Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Game story, une histoire des jeux vidéo

Compte rendu de l'exposition « Game Story. Une histoire du jeu vidéo » qui s'est tenue au Grand Palais à Paris du 10 novembre 2011 au 9 janvier 2012, envisagée à partir du champ de l'histoire et de la théorie du cinéma en termes de discours historique sur un « nouveau média » ainsi que dans une optique intermédiale.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

Random assignment of intervention points in two phase single-case designs: data-division-specific distributions

The present study explores the statistical properties of a randomization test based on the random assignment of the intervention point in a two-phase (AB) single-case design. The focus is on randomization distributions constructed with the values of the test statistic for all possible random assignments and used to obtain p-values. The shape of those distributions is investigated for each specific data division defined by the moment in which the intervention is introduced. Another aim of the study consisted in testing the detection of inexistent effects (i.e., production of false alarms) in autocorrelated data series, in which the assumption of exchangeability between observations may be untenable. In this way, it was possible to compare nominal and empirical Type I error rates in order to obtain evidence on the statistical validity of the randomization test for each individual data division. The results suggest that when either of the two phases has considerably less measurement times, Type I errors may be too probable and, hence, the decision making process to be carried out by applied researchers may be jeopardized.

Observational methodology in football: Development of an instrument to study the offensiva game in football.

The following paper introduces a new approach to the analysis of offensive game in football. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to create an instrument for collecting information for the analysis of offensive action and interactions game. The observation instrument that was used to accomplish the main objective of this work consists of a combination of format fields (FC) and systems of categories (SC). This methodology is a particular strategy of the scientific method that has as an objective to analyse the perceptible behaviour that occurs in habitual contexts, allowing them to be formally recorded and quantified and using an ad hoc instrument in order to obtain a behaviour systematic registration that, since they have been transformed in quantitative data with the necessary reliability and validity determined level, will allow analysis of the relations between these behaviours. The codifications undertaken to date in various games of football have shown that it serves the purposes for which it was developed, allowing more research into the offensive game methods in football.

A new aggregation method for strategic decision making and its application in assignment theory

A new aggregation method for decision making is presented by using induced aggregation operators and the index of maximum and minimum level. Its main advantage is that it can assess complex reordering processes in the aggregation that represent complex attitudinal characters of the decision maker such as psychological or personal factors. A wide range of properties and particular cases of this new approach are studied. A further generalization by using hybrid averages and immediate weights is also presented. The key issue in this approach against the previous model is that we can use the weighted average and the ordered weighted average in the same formulation. Thus, we are able to consider the subjective attitude and the degree of optimism of the decision maker in the decision process. The paper ends with an application in a decision making problem based on the use of the assignment theory.

Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way

It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.

World Of Wars Android Game

World Of Wars es un videojuego de acción para plataformas Android basándose en los estilos shoot em¿up arcades antiguos pero adaptándolos a los nuevos tiempos y nuevas formas de juego que existen en la actualidad. Se ha utilizado la librería Cocos2D-x, así como el lenguaje de programación C++ para el desarrollo de el.

Diseño e implementación de un serious game para el aprendizaje del material quirúrgico y desarrollo de una operación

En este trabajo se recoge información útil que se debe tener en cuenta para desarrollar un serious game pertinente para el entrenamiento de profesionales de la salud, que aporte destrezas y habilidades necesarias para afrontar las cirugías reales. Se propone un serious game a modo de simulador de diferentes operaciones quirúrgicas traumatológicas, que permite al usuario las etapas preoperatorias, intraoperatorias y postoperatorias de una cirugía, en las que se debe describir qué acciones se llevan a cabo, quiénes la realizan y si es necesario algún material específico.