Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

Root distributions of Australian herbaceous perennial legumes in response to phosphorus placement

Many Australian plant species have specific root adaptations for growth in phosphorus-impoverished soils, and are often sensitive to high external P concentrations. The growth responses of native Australian legumes in agricultural soils with elevated P availability in the surface horizons are unknown. The aim of these experiments was to test the hypothesis that increased P concentration in surface soil would reduce root proliferation at depth in native legumes. The effect of P placement on root distribution was assessed for two Australian legumes, Kennedia prorepens F. Muell. and Lotus australis Andrews, and the exotic Medicago sativa L. Three treatments were established in a low-P loam soil: amendment of 0.15 g mono-calcium phosphate in either (i) the top 50 mm (120 µg P g–1) or (ii) the top 500 mm (12 µg P g–1) of soil, and an unamended control. In the unamended soil M. sativa was shallow rooted, with 58% of the root length of in the top 50 mm. K. prorepens and L. australis had a more even distribution down the pot length, with only 4 and 22% of their roots in the 0–50 mm pot section, respectively. When exposed to amendment of P in the top 50 mm, root length in the top 50 mm increased 4-fold for K. prorepens and 10-fold for M. sativa, although the pattern of root distribution did not change for M. sativa. L. australis was relatively unresponsive to P additions and had an even distribution of roots down the pot. Shoot P concentrations differed according to species but not treatment (K. prorepens 2.1 mg g–1, L. australis 2.4 mg g–1, M. sativa 3.2 mg g–1). Total shoot P content was higher for K. prorepens than for the other species in all treatments. In a second experiment, mono-ester phosphatases were analysed from 1-mm slices of soil collected directly adjacent to the rhizosphere. All species exuded phosphatases into the rhizosphere, but addition of P to soil reduced phosphatase activity only for K. prorepens. Overall, high P concentration in the surface soil altered root distribution, but did not reduce root proliferation at depth. Furthermore, the Australian herbaceous perennial legumes had root distributions that enhanced P acquisition from low-P soils.

Nota de la Secretaría sobre la elección de nuevos miembros del Consejo Directivo del Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social = Note by the Secretariat on the election of new members of the Governing Council of the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning

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Note by the Secretariat (Request by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, on behalf of the Regional Council of Martinique for admission as an associate member of ECLAC)

Spanish version available

Establecimiento de relaciones entre la Comisión y el Consejo Intergubernamental de Países Exportadores de Cobre = Establishment of relations between the Commission and the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries

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