Two new game birds from Peru.

v.39:no.32(1959)

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

HARNESSING iNKT CELLS WITH RECOMBINANT CD1d FUSION PROTEINS TO REDIRECT INNATE AND ADAPTIVE IMMUNITY TO THE TUMOR

Les thérapies du cancer, comme la radiothérapie et la chimiothérapie, sont couramment utilisées mais ont de nombreux effets secondaires. Ces thérapies invasives pour le patient nécessitent d'être améliorées et de nombreuses avancées ont été faites afin d'adapter et de personnaliser le traitement du cancer. L'immunothérapie a pour but de renforcer le système immunitaire du patient et de le rediriger de manière spécifique contre la tumeur. Dans notre projet, nous activons les lymphocytes Invariant Natural Killer T (iNKT) afin de mettre en place une immunothérapie innovatrice contre le cancer. Les cellules iNKT sont une unique sous-population de lymphocytes T qui ont la particularité de réunir les propriétés de l'immunité innée ainsi qu'adaptative. En effet, les cellules iNKT expriment à leur surface des molécules présentes aussi sur les cellules tueuses NK, caractéristique de l'immunité innée, ainsi qu'un récepteur de cellules T (TCR) qui représente l'immunité adaptative. Les cellules iNKT reconnaissent avec leur TCR des antigènes présentés par la molécule CD1d. Les antigènes sont des protéines, des polysaccharides ou des lipides reconnus par les cellules du système immunitaire ou les anticorps pour engendrer une réponse immunitaire. Dans le cas des cellules iNKT, l'alpha-galactosylceramide (αGC) est un antigène lipidique fréquemment utilisé dans les études cliniques comme puissant activateur. Après l'activation des cellules iNKT avec l'αGC, celles-ci produisent abondamment et rapidement des cytokines. Ces cytokines sont des molécules agissant comme des signaux activateurs d'autres cellules du système immunitaire telles que les cellules NK et les lymphocytes T. Cependant, les cellules iNKT deviennent anergiques après un seul traitement avec l'αGC c'est à dire qu'elles ne peuvent plus être réactivées, ce qui limite leur utilisation dans l'immunothérapie du cancer. Dans notre groupe, Stirnemann et al ont publié une molécule recombinante innovante, composée de la molécule CD1d soluble et chargée avec le ligand αGC (αGC/sCD1d). Cette protéine est capable d'activer les cellules iNKT tout en évitant l'anergie. Dans le système immunitaire, les anticorps sont indispensables pour combattre une infection bactérienne ou virale. En effet, les anticorps ont la capacité de reconnaître et lier spécifiquement un antigène et permettent l'élimination de la cellule qui exprime cet antigène. Dans le domaine de l'immunothérapie, les anticorps sont utilisés afin de cibler des antigènes présentés seulement par la tumeur. Ce procédé permet de réduire efficacement les effets secondaires lors du traitement du cancer. Nous avons donc fusionné la protéine recombinante αGC/CD1d à un fragment d'anticorps qui reconnaît un antigène spécifique des cellules tumorales. Dans une étude préclinique, nous avons démontré que la protéine αGC/sCD1d avec un fragment d'anticorps dirigé contre la tumeur engendre une meilleure activation des cellules iNKT et entraîne un effet anti-tumeur prolongé. Cet effet anti-tumeur est augmenté comparé à une protéine αGC/CD1d qui ne cible pas la tumeur. Nous avons aussi montré que l'activation des cellules iNKT avec la protéine αGC/sCD1d-anti-tumeur améliore l'effet anti- tumoral d'un vaccin pour le cancer. Lors d'expériences in vitro, la protéine αGC/sCD1d-anti- tumeur permet aussi d'activer les cellules humaines iNKT et ainsi tuer spécifiquement les cellules tumorales humaines. La protéine αGC/sCD1d-anti-tumeur représente une alternative thérapeutique prometteuse dans l'immunothérapie du cancer. - Les cellules Invariant Natural Killer T (iNKT), dont les effets anti-tumoraux ont été démontrés, sont de puissants activateurs des cellules Natural Killer (NK), des cellules dendritiques (DC) et des lymphocytes T. Cependant, une seule injection du ligand de haute affinité alpha-galactosylceramide (αGC) n'induit une forte activation des cellules iNKT que durant une courte période. Celle-ci est alors suivie d'une longue phase d'anergie, limitant ainsi leur utilisation pour la thérapie. Comme alternative prometteuse, nous avons montré que des injections répétées d'αGC chargé sur une protéine recombinante de CD1d soluble (αGC/sCD1d) chez la souris entraînent une activation prolongée des cellules iNKT, associée à une production continue de cytokine. De plus, le maintien de la réactivité des cellules iNKT permet de prolonger l'activité anti-tumorale lorsque la protéine αGC/sCD1d est fusionnée à un fragment d'anticorps (scFv) dirigé contre la tumeur. L'inhibition de la croissance tumorale n'est optimale que lorsque les souris sont traitées avec la protéine αGC/sCD1d-scFv ciblant la tumeur, la protéine αGC/sCD1d-scFv non-appropriée étant moins efficace. Dans le système humain, les protéines recombinantes αGC/sCD1d-anti-HER2 et anti-CEA sont capables d'activer et de faire proliférer des cellules