Les femmes cadres et dirigeantes d'entreprise en Europe : de la sous-représentation aux politiques de promotion de l'égalité dans la prise de décision économique

Cet article présente la situation des femmes au sein des hiérarchies professionnelles et examine les différentes mesures législatives qui visent à promouvoir une meilleure répartition sexuée de la « prise de décision » dans le champ économique en Europe. Il s'appuie à la fois sur les documents publiés par la Commission européenne, sur des initiatives adoptées dans certains États membres et sur des données issues de plusieurs recherches récentes sur les femmes cadres et dirigeantes d'entreprise en Europe.

Iowa Soybean Promotion Board, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, Schedule of Findings, August 31, 2003 & 2004

State Agency Audit Report

Iowa Corn Promotion Board, Independent Auditor's Reports Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, August 31, 2003 & 2004

State Agency Audit Report

Corruption in representative democracy

A parliament with n members, distributed among two parties, decides whether to accept or reject a certain proposal. Each member of the parliament votes in favour or against. If there are at least t members in favour, the proposal is accepted; otherwise it is rejected. A non-member of the parliament, the briber, is interested in having the proposal accepted. To this end, he is willing to bribe members to induce them to vote in favour. It is compared a parliament with party discipline, where members vote according to the party line, and a parliament without party discipline, where members vote according to their own opinion. The paper determines, for given values of n and t , the average number of members that the briber has to bribe in each case (with the average taken with respect to all the possible allocations of members between parties and their votes, and also with respect to those allocations inducing the briber to bribe). The results show that a parliament with parties with party discipline is more costly for the briber to be bribed.

Iowa Sheep and Wool Promotion Board, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2003 and June 30, 2004

State Agency Audit Report

The Collective-Quality Promotion in the Agribusiness Sector: An Overview, October 2005

This paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups. Benefits and costs of common labeling and professional groups for improving quality are detailed. Some empirical facts are presented, mainly focusing on some European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned marketing programs. This paper shows that in some cases the collective-quality promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers.

Iowa Soybean Promotion Board, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, August 31, 2004 & June 30, 2005

State Audit Reports

Membership and internal democracy. Immigrant organisations in the city of Oslo

Immigrant organisations in the City of Oslo receive support from the government for their daily operation. In order to receive such support, each organisation must be membership-based and have internal democratic procedures. This paper raises the question of how we can understand this combination of support for ethnic based organisations and requirements of membership and internal democracy. It explores the usefulness of two partly overlapping ways of understanding this policy and discusses their interrelationship. Firstly, within the context of the crisis of multiculturalism, the paper discusses whether this combination is based on the aim of strengthening the organisations’ procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles. Secondly, the paper analyses whether requirements of membership and internal democracy can mainly be understood within the framework of the Nordic model of voluntary organisation. By comparing the policy at three empirical levels, the paper concludes that this combination can mainly be understood within the framework of the traditional historical Nordic model, but that there is an ambiguity in this policy related to minority rights.

Iowa Corn Promotion Board, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements, Supplementary Information and Schedule of Findings, August 31, 2004 & 2005

State Audit Reports

Secession and liberal democracy. The case of the Basque country

The academic debate about the secession of a territory which is part of a liberal democracy state displays an initial contrast. On the one hand, practical secessionist movements usually legitimize their position using nationalist arguments linked to the principle of national self- determination. On the other hand, we find in academia few defenders of a normative principle of national self-determination. Philosophers, political scientists and jurists usually defend the status quo. And even when they do not defend it, most of them tend to leave the question of that question and secession unresolved or confused. Regarding this issue, liberal-democratic theories show a tendency to be “conservative” in relation to the political borders, regardless the historical and empirical processes of creation of current States. Probably, this feature is not far away to the fact that, since its beginning, political liberalism has not been a theory of the nation, but a theory of the state.