Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Consumer Focus: These Chips and Good for You: New Credit and Debit Card Chips, April 2016

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: New Credit and Debit Card Chips

Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games

On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his / her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he / she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions. Key words: cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus

Advertising in Mobile Games - A Business Model Evaluation

Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää kuinka houkuttelevan liiketoimintamahdollisuuden mobiilipelit tarjoavat mainostusalustana. Tutkimus suoritettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tutkimus aloitettiin määrittelemällä liiketoimintamalli, jonka jälkeen suoritettiin yleinen katsaus Suomen mobiilipelimarkkinoille. Tämän jälkeen arvoketju-, arvoverkko- sekä markkina-analyysin avulla selvitettiin liiketoimintamallin mahdollisuudet sekä rajoitukset. Tutkimukseen käytettiinteorettista viitekehystä joka pohjautui Hamelin liiketoimintamalliin, Porterin arvoketjuun sekä Alleenin arvoverkoon. Tutkimuksen tuloksena todettiin, että mainostaminen mobiilipeleissä tarjoaa liiketoimintamahdollisuuden ilman esteitä sentoteuttamiselle. Suomalaiset mobiilipelimarkkinat ovat kuitenkin pirstoutuneet,minkä johdosta tutkittu 'mainosten hallinta-alusta'-liiketoimintamalli aiheuttaa liian suuret integraatiokustannukset. Myös suuri määrä pelitoimittajia heikentää mallin tehokkuutta.

Pla de Prevenció d’Incendis Forestals a la Serra de Cardó (província de Tarragona)

Els incendis forestals són actualment les majors pertorbacions del sistema mediterrani, ocasionant pèrdues econòmiques, ambientals i alarma social. La nostra àrea d’estudi és la Serra de Cardó, serra prelitoral i meridional catalana representativa de l’ecosistema mediterrani, on llur règim d’incendis de baixa intensitat ha canviat en els últims anys. L’èxode rural i l' abandonament agrícola han augmentat considerablement la colonització d’aquests espais per brolles mediterrànies i masses arbrades de pi blanc, amb la conseqüent acumulació de combustible i continuïtat entre estrats. A més, l’abandonament dels aprofitaments forestals tradicionals i les polítiques medi ambientals dels últims temps, han contribuït a canviar el règim d’incendis d’aquesta zona generant sovint episodis de Grans Incendis Forestals (GIF), provocant incendis intensos, de grans proporcions i d’altes velocitats de propagació que sobrepassen la capacitat de treball dels nostres mitjans d’extinció. Partint d’una anàlisi profunda de tot el territori i per tal d’optimar la planificació territorial i la gestió forestal, analitzarem el context espacio-temporal en el que es donaren els episodis de grans incendis forestals per tal de caracteritzar el nou règim d’incendis. També analitzarem la dinàmica vegetal que afronta el territori per albirar la tendència vegetal futura. Com a resultat d’aquesta anàlisi determinarem punts estratègics de gestió i planificarem infraestructures de prevenció d’acord amb els resultats obtinguts. Analitzarem les zones d’interfície urbano-forestal i classificarem els tipus d’interfase existents, analitzarem el comportament del foc i finalment, d’acord amb els resultats obtinguts i amb la normativa vigent justificarem i pressupostarem les obres de prevenció d’incendis planificades, contribuint a la defensa de la Serra davant possibles focs forestals.

On reduced games and the lexmax solution

For a family of reduced games satisfying a monotonicity property, we introduced the reduced equal split-off set, an extension of the equal split-off set (Branzei et. al, 2006), and study its relation with the core. Regardless of the reduction operation we consider, the intersection between both sets is either empty or a singleton containing the lexmax solution (Arin et al., 2008). We also provide a procedure for computing the lexmax solution for a class of games that includes games with large core (Sharkey, 1982). [JEL Classification: C71]

Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.

A model for the evolution of reinforcement learning in fluctuating games

Many species are able to learn to associate behaviours with rewards as this gives fitness advantages in changing environments. Social interactions between population members may, however, require more cognitive abilities than simple trial-and-error learning, in particular the capacity to make accurate hypotheses about the material payoff consequences of alternative action combinations. It is unclear in this context whether natural selection necessarily favours individuals to use information about payoffs associated with nontried actions (hypothetical payoffs), as opposed to simple reinforcement of realized payoff. Here, we develop an evolutionary model in which individuals are genetically determined to use either trial-and-error learning or learning based on hypothetical reinforcements, and ask what is the evolutionarily stable learning rule under pairwise symmetric two-action stochastic repeated games played over the individual's lifetime. We analyse through stochastic approximation theory and simulations the learning dynamics on the behavioural timescale, and derive conditions where trial-and-error learning outcompetes hypothetical reinforcement learning on the evolutionary timescale. This occurs in particular under repeated cooperative interactions with the same partner. By contrast, we find that hypothetical reinforcement learners tend to be favoured under random interactions, but stable polymorphisms can also obtain where trial-and-error learners are maintained at a low frequency. We conclude that specific game structures can select for trial-and-error learning even in the absence of costs of cognition, which illustrates that cost-free increased cognition can be counterselected under social interactions.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.