247 resultados para referendum
Resumo:
The EU’s October summit was dominated by one issue; the migration and refugee crisis, with EU leaders intent on putting on a public display of unity after weeks of bitter arguments, and concentrating on fire-fighting and immediate measures to tackle the most pressing reasons for, and impacts of, the crisis. Longer-term measures to address some of the root causes of increased migratory flows, support for the integration of newly arrived refugees or the introduction of new channels of legal migration, were not discussed. The Summit also spent little time on two issues that had originally been expected to be a key part of the agenda: the forthcoming British referendum on EU membership, where irritation with the slow pace of talks and British vagueness about its demands were in evidence; and the governance of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), where EU leaders missed another opportunity for a thorough debate about future perspectives on the basis of the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’.
Resumo:
After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour.
Resumo:
Given the potential impact on the EU, the UK‘s in/out referendum and the associated reform agenda should be high up the Brussels agenda. But, curiously, so far there has been little obvious activity in Brussels, with few signs that it has the attention of the EU leadership. During the October Summit there was only a very short discussion of the UK referendum, with David Cameron pledging to set out the UK’s specific issues to be addressed (the EU reform agenda) in writing to President Tusk by early November, which he duly did on 10 November.
Resumo:
Beyond the drama of the European Council summit of 18-19 February 2016, what became clear was the fundamental desire on the part of the leaders of all 28 EU member states to agree a deal on the British government’s demands for a renegotiated settlement on the UK’s relationship within the European Union. The deal has provided David Cameron with the political capital he needed to call a date for the in/out referendum and to lead a campaign for the UK to stay in the EU. Yet, for all the technical reforms packed into it, the deal is neither a crowd pleaser nor a vote winner. It does, however, mark a watershed acknowledgement that EU integration is not a one-directional process of ‘ever closer union’. In this CEPS Special Report, Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans analyse the substance of the “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union” and shed light on its legal character. They contextualise this EU deal to avoid Brexit, and draw on the conclusions reached in a simulation of European Council negotiations between representatives of think tanks in the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), conducted by CEPS and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in October 2015.
Resumo:
Following the agreement made by Prime Minister David Cameron with the EU on 18-19 February 2016, the day for the referendum for the UK to remain in or leave the EU is set for 23 June 2016. This will be the most important decision taken by the British people in half a century, and whose consequences will live on for another half century. The first edition of this book, published in March 2015, laid the foundations for any objective assessment of the workings of the EU and the UK’s place in it. It was widely acclaimed and rated as “a myth-breaking exercise of the best kind”. This second edition adds a substantial new chapter following Cameron’s agreement with the EU and announcement of the referendum. It reviews both the ‘Plan A’, namely the status quo for the UK in the EU as amended by the new agreement, and three variants of a ‘Plan B’ for secession. The key point is that the ‘leave’ camp have not done their homework or ‘due diligence’ to specify the post-secession scenario, or how the British government would face up to the challenges that this would bring. The authors therefore do the ‘leave’ camp’s homework for them, setting out three Plan Bs more concretely and in more depth than the ‘leave’ camp have been able or wanted to do, or any other source has done. The book is therefore unique and essential reading for anyone concerned with the fateful choice that lies soon ahead.
Resumo:
On 9 May 2016, in a further attempt to discourage the British public opinion from opting for their country’s abandonment of the European Union (EU) in the ‘in/out’ referendum on 23 June, Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the UK has regretted "turning its back" on Europe in the past, and that the EU had "helped reconcile" countries and maintain peace on the Old Continent.
Resumo:
From the Executive Summary. A majority of Europeans would like the UK to remain a member of the European Union (EU), but at the same time they do not think that a Brexit would be the end of Europe. Whereas age or gender do not have a pronounced effect on how one views these matter, one factor clearly does: the more people support their own country’s membership in the EU, the more they want the UK to remain a member as well. The opposite is not true, however. Eurosceptics are not rooting for the UK to leave. These public opinion trends are demonstrated by the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s latest eupinions survey. eupinions conducts regular polls in all European member states to explore what European citizens think about current political issues. The latest wave of the survey is devoted to their views on the British referendum on membership in the EU.
Resumo:
A guide to information sources on the 'Brexit Debate' in the United Kingdom - the decision to hold a referendum in the United Kingdom on the 23 June 2016 as to whether the country should remain or leave the European Union. The guide is a structured listing of information sources from the EU, the UK government, UK Parliament, the main campaigning groups, think tanks, news sources and other sources on this important topic. Note that the images within the guide are all hyperlinks to the full text of the sources. The guides is being constantly updated during 2016.
