Exploring the usefulness of structural–functional approaches to analyse governance of planning systems

Existing planning theories tend to be limited in their analytical scope and often fail to account for the impact of many interactions between the multitudes of stakeholders involved in strategic planning processes. Although many theorists rejected structural–functional approaches from the 1970s, this article argues that many of structural–functional concepts remain relevant and useful to planning practitioners. In fact, structural–functional approaches are highly useful and practical when used as a foundation for systemic analysis of real-world, multi-layered, complex planning systems to support evidence-based governance reform. Such approaches provide a logical and systematic approach to the analysis of the wider governance of strategic planning systems that is grounded in systems theory and complementary to existing theories of complexity and planning. While we do not propose its use as a grand theory of planning, this article discusses how structural–functional concepts and approaches might be applied to underpin a practical analysis of the complex decision-making arrangements that drive planning practice, and to provide the evidence needed to target reform of poorly performing arrangements.

On the efficacy of key corporate governance recommendations in mid-tier companies : window-dressing or value-adding?

This paper examins the relationship between firm performance and key board and audit committee variables in a sample of mid-tier listed Australian firms. Unlike the UK where the corporate governance Code specifically outlines special arrangements for companies outside the FTSE 350 index, the ASX Corporate Governance recommendations make no special provisions for mid-tier companies. Consequently, mid-tier Australian companies may be expending scarce resources in conforming with recommendations that are not value-creating.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Convergence in European corporate governance : the audit committee concept

This paper analyses recent corporate governance codes issued by 20 countries for evidence of convergence in corporate governance systems in Europe. The analysis shows that there has been a degree of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as the audit committee concept is widely accepted in countries with both unitary and two-tier governance systems. Further, the latest audit committee recommendations in countries that have issued several governance codes show a strengthening of the recommendations for an audit committee over time in line with the Anglo-Saxon audit committee concept and convergence with the debate in the US and UK on issues such as the independence and financial expertise of members. However, consistent with the literature on the convergence of European corporate governance systems, at an operational level there is limited consistency in the recommended structure and role of audit committees.

Volunteering and recent governance reforms

The regulatory reforms touching volunteer governs over the last 25 years are identified and analysed. BOth direct reforms such as the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission's (ACNC) governance standards and society--wide indirect reforms to workplace health and safety, civil liability and deemed liability provisions are discussed in this chapter.

The ACNC's new governance rules

Australian charities have a new regulator in the form of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) which began operations in December 2012; and new governance rules which applied from 1 July 2013. While there is some uncertainty over the ACNC's future, the new legislative framework currently applies to approximately 58,000 charities which seek federal tax concessions and other benefits, and includes governance standards that apply across charitable organisational forms (company, trust and association) with some exceptions. The governance standards are a minimum benchmark that many charities will already meet, if they are companies or incorporated associations.

Corporate governance and bankruptcy risk

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge, and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit services fees

This paper extends prior research on the relationship between governance quality and auditor remuneration.We examine the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE), a proxy for governance quality, on audit fees (AF) and non-audit services fees (NASF) using a new composite measure comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. We find that after controlling for board of director characteristics, there is a significant positive association between ACE and AF only for larger clients. Our results indicate that effective audit committees undertake more monitoring which results in wider audit scope and higher audit fees. Contrary to our expectations, we find the association between ACE and NASF to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggests that larger clients are more likely to purchase non-audit services (NAS) even in the presence of effective audit committees probably due to the complexity of their activities. Overall, our findings support regulatory initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance quality.

The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committee

This chapter provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics, and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behavior. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (1) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (2) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (3) complementing extant research methods with field studies; and (4) investigation of unintended as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

Corporate governance in 2010 : what will change?

2010 is expected to see the publication of a new UK Code on Corporate Governance, replacing the Combined Code. Why is a new code being issued? What significant changes are proposed? WIll it change the corporate governance world?

Understanding Formal and Informal Governance on Infrastructure Projects - Literature Review [industry report]

In Australia, collaborative contracts have been increasingly used to govern infrastructure projects. These contracts combine formal and informal mechanisms to manage project delivery. Formal mechanisms (e.g. financial risk sharing) are specified in the contract, while informal mechanisms (e.g. integrated team) are not. The paper reports on a literature review to operationalise the concepts of formal and informal governance, as the literature contains a multiplicity of, often un-testable, definitions. This work is the first phase of a study that will examine the optimal balance of formal and informal governance structures. Desk-top review of leading journals in the areas of construction management and business management, as well as recent government documents and industry guidelines, was undertaken to to conceptualise and operatinalise formal and informal governance mechanisms. The study primarily draws on transaction-cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1979; 1991), relational contract theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000) and social psychology theory (e.g. Gulati 1995). Content analysis of the literature was undertaken to identify key governance mechanisms. Content analysis is a commonly used methodology in the social sciences area. It provides rich data through the systematic and objective review of literature (Krippendorff 2004). NVivo 9, a qualitative data analysis software package, was used to assist in this process. Formal governance mechanisms were found to be usefully broken down into four measurable categories: (1) target cost arrangement (2) financial risk and reward sharing regime (3) transparent financials and (4) collaborative multi-party agreement Informal governance mechanisms were found to be usefully broken down into three measurable categories: (1) leadership structure (2) integrated team (3) joint management system We expect these categories to effectively capture the key governance drivers of outcomes on infrastructure projects. These categories will be further refined and broken down into individual governance mechanisms for assessment through a large-scale Australian survey planned for late 2012. These individual mechanisms will feature in the questionnaire that QUT will deliver to AAA in October 2012.

Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance

Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors minimize risk for a given level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets. This study sets out to determine the role of the institutional investor in monitoring risk and firm performance. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical study shows a positive association between firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and performance for firms with increasing institutional shareholdings. The study also finds that the significance of this association depends on the institutional investor's ability to influence management, which in turn depends on the size of ownership and whether the investee firm does not have potential business dealings with the investor. We also find that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors engage in promoting short-term performance or exit rather than support long-term value creation. The results are robust while controlling the potential for endogeneity and using sensitivity tests to control for variants of performance and risk. These findings add to the growing body of literature examining institutional ownership and the importance of understanding the role of risk-management in the risk and return relation.