Amélioration de l'hyperglycémie hospitalière: création d'un nouveau modèle de gouvernance [Improvement of hospital hyperglycemia: creation of a new governance model?].

The report of significant decrease of the inpatient hospital mortality and morbidity with an efficient insulin therapy has demonstrated the need of a good glycaemic control for patients hospitalised in acute care. However, one is faced with numerous difficulties in the hospital management of patients with hyperglycaemia, errors often occur when prescribing insulin, and the management skills are insufficient. Our goal is to change the medical and nursing practices to evolve towards an efficient and safe management of the hospitalised patient. The model we lay out in this article is based upon observation of the therapeutic support of patients with a chronic condition, whilst using a systemic management approach.

A Three-Dimensional Framework to Analyse the Governance of Population Registers

In June 2006, the Swiss Parliament made two important decisions with regards to public registers' governance and individuals' identification. It adopted a new law on the harmonisation of population registers in order to simplify statistical data collection and data exchange from around 4'000 decentralized registers, and it also approved the introduction of a Unique Person Identifier (UPI). The law is rather vague about the implementation of this harmonisation and even though many projects are currently being undertaken in this domain, most of them are quite technical. We believe there is a need for analysis tools and therefore we propose a conceptual framework based on three pillars (Privacy, Identity and Governance) to analyse the requirements in terms of data management for population registers.

Protección tecnológica y contractual de las obras con derecho de autor: ¿Hacia una privatización del acceso a la información?

Los problemas que el gran desarrollo de la información digital e Internet están provocando al derecho de autor se están intentando solucionar a través de tres vías: legislativa, tecnológica y contractual. La protección proporcionada a las obras con derecho de autor mediante medidas tecnológicas complementa a las condiciones de uso establecidas en las licencias y, además, ambos tipos de protección están respaldados por las nuevas leyes surgidas para adaptarse al nuevo contexto tecnológico. Como resultado de esta triple protección se están poniendo en grave peligro las excepciones y limitaciones a los derechos de autor reconocidas por las leyes de derecho de autor para beneficiar a las bibliotecas, sus usuarios y los ciudadanos en general, dando lugar a una fuerte y peligrosa privatización del acceso a la información.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.