Resumo:
In a post-imperial burst to define the boundaries of its sovereignty, Britannia is ruling the waves again, albeit in the form of air time devoted to the fallout from its referendum vote rather than in a show of force from its flotilla. It was with disbelief and sorrow that the UK’s partners in Europe and the rest of the world woke up to the news of the British Leave vote in the referendum on its EU membership. The prospect of a Brexit has sent shock waves throughout the international financial and political system and is set to occupy media debate for months to come.
Resumo:
I am still trying to process the shock of the UK referendum, which has dealt a historic blow to the European Union and has alerted us to the danger of the wave of anti-establishment and anti-elite sentiments shaking up developed nations, and bringing about disastrous decisions that cannot be easily reversed. These movements are present in many European countries; we cannot underestimate the dangers of tumbling down the slippery slope of nationalism, which could put the very survival of the Union into question. A response from the EU, or from a smaller circle of its founding or main members, is necessary – as long as we can identify meaningful goals.
Resumo:
The EU Summit and the separate meeting of the EU27 without the UK on 28/29 June 2016 demonstrated that the EU is in limbo. Following the initial shock, frustration and anger after the unexpected result of the UK ‘in/out’ referendum, the future relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) monopolised the meetings of EU leaders. The EU has entered uncharted waters and leaders are struggling to figure out how exactly to deal with the manifold (potential) consequences of the ‘Brexit crisis’. Despite the many uncertainties, the EU27 managed to reach some common lines, trying to convey four key messages, although the final outcome of the crisis and its effects on the Union’s overall future are still very unclear:
Resumo:
Introduction. With the dust barely settled on the Brexit referendum, a messy legal picture has emerged. Among the many challenges are what, when and how exactly the UK’s withdrawal from the EU should be negotiated. In truth, the way the divorce procedure has been regulated under Article 50 TEU leaves much to be desired. Gaps left by the EU legislator will have to be filled rather swiftly by political elites and lawyers. To the EU and its member states, only the rudimentary aspects of withdrawal are clear. In the UK, however, even the staunchest proponents of Vote Leave seem to have been caught off-guard, with no actionable plan for how to handle Brexit – only visions of alternatives to EU membership that are unlikely to be acceptable to the EU27. The fact that alternatives to membership had not been considered seriously prior to the referendum is perplexing, and underlines the impression that the entire exercise was a stroke of irresponsible political chutzpah.
Resumo:
Much has been made of the divide that opened up in 2015 between eastern and western member states as a result of acrimonious discussions on how to handle the refugee crisis and distribute asylum applicants across the EU. Against the prevailing political sentiment in certain member state capitals, Germany and France pushed through a plan devised by the European Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees, by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Rather than creating an east/west divide, however, the vote split the group of (relatively) new Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) of the EU into two factions: Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the plan, whereas several other CEECs, namely Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, joined the controversial motion on the side of the other (northern, southern and western) member states. Finland abstained. Few member states have shifted their positions in the meantime. If anything, in fact, they have coalesced among the Visegrad 4, following a change of government in Poland; and they have hardened, as a result of new proposals by the Commission to fine member states that refuse to accept refugees. With Hungary’s referendum on the Commission’s relocation scheme scheduled for October 2nd, tensions are set to intensify even further.
Resumo:
There has been much debate about the demographic factors that contributed to the outcome of the UK’s referendum on its membership of the EU. Two aspects command special attention. First, there are marked differences between young and old generations in the preferences shown for remaining in the EU. While the former predominantly voted to remain, a great majority of the latter voted to leave. On the other hand, voter turnout revealed the opposite trend: about 83% of UK citizens aged 65 and older voted, whereas only 36% of those aged 18-24 cast their vote (Figure 1).
Resumo:
Britain’s referendum on EU membership revealed a country divided; while the United Kingdom voted to leave by 52%, Scotland voted by 62% to remain in the EU, putting the question of Scottish independence back on the table. The Scottish government says that Scotland should not be taken out of the EU against the will of its people, and that a second referendum on independence is “highly likely”. Although the Scottish people voted against independence in a referendum in 2014, opinion polls currently suggest that a majority in Scotland wants another referendum, and would vote for independence. In this Policy Brief, Graham Avery looks at how the Scottish question relates to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; what factors have changed since the Scottish people voted against independence in 2014 and what Scotland‘s chances are of remaining in the EU.