iNKT à partir de PBMCs issues de donneurs sains. De plus, la protéine αGC/sCD1d-scFv a la capacité d'activer directement des clones iNKT humains en l'absence de cellules présentatrices d'antigènes (CPA), contrairement au ligand αGC libre. Mais surtout, la lyse des cellules tumorales par les iNKT humaines n'est obtenue que lorsqu'elles sont incubées avec la protéine αGC/sCD1d-scFv anti- tumeur. En outre, la redirection de la cytotoxicité des cellules iNKT vers la tumeur est supérieure à celle obtenue avec une stimulation par des CPA chargées avec l'αGC. Afin d'augmenter les effets anti-tumoraux, nous avons exploité la capacité des cellules iNKT à activer l'immunité adaptive. Pour ce faire, nous avons combiné l'immunothérapie NKT/CD1d avec un vaccin anti-tumoral composé d'un peptide OVA. Des effets synergiques ont été obtenus lorsque les traitements avec la protéine αGC/sCD1d-anti-HER2 étaient associés avec le CpG ODN comme adjuvant pour la vaccination avec le peptide OVA. Ces effets ont été observés à travers l'activation de nombreux lymphocytes T CD8+ spécifique de la tumeur, ainsi que par la forte expansion des cellules NK. Les réponses, innée et adaptive, élevées après le traitement avec la protéine αGC/sCD1d-anti-HER2 combinée au vaccin OVA/CpG ODN étaient associées à un fort ralentissement de la croissance des tumeurs B16- OVA-HER2. Cet effet anti-tumoral corrèle avec l'enrichissement des lymphocytes T CD8+ spécifiques observé à la tumeur. Afin d'étendre l'application des protéines αGC/sCD1d et d'améliorer leur efficacité, nous avons développé des fusions CD1d alternatives. Premièrement, une protéine αGC/sCD1d dimérique, qui permet d'augmenter l'avidité de la molécule CD1d pour les cellules iNKT. Dans un deuxième temps, nous avons fusionné la protéine αGC/sCD1d avec un scFv dirigé contre le récepteur 3 du facteur de croissance pour l'endothélium vasculaire (VEGFR-3), afin de cibler l'environnement de la tumeur. Dans l'ensemble, ces résultats démontrent que la thérapie médiée par la protéine recombinante αGC/sCD1d-scFv est une approche prometteuse pour rediriger l'immunité innée et adaptive vers le site tumoral. - Invariant Natural Killer T cells (iNKT) are potent activators of Natural Killer (NK), dendritic cells (DC) and T lymphocytes, and their anti-tumor activities have been well demonstrated. However, a single injection of the high affinity CD1d ligand alpha-galactosylceramide (αGC) leads to a strong but short-lived iNKT cell activation followed by a phase of long-term anergy, limiting the therapeutic use of this ligand. As a promising alternative, we have demonstrated that when αGC is loaded on recombinant soluble CD1d molecules (αGC/sCD1d), repeated injections in mice led to the sustained iNKT cell activation associated with continued cytokine secretion. Importantly, the retained reactivity of iNKT cell led to prolonged antitumor activity when the αGC/sCD1d was fused to an anti-tumor scFv fragments. Optimal inhibition of tumor growth was obtained only when mice were treated with the tumor-targeted αGC/CD1d-scFv fusion, whereas the irrelevant αGC/CD1d-scFv fusion was less efficient. When tested in a human system, the recombinant αGC/sCD1d-anti-HER2 and -anti-CEA fusion proteins were able to expand iNKT cells from PBMCs of healthy donors. Furthermore, the αGC/sCD1d-scFv fusion had the capacity to directly activate human iNKT cells clones without the presence of antigen-presenting cells (APCs), in contrast to the free αGC ligand. Most importantly, tumor cell killing by human iNKT cells was obtained only when co- incubated with the tumor targeted sCD1d-antitumor scFv, and their direct tumor cytotoxicity was superior to the bystander killing obtained with αGC-loaded APCs stimulation. To further enhance the anti-tumor effects, we exploited the ability of iNKT cells to transactivate the adaptive immunity, by combining the NKT/CD1d immunotherapy with a peptide cancer vaccine. Interestingly, synergistic effects were obtained when the αGC/sCD1d- anti-HER2 fusion treatment was combined with CpG ODN as adjuvant for the OVA peptide vaccine, as seen by higher numbers of activated antigen-specific CD8 T cells and NK cells, as compared to each regimen alone. The increased innate and adaptive immune responses upon combined tumor targeted sCD1d-scFv treatment and OVA/CpG vaccine were associated with a strong delay in B16-OVA-HER2 melanoma tumor growth, which correlated with an enrichment of antigen-specific CD8 cells at the tumor site. In order to extend the application of the CD1d fusion, we designed alternative CD1d fusion proteins. First, a dimeric αGC/sCD1d-Fc fusion, which permits to augment the avidity of the CD1d for iNKT cells and second, an αGC/sCD1d fused to an anti vascular endothelial growth factor receptor-3 (VEGFR-3) scFv, in order to target tumor stroma environment. Altogether, these results demonstrate that the iNKT-mediated immunotherapy via recombinant αGC/sCD1d-scFv fusion is a promising approach to redirect the innate and adaptive antitumor immune response to the tumor site.

