Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism usedin Andorra, which is called La Crema in the locallanguage. This mechanism relies on households'announced property values to determine how much ahousehold is reimbursed in the case of a fire andhow payments are apportioned among other households.The only Pareto eficient allocation reachablethrough the mechanism requires that all householdshonestly report the true value of their property.However, such honest reporting is not an equilibriumexcept in the extreme case where the property valuesare identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, thebenefits from deviating from truthful reportingvanish, and all of the non-degenerate equilibriaof the mechanism are nearly truthful andapproximately Pareto efficient.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Palvelutasosopimus toimittajan hallinnnan työkaluna Case: IT-käyttötukipalvelu

Työn tavoitteena on selvittää palvelutasosopimuksella ja sen hallinnalla saatavaa hyötyä toimittajan hallinnassa. Tutkimusongelmaa on lähdetty selvittämään tutustumalla ensin lyhyesti toimittajan hallintaan ja laajemmin palvelutasosopimuksista ja niiden hallinnasta olemassa olevaan teoria-aineistoon. Tämän teoriapohjan perusteella palvelutasosopimuksia ja niiden hallintaa on tutkittu käytännössä case-yrityksen valossa, mahdollisimman realistiseen lopputulokseen pääsemiseksi. Palvelujen ulkoistaminen tulee tulevaisuudessa lisääntymään ja tätä kautta yritysten onnistuminen markkinoilla on yhä riippuvaisempaa niiden kyvystä hallita toimittajiaan. Palvelutasosopimukset ja prosessit niiden ympärillä ovat hyödyllisiä työkaluja toimittajan suorituksen valvonnassa ja kehittämisessä sekä toimittajasuhteen luotsaamisessa kohti kumppanuussuhdetta. Tämä edellyttää kuitenkin, että kauppakumppanit sisäistävät palvelutasosopimusten kautta saavutettavat hyödyt ja sitoutuvat koko palvelutason hallintaprosessiin.

Organizational Design of R&D Activities

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and finances research leading to the innovation. In an independent structure, the firm that markets the innovation buys it from an independent research unit which is financed externally. We compare the two structures under the assumption that the research unit has some private information about the real cost of developing the new product. When development costs are negatively correlated with revenues from the innovation, the integrated structure dominates. The independent structure dominates in the opposite case.

Le hardship : vers une reconnaissance du principe par les tribunaux arbitraux du commerce international

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

Sollicitude, dépendance et lien social

La croissance de la population vieillissante en Amérique du Nord a un impact significatif sur nos politiques sociales. Ainsi, l’État québécois met à la disposition des personnes âgées une aide afin de faciliter le maintien à domicile. Qui a maintenant la responsabilité de répondre aux besoins des personnes âgées; est-ce la famille ou l’État? Si la réponse peut nous aider à formuler des politiques sociales équitables, elle nous pousse aussi à repenser le lien social à la lumière de la dépendance. Dans un premier temps nous nous pencherons sur l’évolution de l’éthique de la sollicitude pour ensuite analyser les apports des études sur la production du handicap. Puisque la problématique de la dépendance s’avère cruciale dans ce débat, les écrits de deux théoriciens français, Albert Memmi et Bernard Ennuyer, nous aideront à élucider la question de la dépendance. Nous verrons par la suite comment ces divers apports peuvent nous amener à reconceptualiser le lien social.

Impacts des migrations forcées sur les pays hôtes

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.

Competition between HMO and PPO: A Two-Sided Market Approach

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholderson one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during the last decade in the US.

El papel de las ideas en ciencia y tecnología en los primeros años de COLCIENCIAS

El presente artículo busca responder hasta qué punto pensar y participar en espacios de discusión acerca de la política de ciencia y tecnología permite resolver las tensiones propias de la interrelación de actores de la política de ciencia y tecnología, así como también legitimar la acción y decisión de la entidad llamada a diseñar la política científico-tecnológica. Con el acento puesto en las dos primeras décadas de funcionamiento de Colciencias, se concluye que la participación de los policy makers de esta entidad en las discusiones de ciencia y tecnología, así como la preocupación por pensar la ciencia y la tecnología en el entorno del modelo de desarrollo imperante en el momento, permitió una mayor consistencia y coherencia entre instrumentos y políticas y un diálogo legítimo con otras entidades y actores que por su naturaleza también implementaban políticas que afectaban a la ciencia y la tecnología.

Universidad y sociedad. Extensión universitaria, conocimiento y redes sociales

A pesar de las múltiples inflexiones que en los últimos siglos se han dado en el mundo (Kuhn, 1962), aún se mantiene el empeño de entenderlo a través de un pensamiento limitado que debe conducir a una reflexión acerca de cómo se entiende y cómo evoluciona la vida. La transformación y el cambio de paradigmas de los últimos años no son más que una manifestación de la evolución del pensamiento humano y de las visiones de la realidad (Fritjof, 2004). La extensión del conocimiento es una respuesta a la inquietud social respecto a la necesidad sentida de un cambio en los modos de actuar y en las estructuras del pensamiento (innovación social), en la que se desarrolle un proceso de trasformación de las instituciones y la aplicación de los valores, para reorientar el curso del desarrollo humano, es decir, el curso de la realidad, para lo cual es necesaria una nueva visión de la vida.

Robust Control of Systems Subjected to Uncertain Disturbances and Actuator Dynamics

Esta tesis está enfocada al diseño y validación de controladores robustos que pueden reducir de una manera efectiva las vibraciones structurales producidas por perturbaciones externas tales como terremotos, fuertes vientos o cargas pesadas. Los controladores están diseñados basados en teorías de control tradicionalamente usadas en esta area: Teoría de estabilidad de Lyapunov, control en modo deslizante y control clipped-optimal, una técnica reciente mente introducida : Control Backstepping y una que no había sido usada antes: Quantitative Feedback Theory. La principal contribución al usar las anteriores técnicas, es la solución de problemas de control estructural abiertos tales como dinámicas de actuador, perturbaciones desconocidas, parametros inciertos y acoplamientos dinámicos. Se utilizan estructuras típicas para validar numéricamente los controladores propuestos. Especificamente las estructuras son un edificio de base aislada, una plataforma estructural puente-camión y un puente de 2 tramos, cuya configuración de control es tal que uno o mas problemas abiertos están presentes. Se utilizan tres prototipos experimentales para implementar los controladores robustos propuestos, con el fin de validar experimentalmente su efectividad y viabilidad. El principal resultado obtenido con la presente tesis es el diseño e implementación de controladores estructurales robustos que resultan efectivos para resolver problemas abiertos en control estructural tales como dinámicas de actuador, parámetros inciertos, acoplamientos dinámicos, limitación de medidas y perturbaciones desconocidas.