Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Biased representation of homothetic preferences on homogeneous sets

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any preference relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a quantitative utility function and unique bias. This bias may favor or disfavor the preference for an object. In the first case, preferences are complete but not transitive and an object may be preferred even when its utility is lower. In the second case, preferences are asymmetric and transitive but not negatively transitive and it may not be sufficient for an object to have a greater utility for be preferred. In this manner, the bias reflects the extent to which preferences depart from the maximization of a utility function.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Do the eealthy risk more money? An experimental comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks?We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when theamounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is asmaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly,for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthydisplaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy.We also replicate our previous finding that many people display riskattraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. Weargue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts,together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined,independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Systematic Assessment of Factors Influencing Preferences of Crohn's Disease Patients in Selecting an Anti-TNF agent (CHOOSE TNF TRIAL)

Background a nd A ims: I nfliximab (IFX), adalimumab (ADA)and certolizumab pegol (CZP) have similar efficacy for inductionand maintenance of clinical response and remission in Crohn'sdisease (CD). Given the comparable nature of t hese drugs,patients' p references m ay i nfluence the choice o f the product.Goal: to identify factors contributing to CD patients' decision inselecting one anti-TNF agent over the others.Methods: A p rospectdive s urvey was performed a mong a nti-TNF-naïve CD patients. Prior to completion of a questionnaire,patients were provided with a description of the three anti-TNFagents f ocusing on indications, route of administration, s ideeffects, and scientific evidence of efficacy and safety.Results: One hundred patients (47f/53m, mean age 45±16yrs)completed the questionnaire. Disease location was ileal, colonicand ileocolonic in 33%, 40% and 27% of patients, respectively.Thirty-six percent preferred ADA as medication of choice, while28% and 2 5% p referred CZP and IFX; 11% were u ndecided.Patients' decision in selecting an anti-TNF drug was influencedby t he following f actors: side effects ( 76%), p hysician'srecommendation (66%), route of administration (54%), efficacydata (52%), time required for therapy administration (27%),recommendations by other CD patients (21%) and interactionswith other medications (12%).Conclusions: T he majority of p atients p referred anti-TNFmedications t hat were a dministered by s ubcutaneous i njectionrather t han b y intravenous i nfusion. Side effect profile andphysicians' r ecommendation are t wo m ajor factors influencingthe patients' s election of a specific anti-TNF d rug. Patients'concerns about safety and lifestyle habits should be taken intoaccount when prescribing anti-TNF drugs.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

Ignoring information in binary choice with continuous variables: When is less 'more'?

When can a single variable be more accurate in binary choice than multiple sources of information? We derive analytically the probability that a single variable (SV) will correctly predict one of two choices when both criterion and predictor are continuous variables. We further provide analogous derivations for multiple regression (MR) and equal weighting (EW) and specify the conditions under which the models differ in expected predictive ability. Key factors include variability in cue validities, intercorrelation between predictors, and the ratio of predictors to observations in MR. Theory and simulations are used to illustrate the differential effects of these factors. Results directly address why and when one-reason decision making can be more effective than analyses that use more information. We thus provide analytical backing to intriguing empirical results that, to date, have lacked theoretical justification. There are predictable conditions for which one should expect less to be more.

Mirror me : the effect of the voting advice application smartvote on voting preferences and behavior of Swiss voters

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become a central component of election campaigns worldwide. Through matching political preferences of voters to parties and candidates, the web application grants voters a look into their political mirror and reveals the most suitable political choices to them in terms of policy congruence. Both the dense and concise information on the electoral offer and the comparative nature of the application make VAAs an unprecedented information source for electoral decision making. In times where electoral choices are found to be highly individualized and driven by political issue positions, an ever increasing number of voters turn to VAAs before casting their ballots. With VAAs in high demand, the question of their effects on voters has become a pressing research topic. In various countries, survey research has been used to proclaim an impact of VAAs on electoral behavior, yet practically all studies fail to provide the scientific evidence that would allow for making such claims. In this thesis, I set out to systematically establish the causal link between VAA use and electoral behavior, using various data sources and appropriate statistical techniques in doing so. The focus lies on the Swiss VAA smartvote, introduced in the forefront of the 2003 Swiss federal elections and meanwhile an integral part of the national election campaign, smartvote has produced over a million voting recommendations in the last Swiss federal elections to an active electorate of two million, potentially guiding a vast amount of voters in their choices on the ballot. In order to determine the effect of the VAA on electoral behavior, I analyze both voting preferences and choice among Swiss voters during two consecutive election periods. First, I introduce statistical techniques to adequately examine VAA effects in observational studies and use them to demonstrate that voters who used smartvote prior to the 2007 Swiss federal elections were significantly more likely to swing vote in the elections than non- users. Second, I analyze preference voting during the same election and show that the smartvote voting recommendation inclines politically knowledgeable voters to modify their ballots and cast candidate specific preference votes. Third, to further tackle the indication that smartvote use affects the preference structure of voters, I employ an experimental research design to demonstrate that voters who use the application tend to strengthen their vote propensities for their most preferred party and adapt their overall party preferences in a way that they consider more than one party as eligible vote options after engaging with the application. Finally, vote choice is examined for the 2011 Swiss federal election, showing once more that the VAA initiated a change of party choice among voters. In sum, this thesis presents empirical evidence for the transformative effect of the Swiss VAA smartvote on the electoral behavior.

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly

On the use of spatially discrete data to compute energy and mass balance

In many practical applications the state of field soils is monitored by recording the evolution of temperature and soil moisture at discrete depths. We theoretically investigate the systematic errors that arise when mass and energy balances are computed directly from these measurements. We show that, even with no measurement or model errors, large residuals might result when finite difference approximations are used to compute fluxes and storage term. To calculate the limits set by the use of spatially discrete measurements on the accuracy of balance closure, we derive an analytical solution to estimate the residual on the basis of the two key parameters: the penetration depth and the distance between the measurements. When the thickness of the control layer for which the balance is computed is comparable to the penetration depth of the forcing (which depends on the thermal diffusivity and on the forcing period) large residuals arise. The residual is also very sensitive to the distance between the measurements, which requires accurately controlling the position of the sensors in field experiments. We also demonstrate that, for the same experimental setup, mass residuals are sensitively larger than the energy residuals due to the nonlinearity of the moisture transport equation. Our analysis suggests that a careful assessment of the systematic mass error introduced by the use of spatially discrete data is required before using fluxes and residuals computed directly from field measurements.

Ectoparasite affects choice and use of roost sites in the great tit, Parus major

Many diurnal bird species roost at night in holes. As a regular visitor of a hole they are therefore a welcome host for several species of ectoparasites. The interactions of ectoparasites with the behaviour, life-history traits and population demography of their hosts are largely unknown. In the present study the effects of the haematophagous hen flea, Ceratophyllus gallinae , on the great tit's choice of winter roost site were investigated experimentally. Three experiments tested (1) whether great tits prefer a clean nestbox to one containing an old, but parasite-free nest, (2) whether they prefer a parasite-free nestbox to one infested with the haematophagous hen flea, and (3) whether they prefer not to use a nestbox when there is only an infested box available in their territory. In the first experiment there was no discrimination and both kinds of boxes were used equally often. In the second experiment the great tits clearly preferred to roost in the box without ectoparasites. In the third experiment a significantly higher proportion of the infested nestboxes were not used for roosting compared with the parasite-free boxes. Recently the validity of the conclusions drawn from nestbox studies where the naturally occurring detrimental ectoparasites are eliminated by the routine removal of old nests between breeding seasons has been questioned. This study shows that ectoparasites affect host behaviour and therefore lends support to that criticism.