Managerial incentives for mergers

We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeover decisions. We show that the optimalcontract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under bothquantity and price competition. This result is in contrast to the previousliterature and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rivalfirms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. \\However, as a side--effect of such a contract, the manager might take overmore rivals than would be profitable.

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1998

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1998

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1999

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 1999

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2000

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2000

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2001

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2001

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2002

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2002

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2003

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2003

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2004

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2004

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2005

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2005

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2007

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2007

Iowa Individual Income Tax School District, Tax Year 1997

Iowa School District Surtax Report 1997

Iowa Individual Income Tax School District, Tax Year 1998

Iowa School District Surtax Report 1998

Iowa Individual Income Tax School District Report, Tax Year 1999

Iowa School District Surtax Report 1999