Interagency coordination in drug research and regulation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, first session. Agency coordination study, pursuant to S. Res. 27, 88th Cong. Review of cooperation on drug policies among Food and Drug Administration, National Institutes of Health, Veterans' Administration, and other agencies. Mar. 20-June 26, 1963.

Mode of access: Internet.

Municipal cooperation; a digest of the law of New York permitting intergovernmental service arrangements among municipalities of the State.

Kept up-to-date by supplements.

Interagency coordination in drug research and regulation : hearings before the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, second session. Agency coordination study (pursuant to S. Res. 276, 87th Cong.). Review of cooperation on drug policies among Food and Drug Administration, National Institutes of Health, Veterans' Administration, and other agencies. ...

Pt. 4-5 titles vary: "Eighty-eighth Congress, first session. Agency Coordination Study (pursuant to S. Res. 27, 88th Cong., as amended). Review of cooperation on drug policies among (the) Food and Drug Administration, National Institutes of Health, Veterans' Administration, and other agencies.

Experimental evidence that partner choice is a driving force in the payoff distribution among cooperators or mutualists: the cleaner fish case

Supply and demand largely determine the price of goods on human markets. It has been proposed that in animals, similar forces influence the payoff distribution between trading partners in Sexual selection, intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism. Here we present the first experimental evidence supporting biological market theory in it study on cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus. Cleaners interact with two classes of clients: choosy client species with access to several cleaners usually do not queue for service and do not return if ignored, while resident client species with access to only one cleaning station do queue or return. We used plexiglas plates with equal amounts of food to stimulate these behaviours of the two client classes. Cleaners soon inspected 'choosy' plates before 'resident' plates. This supports previous field observations that suggest that client species with access to several cleaners exert choice to receive better(immediate) service.

From perfect strangers to research partners: a study of relationships, resource sharing and perceived benefits within R&D cooperation networks

Doctoral thesis in Marketing and Strategy.

The basilar artery international cooperation study (BASICS).

Basilar artery occlusion is a rare cause of stroke with a high case fatality rate and an often poor clinical outcome among survivors. Our limited knowledge on the outcome in patients with basilar artery occlusion comes from small case series of selected patients.STUDY AIM: The main purpose of the registry is to collect preliminary data that will help direct the design of a future clinical treatment trial. The target number of patients included is 500.DESIGN: BASICS is a prospective, observational, multi-center, international registry of consecutive patients presenting with a symptomatic and radiologically confirmed basilar artery occlusion.STUDY OUTCOMES: From November 2002 until December 2006 data have been collected on 400 patients, from 42 centers in 12 countries. Most patients were treated with IA therapy (55%), followed by antithrombotics (29%) and IV thrombolysis (6%). The overall mortality was 45%.

The Inter-municipal Cooperation in Switzerland and the Trend towards Amalgamation

In Switzerland, the ongoing reforms of fiscal federalism put municipalities under increased fiscal stress. A majority of the municipalities had responded by increasing the cooperation with neighbouring municipalities over the last few years. Simultaneously, many discuss or are directly involved in a possible amalgamation project. Accordingly, the paper aimed at describing how cooperation has presently developed between Swiss municipalities, in order to illustrate the existing trend towards amalgamation. Current surveys helped us estimate the growing importance of inter-municipal arrangements together with the surge of amalgamations. A further goal was to investigate if cantonal financial incentives to municipal amalgamation essentially benefit the cantonal community, following the fiscal equivalence principle, or if they rather benefit amalgamating municipalities. In reality, equivalence does not exist. However, this may possibly be the condition to reduce inequality among amalgamating municipalities.

Eusociality and cooperation

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.

Study of a measles outbreak in Granada with preventive measures applied by the courts, Spain, 2010 to 2011.

Measles had practically been eliminated in Granada since the systematic vaccination of children with two doses introduced in 1984. However, in 2009 the disease returned in the form of small outbreaks. This study describes the measles outbreak that occurred in Granada from October 2010 to August 2011 and the measures imposed to control it. Information was sourced from the records of the Andalusian epidemiological surveillance system. A total of 308 cases were recorded, representing an incidence rate of 33.6 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. The first wave of the epidemic took place in Granada city, with the majority of cases occurring among families who lived in the Albaycín neighbourhood and were opposed to vaccination for ideological and/or religious reasons. The initial cases were in unvaccinated children aged 1 to 13 years. The outbreak later spread throughout the province. To control the outbreak, the vaccination schedule for the exposed children was brought up to date. The Regional Ministry of Health decided to take legal action in order to ensure vaccination of those in the initial nucleus of the outbreak.

Cross-Border Cooperation Between Spain and Portugal: A case Study of the Southern Regions

After centuries of lack of contacts between Spain and Portugal, the democratization of both countries allowed for a rapprochement which today is becoming more intensive. The crucial factor of the growing integration of Spanish and Portuguese border regions into a cross-border region is naturally the INTERREG programme. Both regions are disadvantaged within the European Union and their respective countries as poor regions. They have the status of a ‘double periphery’. In the 1980s and particularly 1990s actors on both sides of the border intensified their contacts in order to overcome their double peripherality. The growing number of projects, the improvement of infrastructures and the revival of associationism will certainly change the quality of life of these regions, which are still among the lowest in both countries. The continuation of the INTERREG programme after 2007-2013 will be an important consolidating tool for the further development of cross-border cooperation.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Eusociality and cooperation.

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.