The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the emerging markets

A presente dissertação investiga a relação empírica entre a crise financeira de 2007-2009, a crise da dívida soberana de 2010-2012 e a recente desaceleração dos mercados de capitais nos mercados emergentes. A exposição dos mercados emergentes à crise nos desenvolvidos é quantificada através de um modelo de interdependência de factores. Os resultados mostram que estes sofreram, de facto, um choque provocado por ambas as crises. No entanto, este foi um choque de curta duração enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos ainda lutavam com as consequências resultantes das sucessivas crises financeiras. A análise do modelo mostra ainda que após a crise da divida soberana, enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos iniciam a sua recuperação, os emergentes desaceleram o seu crescimento. De forma a completar a análise do modelo foi efectuado um estudo sobre a influência dos fluxos de capitais entre os mercados emergentes e desenvolvidos na direcção do seu crescimento, revelando que existe uma relação entre estes dois eventos.

The importance of firms' strategic resources and capabilities in crisis situations

The general idea of this research is to analyze overall firm performance before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The main question is: What kind of strategies did companies adopt that led to positive business performance after the crisis? Are there any particular competitive advantages that bring better performance in the case of an economic downturn? This research focuses on competitive advantage gained by resource-based view attributes of a product (quality, durability and prestige) and dynamic capabilities (strategic flexibility in product development and technological innovation ability). The economic crisis setting provides a proper background to analyze the competitive advantage strategies in a dynamic, low-probability environment to determine which are most worth adopting in the business world. I employ an OLS regression analysis in order to measure the business performance of 136 Brazilian firms across four years – 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012. The findings indicate that even though all of the strategic resources and capabilities positively influence firm performance in expansionary periods, only the superior product characteristics are pertinent in surviving an economic downturn.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Panorama de la Inserción Internacional de América Latina y el Caribe 2008-2009: crisis y espacios de cooperación regional

Incluye Bibliografía

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2008-2009: Crisis and opportunities for regional cooperation

Incluye Bibliografía

Financial globalization and the emerging economies

Includes bibliography

The reactions of the Governments of the Americas to the international crisis: follow-up to policy measures adopted up to 31 December 2011. (Preliminary version)

Includes Bibliography

International trade in Latina America and the Caribbean 2009: crisis and recovery

Includes bibliography

The Role of Tax Policy in the Context of the Global Crisis: consequences and prospects

Includes bibliography

Globalization of financial markets: implications for the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Istmo Centroamericano y República Dominicana: desafíos de la crisis global al crecimiento agropecuario

Incluye Bibliografía

Insurance underwriter or financial development fund: what role for reserve pooling in Latin America?

Includes bibliography

International financial reform: a broad agenda

Includes bibliography

Identifying financial crises in real time

Following the thermodynamic formulation of a multifractal measure that was shown to enable the detection of large fluctuations at an early stage, here we propose a new index which permits us to distinguish events like financial crises in real time. We calculate the partition function from which we can obtain thermodynamic quantities analogous to the free energy and specific heat. The index is defined as the normalized energy variation and it can be used to study the behavior of stochastic time series, such as financial market daily data. Famous financial market crashes-Black Thursday (1929), Black Monday (1987) and the subprime crisis (2008)-are identified with clear and robust results. The method is also applied to the market fluctuations of 2011. From these results it appears as if the apparent crisis of 2011 is of a different nature to the other three. We also show that the analysis has forecasting capabilities. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.