Co-Movement, Spillovers and Excess Returns in Global Bond Markets

This paper investigates global term structure dynamics using a Bayesian hierarchical factor model augmented with macroeconomic fundamentals. More than half of the variation in bond yields of seven advanced economies is due to global co-movement, which is mainly attributed to shocks to non-fundamentals. Global fundamentals, especially global inflation, affect yields through a ‘policy channel’ and a ‘risk compensation channel’, but the effects through two channels are offset. This evidence explains the unsatisfactory performance of fundamentals-driven term structure models. Our approach delineates asymmetric spillovers in global bond markets connected to diverging monetary policies. The proposed model is robust as identified factors has significant explanatory power of excess returns. The finding that global inflation uncertainty is useful in explaining realized excess returns does not rule out regime changing as a source of non-fundamental fluctuations.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Markets and linguistic diversity

The choice of language is a crucial decision for firms competing in cultural goods and media markets with a bilingual or multilingual consumer base. To the extent that multilingual consumers have preferences over the intrinsic characteristics (content) as well as over the language of the product, we can examine the efficiency of market outcomes regarding linguistic diversity. In this paper, I extend the spokes model and introduce language as an additional dimension of product differentiation. I show that: (i) if firms supply their product in a single language (the adoption model) then the degree of linguistic diversity is inefficiently low, and (ii) if some firms supply more than one linguistic version (the translation model) then in principle the market outcome may exhibit insufficient or excessive linguistic diversity. However, excessive diversity is associated to markets where the fraction of products in the minority language is disproportionately high with respect to the relative size of the linguistic minority.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Driving competition in local gasoline markets

Relevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other.

Effect of irrigation water and processing on the microbial quality of lettuces produced and sold on markets in Dakar (Senegal)

The aim of this survey is to assess the microbiological impact of irrigation water on lettuces produced on two urban agricultural sites and sold on markets; 6 and 7%, respectively, of lettuces coming from the sites of Pikine and Patte d'Oie were Salmonella spp. positive. Lettuces irrigated with shallow groundwater (''Ceanes'' water) were more contaminated (8% at both Pikine and Patte d'Oie sites) compared to those irrigated with wastewater (4% at Pikine) or well water (5% at Patte d'Oie). As for the lettuces in marketplaces, their contamination seems to depend on the type of treatment occurring before sale. Lettuces previously washed in the ``Ceanes'' were more contaminated than those rinsed with tap water at the marketplace. Salmonella spp. have been isolated from all marketplaces. However, the rates of contamination in markets surrounding Patte d'Oie are higher (9 and 11% at Grand Yoff and Dalifort) than those surrounding Pikine (4 and 2% at Zinc and Sham) or Rufisque, the control (2%). Our results confirm that the reuse of wastewater in irrigation is an alternative to animal manure. Its risk of microbial contamination can be significantly reduced by washing the vegetables with tap water before they are sold. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.