identified to have KLF4-binding sites. Finally, I found an increased FoxM1 expression in gastric mucosa of villin-Cre -directed tissue specific Klf4-null mice.^ In summary, I offered both clinical and mechanistic evidence that dysregulated expression of FoxM1 play an important role in gastric cancer development and progression, while KLF4 mediates negative regulation of FoxM1 expression and its loss significantly contributes to FoxM1 dysregulation. ^

Effect of patient accrual patterns on power and size of log-rank test for time-to-event outcome in clinical trials

The determination of size as well as power of a test is a vital part of a Clinical Trial Design. This research focuses on the simulation of clinical trial data with time-to-event as the primary outcome. It investigates the impact of different recruitment patterns, and time dependent hazard structures on size and power of the log-rank test. A non-homogeneous Poisson process is used to simulate entry times according to the different accrual patterns. A Weibull distribution is employed to simulate survival times according to the different hazard structures. The current study utilizes simulation methods to evaluate the effect of different recruitment patterns on size and power estimates of the log-rank test. The size of the log-rank test is estimated by simulating survival times with identical hazard rates between the treatment and the control arm of the study resulting in a hazard ratio of one. Powers of the log-rank test at specific values of hazard ratio (≠1) are estimated by simulating survival times with different, but proportional hazard rates for the two arms of the study. Different shapes (constant, decreasing, or increasing) of the hazard function of the Weibull distribution are also considered to assess the effect of hazard structure on the size and power of the log-rank test. ^

P-wave velocities and applied bed thickness and velocity changes for synthetic seismograms, ODP Leg 188 and Leg 119 sites

Synthetic seismograms provide a crucial link between lithologic variations within a drill hole and reflectors on seismic profiles crossing the site. In essence, they provide a ground-truth for the interpretation of seismic data. Using a combination of core and logging data, we created synthetic seismograms for Ocean Drilling Program Sites 1165 and 1166, drilled during Leg 188, and Site 742, drilled during Leg 119, all in Prydz Bay, Antarctica. Results from Site 1165 suggest that coring penetrated a target reflector initially thought to represent the onset of drift sedimentation, but the lithologic change across the boundary does not show a change from predrift to drift sediments. The origin of a shallow reflector packet in the seismic line across Site 1166 and a line connecting Sites 1166 and 742 was resolved into its constituent sources, as this reflector occurs in a region of large-scale, narrowly spaced impedance changes. Furthermore, Site 1166 was situated in a fluvio-deltaic system with widely variable geology, and bed thickness changes were estimated between the site and both seismic lines.

Physical properties and velocity measurement comparison for sediments from DSDP Holes 92-597B and 92-597C

The bulk and grain densities, porosity, water content, and ultrasonic compressional- and shear-wave velocities of 25 basalt samples from DSDP Holes 597B and 597C were measured. The velocities were measured at in situ pore and confining pressures. The bulk densities of the samples vary between 2.690 and 3.050 g/cm**3. Porosities of selected samples vary between 2.4 and 9.3%. The grain densities vary between 2.993 and 3.117 g/cm3, a range that suggests that bulk density differences are due primarily to variations in porosity. Compressional-wave velocities range from 5.70 to 6.81 km/s, and shear-wave velocities range from 1.66 to 3.84 km/s. The variation in compressional velocity appears to be due primarily to variations in grain size and the associated greater density of grain-boundary cracks for samples with a smaller average grain size. On the basis of these results we would expect compressional and shear velocities to increase with increasing depth in the shallow crust, primarily as the result of the effects of confining pressure on crack density.

Export Restrictions on Critical Minerals and Metals: Testing the Adequacy of WTO Disciplines

Conventional wisdom on the insufficiency of existing WTO disciplines on export restrictions has triggered momentum on the issue. In this book, Ilaria Espa offers a comprehensive analysis of the scope and coverage of WTO disciplines on export restrictions in light of emerging case law. She investigates whether such rules still provide a credible and effective framework capable of preventing abuses in the use of export restrictive measures on critical minerals and metals during a period of economic crisis and change in international trade patterns. Giving a broad overview of the export restrictions applied to these materials, Espa identifies distinctive features in the proliferation of export barriers and analyses the existing WTO rules to reveal their gaps and inconsistencies. She goes on to present solutions based upon her findings with the aim of bringing more coherence and equity to WTO rules on the export side.