“Safety and health” as a criterion in the choice of tunneling method

Risk management is of paramount importance in the success of tunnelling works and is linked to the tunnelling method and to the constraints of the works. Sequencial Excavation Method (SEM) and Tun-nel Boring Machine (TBM) method have been competing for years. This article, part of a wider study on the influence of the â Safety and Healthâ criterion in the choice of method, reviews the existing literature about the criteria usually employed to choose the tunnelling method and on the criterion â Safety and Healthâ . This crite-rion is particularly important, due to the financial impacts of work accidents and occupational diseases. This article is especially useful to the scientific and technical community, since it synthesizes the relevance of each one of the choice criteria used and it shows why â Safety and Healthâ must be a criterion in the decision mak-ing process to choose the tunnelling method.

De l'importance de la psychologie collective dans le sciences sociales: Serge Moscovici et les passions humaines

L'oeuvre de Moscovici se résume à une tentative de rapprochement du psychique et du social, ne serait-ce que parce que la rationalité et l'irrationalité sont transversales auz comportaments individuels et à l'activité sociale. En ce sens, l'individu n'est pas plus du ressort de la seule psychologie que la societé ne l'est de la seule sociologie. Simplifier la realité reviendrait à simplifier la connossaince de celle-ci. La psycho-sociologie de Moscovici nous invite donc à prendre en compte l'homme dans sa complétude, en tant que mixte de logique et de sentiments, de raison et de passions. On comprendra alors l'importance du paradigme écologique dans les sciences sociales comme forme de compréhension de ce qui relie l'homme à une entité plus vaste, le renvoyant aussi bien à la nature et à son ascendance animale qu'à la techinque et à sa destinée post-humaine.

Basel III liquidity rules : measuring the impact on portuguese small banks activity

Mestrado em Finanças

Partially supervised learning of fuzzy classification rules

Fuzzy classification, semi-supervised learning, data mining

Financial structure choice in owner-managed firms : entrepreneurial characteristics, utility of control, and the competitive context

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2011

Bestimmung von Präferenzen bei der Studiengangs- und Studienortwahl aus Sicht von Studierenden mittels Choice-Based Conjointanalyse

Diese Bachelorarbeit gliedert sich in einen theoretischen und einen praktischen Abschnitt. Zunächst werden Studien- und Berufswahlmodelle aus theoretischer Sicht betrachtet. Dabei ist festzuhalten, dass kein Ansatz existiert, der den komplexen Studienwahlprozess vollständig abbildet und erklärt. Jedoch ergänzen sich verschiedene Modelle, sodass alle bedeutenden Einflussfaktoren berücksichtigt sind. Ebenso die Conjointanalyse wird einer theoretischen Betrachtung unterzogen. Als eine Methode der Präferenzmessung wird dieses Analyseverfahren häufig eingesetzt, um die Vorziehenswürdigkeit von Produkten zu ermitteln. Sowohl im Bereich der Neuproduktentwicklung, als auch bei der Marktsegmentierung und der Preisfindung findet die Analyse Verwendung. Sehr charakteristisch für die Methodik ist, dass die Präferenzbeurteilung ganzheitlich für das Produkt erfolgt und nicht direkt einzelne Produkteigenschaften bei der Auskunftsperson abgefragt werden. Besonders relevant für diese Arbeit ist die Choice-Based Conjointanalyse. Die Vorziehenswürdigkeit von Konzepten werden basierend auf Auswahlentscheidungen von Probanden erfasst. Die Beweggründe bei der Studienortwahl aus Sicht der Studierenden an der Hochschule Anhalt werden im praktischen Abschnitt dieser Ausarbeitung mit Hilfe der Choice-Based Conjointanalyse untersucht. Dafür wurde ein Fragebogen entwickelt. Es konnte ermittelt werden, dass sowohl der Ruf der Hochschule, als auch die Heimatnähe und die Höhe des Semesterbeitrages bedeutende Einflussfaktoren bei der Studiengangwahl darstellen. Darüber hinaus werden Motive der Studiengangwahl analysiert. Festzuhalten ist, dass sowohl intrinsische Motive, aber auch extrinsische Motive von hoher Wichtigkeit sind.

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Accuracy vs. simplicity: a complex trade-off

Inductive learning aims at finding general rules that hold true in a database. Targeted learning seeks rules for the predictions of the value of a variable based on the values of others, as in the case of linear or non-parametric regression analysis. Non-targeted learning finds regularities without a specific prediction goal. We model the product of non-targeted learning as rules that state that a certain phenomenon never happens, or that certain conditions necessitate another. For all types of rules, there is a trade-off between the rule's accuracy and its simplicity. Thus rule selection can be viewed as a choice problem, among pairs of degree of accuracy and degree of complexity. However, one cannot in general tell what is the feasible set in the accuracy-complexity space. Formally, we show that finding out whether a point belongs to this set is computationally hard. In particular, in the context of linear regression, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard. Computational complexity may explain why a person is not always aware of rules that, if asked, she would find valid. This, in turn, may explain why one can change other people's minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing new information.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.