997 resultados para Brussels IIa Regulation


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Mikrodialyse, Haushuhnküken, Naloxon, DAGO, Stressvokalisation

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Helicobacter pylori, genexpression, MMP-1, human primary gastric epithelial cells

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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2010

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Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Habil.-Schr., 2012

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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

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Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2015

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Production of desirable outputs is often accompanied by undesirable by products that have damaging effects on the environment, and whose disposal is frequently regulated by public authorities. In this paper, we compute directional technology distance functions under particular assumptions concerning disposability of bads in order to test for the existence of what we call ‘complex situations’, where the biggest producer is not the greatest polluter. Furthermore, we show that how in such situations, environmental regulation could achieve an effective reduction in the aggregate level of bad outputs without reducing the production of good outputs. Finally, we illustrate our methodology with an empirical application to a sample of Spanish tile ceramic producers.

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We study a problem of adverse selection in the context of environmental regulation, where the firm may suffer from a certain degree of ignorance about its own type. In a framework like the construction of a certain infrastructure project, the presence of ignorance about its impact on the environment, can play an important role in the determination of the regulatory policy. First, an optimal contract is constructed for any exogenous level of ignorance. Second, the presence of potentially informed third-parties is studied from the perspective of the regulator, which allows us to analyze the impact on the efficiency of the contract, of the presence of environmentalists and of experts. Then, we obtain some insights on how the problem differs when the degree of ignorance is a choice variable for the firm. We finally use our results to derive policy implications concerning the existing envoronmental regulation, and the potential role of interested parties as information providers.