How the gut links innate and adaptive immunity.

Mucosal surfaces represent the main sites in which environmental microorganisms and antigens interact with the host. Sentinel cells, including epithelial cells, lumenal macrophages, and intraepithelial dendritic cells, continuously sense the environment and coordinate defenses for the protection of mucosal tissues. The mucosal epithelial cells are crucial actors in coordinating defenses. They sense the outside world and respond to environmental signals by releasing chemokines and cytokines that recruit inflammatory and immune cells to control potential infectious agents and to attract cells able to trigger immune responses. Among immune cells, dendritic cells (DC) play a key role in controlling adaptive immune responses, due to their capacity to internalize foreign materials and to present antigens to naive T and B lymphocytes, locally or in draining organized lymphoid tissues. Immune cells recruited in epithelial tissues can, in turn, act upon the epithelial cells and change their phenotype in a process referred to as epithelial metaplasia.

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Notes on Agents’ Behavioral Rules Under Adaptive Learning and Studies of Monetary Policy

These notes try to clarify some discussions on the formulation of individual intertemporal behavior under adaptive learning in representative agent models. First, we discuss two suggested approaches and related issues in the context of a simple consumption-saving model. Second, we show that the analysis of learning in the NewKeynesian monetary policy model based on “Euler equations” provides a consistent and valid approach.

Adaptive Continuous time Markov Chain Approximation Model to General Jump-Diusions

We propose a non-equidistant Q rate matrix formula and an adaptive numerical algorithm for a continuous time Markov chain to approximate jump-diffusions with affine or non-affine functional specifications. Our approach also accommodates state-dependent jump intensity and jump distribution, a flexibility that is very hard to achieve with other numerical methods. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the proposed Markov chain transition density converges to the one given by the likelihood expansion formula as in Ait-Sahalia (2008). We provide numerical examples for European stock option pricing in Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1976) and Kou (2002).

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Automatic front-crawl temporal phase detection using adaptive filtering of inertial signals

This study introduces a novel approach for automatic temporal phase detection and inter-arm coordination estimation in front-crawl swimming using inertial measurement units (IMUs). We examined the validity of our method by comparison against a video-based system. Three waterproofed IMUs (composed of 3D accelerometer, 3D gyroscope) were placed on both forearms and the sacrum of the swimmer. We used two underwater video cameras in side and frontal views as our reference system. Two independent operators performed the video analysis. To test our methodology, seven well-trained swimmers performed three 300 m trials in a 50 m indoor pool. Each trial was in a different coordination mode quantified by the index of coordination. We detected different phases of the arm stroke by employing orientation estimation techniques and a new adaptive change detection algorithm on inertial signals. The difference of 0.2 +/- 3.9% between our estimation and video-based system in assessment of the index of coordination was comparable to experienced operators' difference (1.1 +/- 3.6%). The 95% limits of agreement of the difference between the two systems in estimation of the temporal phases were always less than 7.9% of the cycle duration. The inertial system offers an automatic easy-to-use system with timely feedback for the study of swimming.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.