Seniority-based pay: is it used as a motivation device?

The purpose of this article is to explain what factors determine the use of seniority-based pay for production workers in Spanish manufacturing industry. The data used in order to achieve these objectives was taken from 774 Spanish industrial plants. The estimation of several ordered probit models enabled us to see that in firms where it was more costly for management to engage in opportunistic behaviour, deferred payment shows a negative relation to the use of devices, like monitoring or incentive payment, designed to align workers’ objectives with those of the company.

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

(When) would i lie to you? comment on? deception: the role of consequences?

This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005,American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy?s data cannot reject the hipótesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person?s decisión of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial differences in behavior between our sub jects and Gneezy?s sub jects.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Some go without a cigarette: characteristics of cannabis users who have never smoked tobacco.

OBJECTIVES: To estimate the prevalence of youth who use cannabis but have never been tobacco smokers and to assess the characteristics that differentiate them from those using both substances or neither substance. DESIGN: School survey. SETTING: Postmandatory schools. PARTICIPANTS: A total of 5263 students (2439 females) aged 16 to 20 years divided into cannabis-only smokers (n = 455), cannabis and tobacco smokers (n = 1703), and abstainers (n = 3105). OUTCOME MEASURES: Regular tobacco and cannabis use; and personal, family, academic, and substance use characteristics. RESULTS: Compared with those using both substances, cannabis-only youth were younger (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 0.82) and more likely to be male (AOR, 2.19), to play sports (AOR, 1.64), to live with both parents (AOR, 1.33), to be students (AOR, 2.56), and to have good grades (AOR, 1.57) and less likely to have been drunk (AOR, 0.55), to have started using cannabis before the age of 15 years (AOR, 0.71), to have used cannabis more than once or twice in the previous month (AOR, 0.64), and to perceive their pubertal timing as early (AOR, 0.59). Compared with abstainers, they were more likely to be male (AOR, 2.10), to have a good relationship with friends (AOR, 1.62), to be sensation seeking (AOR, 1.32), and to practice sports (AOR, 1.37) and less likely to have a good relationship with their parents (AOR, 0.59). They were more likely to attend high school (AOR, 1.43), to skip class (AOR, 2.28), and to have been drunk (AOR, 2.54) or to have used illicit drugs (AOR, 2.28). CONCLUSIONS: Cannabis-only adolescents show better functioning than those who also use tobacco. Compared with abstainers, they are more socially driven and do not seem to have psychosocial problems at a higher rate.

Estudio de sincronización cooperativa en redes de sensores

En este informe se estudia cómo es posible utilizar redes de sensores inalámbricos (WSN), para la localización de determinados eventos. Se hace un estudio previo de cómo una red de sensores puede llegar a estar sincronizada de una manera cooperativa, interactuando todos los sensores de la red entre sí. Primero se realiza el estudio para la sincronización de dos sensores con frecuencias diferentes, viéndose los parámetros que intervienen para que esta sincronización se realice con éxito, y también los efectos que en ella se produce al añadirle ruido. Seguidamente, se realiza el estudio para la sincronización de redes de N sensores, de manera que interactúen entre ellos de forma cooperativa. Se observan las características de la sincronización cuando todos los sensores llegan a consenso y, después, se busca la forma para que el consenso tienda hacia un valor determinado por mutuo acuerdo de los sensores. Finalmente, a partir de las características obtenidas en el consenso de N sensores, se realiza una aplicación práctica para la localización de eventos por medio del consenso de estas redes de sensores inalámbricos.

I have faith in my thing, you know what I mean? Mixed method elements on individual investments on religious markets.

In contemporary society, religious signification and secular systems mix and influence each other. Holistic conceptions of a world in which man is integrated harmoniously with nature meet representations of a world run by an immanent God. On the market of the various systems, the individual goes from one system to another, following his immediate needs and expectations without necessarily leaving any marks in a meaningful long term system. This article presents the first results of an ongoing research in Switzerland on contemporary religion focusing on (new) paths of socialization of modern that individuals and the various (non-) belief systems that they simultaneously develop

Flying High and Laying Low in the Public and Private Sectors: A Comparison of Pay Differentials for Full-Time Male Employees in Britain

Using new linked employee-employer data for Britain in 2004, this paper shows that, on average, full-time male public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points more than their private sector counterparts. Decomposition analysis reveals that the majority of this pay premium is associated with public sector employees having individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to their working in higher paid occupations. Further focussing analysis on the highly skilled and unskilled occupations in both sectors, reveals evidence of workplace segregation positively impacting on earnings in the private sector for the highly skilled, and in the public sector for the unskilled. Substantial earnings gaps between the highly skilled and unskilled are found, and the unexplained components in these gaps are very similar regardless of sector.

Public Sector Pay in Finland

This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within the public sector.

Effects of Experience, Knowledge and Signals on Willingness to Pay for a Public Good

This paper compares how increases in experience versus increases in knowledge about a public good affect willingness to pay (WTP) for its provision. This is challenging because while consumers are often certain about their previous experiences with a good, they may be uncertain about the accuracy of their knowledge. We therefore design and conduct a field experiment in which treated subjects receive a precise and objective signal regarding their knowledge about a public good before estimating their WTP for it. Using data for two different public goods, we show qualitative equivalence of the effect of knowledge and experience on valuation for a public good. Surprisingly, though, we find that the causal effect of objective signals about the accuracy of a subject’s knowledge for a public good can dramatically affect their valuation for it: treatment causes an increase of $150-$200 in WTP for well-informed individuals. We find no such effect for less informed subjects. Our results imply that WTP estimates for public goods are not only a function of true information states of the respondents but beliefs about those information states.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.