Impact of Openness to Trade on Capital Formation in Developed and Emerging Markets: a Comparative Study.

Rapport de recherche

Chronic limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and oligopolistic markets: an urgent case for socialized capital

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the serious limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and urge for a shift to socialized capital before further economic deterioration leads to a succession of global conflicts. Design/methodology/approach – This conceptual paper adopts a macro perspective in presenting argument on how global, financial markets integration and capital flow liberalization have led to inadequate market and corporate governance measures. The argument is couched in a selected literature and is preceded by a proposed solution – the requirement for socialized capital. An analysis of the nature of socialized capital is outlined and the questions that require attention identified if a paradigm shift from neo-liberal capitalism is to take place. Findings – The need to urgently shift to a new philosophy of capitalism is overwhelming. Emphasized is that capital needs to adopt a socialised identity and is supported by investment horizons of 30 years or more. It is argued that non-market (e.g. state, NGOs, civil society) intervention is critical in setting appropriate frameworks within which socialized capital can operate. Research limitations/implications – This is a theoretical paper, in which questions are raised which require transparent, public debate. Originality/value – The paper presents the case for a fundamental reconsideration of present day markets, the role of capital and the influence of elites in determining the public good.

Corporate capital structure revisited: incomplete markets and default

After Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their capital structure irrelevance proposition, analysis of corporate Önancing choices involving debt and equity instruments have generally followed two trends in the literature, where models either incorporate informational asymmetries or introduce tax beneÖts in order to explain optimal capital structure determination (Myers, 2002). None of these features is present in this paper, which develops an asset pricing model with the purpose of providing a positive theory of corporate capital structure by replicating main aspects of standard contractual practice observed in real markets. Alternatively, the imperfect market structure of the economy is tailored to match what is most common in corporate reality. Allowance for default on corporate debt with an associated penalty of seizure of Örmís future cash áows by creditors is introduced, for instance. In this context, a qualitative assessment of Önancial managersídecisions is carried out through numerical procedures.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Proposals for curbing the boom-bust cycle in the supply of capital to emerging markets

Includes bibliography

Capital goods: size of markets, sectoral structure and demand prospects in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Farm-level Capital: Capital positions, structures, the dynamics of farm-level investments, capital accumulation and leverage positions. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 7, October 2011

This Factor Markets Working Paper describes and highlights the key issues of farm capital structures, the dynamics of investments and accumulation of farm capital, and the financial leverage and borrowing rates on farms in selected European countries. Data collected from the Farm Account Data Network (FADN) suggest that the European farming sector uses quite different farm business strategies, capabilities to generate capital revenues, and segmented agricultural loan market regimes. Such diverse business strategies have substantial, and perhaps more substantial than expected, implications for the financial leverage and performance of farms. Different countries adopt different approaches to evaluating agricultural assets, or the agricultural asset markets simply differ substantially depending on the country in question. This has implications for most of the financial indicators. In those countries that have seen rapidly increasing asset prices at the margin, which were revised accordingly in the accounting systems for the whole stock of assets, firm values increased significantly, even though the firms had been disinvesting. If there is an asset price bubble and it bursts, there may be serious knock-on effects for some countries.

Developments in the Agricultural and Rural Capital Market of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 9, October 2011

The undeveloped rural capital market in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is constrained by an urban–rural development gap, with limited capacities for rural development and imperfections in the rural capital market. Among the most striking hindrances are the illegal status of a large share of agricultural buildings and other real estate in rural areas, particularly on the individual family farms that prevail in the country, and the insufficient knowledge and abilities of individual farmers in applying for credit. National, EU and other donor funds are being used to improve knowledge, skills and other human resources, and to address the illegal status of buildings and facilities. In recent years, government support for agricultural, rural and regional development has been introduced to promote good agricultural practices, production and economic activity in rural areas. The elimination of imperfections and improvements to the functioning of the capital market – making access to credit and funds easier, especially for small-scale family farms and for rural development – are seen as measures contributing to agriculture and more balanced rural and regional development.

Drivers of Agricultural Physical Capital Development: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 18, February 2012

This paper aims to identify drivers of physical capital adjustments in agriculture. It begins with a review of some of the most important theories and modelling approaches regarding firms’ adjustments of physical capital, ranging from output-based models to more recent approaches that consider irreversibility and uncertainty. Thereafter, it is suggested that determinants of physical capital adjustments in agriculture can be divided into three main groups, namely drivers related to: i) expected (risk-adjusted) profit, ii) expected societal benefits and costs and iii) expected private nonpecuniary benefits and costs. The discussion that follows focuses on the determinants belonging to the first group and covers aspects related to product market conditions, technological conditions, financial conditions and the role of firm structure and organization. Furthermore, the role of subjective beliefs is emphasized. The main part of this paper is concerned with the demand side of the physical capital market and one section also briefly discusses some aspects related to supply of farm assets.