The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism

Household Debt in Europe’s Periphery: The dangers of a prolonged recession. ECRI Commentary No. 12, 22 November 2012

The second-dip recession in Europe’s periphery has created a poisonous mix, which risks threatening further the financial system and the economy. Against this background, this ECRI Commentary argues that time matters in the household deleveraging cycle and that a swift recovery is one of its most vital parts. The paper also assesses the extent to which self-feeding phenomena related to household debt have already materialised and evaluates the risks for countries that have so far been spared their full effects. It also offers a theoretical policy response towards a more sustainable household credit sector and overall economic recovery.

‘Leger est aprendre mes fort est arendre’: wool, debt, and the dispersal of Pipewell Abbey (1280-1330)

It has long been known that English Cistercian monasteries often sold their wool in advance to foreign merchants in the late thirteenth century. The abbey of Pipewell in Northamptonshire features in a number of such contracts with Cahorsin merchants. This paper looks again at these contracts in the context of over 200 other such agreements found in the governmental records. Why did Pipewell descend into penury over this fifty year period? This case study demonstrates that the promise of ready cash for their most valuable commodity led such abbots to make ambitious agreements – taking on yet more debt to service existing creditors – that would lead to their eventual bankruptcy.

The economic consequences of mortgage debt

Unsurprisingly, a great deal of attention has been paid to the economic consequences of the credit crunch. However, this paper shows that the credit crunch was preceded by a strong build-up of mortgage debt internationally, which, in the long run, could turn out to be more significant than the credit crunch itself. Indeed, the debt build-up suggests that the credit crunch is more likely to reoccur, because highly-indebted households have weaker buffers to withstand unexpected shocks to their incomes or to interest rates. The paper presents a model that can explain the debt build-up and changes to the distribution of debt between existing owners and first-time buyers, which hinders access to home-ownership for the latter, even amongst those households who would be considered as credit-worthy.