3D Pose from Three Corresponding Points Under Weak-Perspective Projection

Model-based object recognition commonly involves using a minimal set of matched model and image points to compute the pose of the model in image coordinates. Furthermore, recognition systems often rely on the "weak-perspective" imaging model in place of the perspective imaging model. This paper discusses computing the pose of a model from three corresponding points under weak-perspective projection. A new solution to the problem is proposed which, like previous solutins, involves solving a biquadratic equation. Here the biquadratic is motivate geometrically and its solutions, comprised of an actual and a false solution, are interpreted graphically. The final equations take a new form, which lead to a simple expression for the image position of any unmatched model point.

Direct synthesis of highly ordered Fe-SBA-15 mesoporous materials under weak acidic conditions

Iron-substituted SBA-15 (Fe-SBA-15) materials have been synthesized via a simple direct hydrothermal method under weak acidic conditions. The powder X-ray diffraction (XRD), NZ sorption and transmission electron microscopy (TEM) characterizations show that the resultant materials have well-ordered hexagonal meso-structures. The diffused reflectance UV-vis and UV resonance Raman spectroscopy characterizations show that most of the iron ions exist as isolated framework species for calcined materials when the Fe/Si molar ratios are below 0.01 in the gel. The presence of iron species also has significant salt effects that can greatly improve the ordering of the mesoporous structure. Different iron species including isolated framework iron species, extraframework iron clusters and iron oxides are formed selectively by adjusting the pH values of the synthesis solutions and Fe/Si molar ratios. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Taxi! Urban economies and the social and transport Impacts of the taxicab.

The taxicab provides a significant contribution to the accessibility of a city and provides a wide range of services across many social groups. Considering the role of the taxi this books examines the impacts that the mode currently has, and how it may continue to develop in the provision of access within the city.

Some Considerations on a Calculus with Weak References

Weak references are references that do not prevent the object they point to from being garbage collected. Most realistic languages, including Java, SML/NJ, and OCaml to name a few, have some facility for programming with weak references. Weak references are used in implementing idioms like memoizing functions and hash-consing in order to avoid potential memory leaks. However, the semantics of weak references in many languages are not clearly specified. Without a formal semantics for weak references it becomes impossible to prove the correctness of implementations making use of this feature. Previous work by Hallett and Kfoury extends λgc, a language for modeling garbage collection, to λweak, a similar language with weak references. Using this previously formalized semantics for weak references, we consider two issues related to well-behavedness of programs. Firstly, we provide a new, simpler proof of the well-behavedness of the syntactically restricted fragment of λweak defined previously. Secondly, we give a natural semantic criterion for well-behavedness much broader than the syntactic restriction, which is useful as principle for programming with weak references. Furthermore we extend the result, proved in previously of λgc, which allows one to use type-inference to collect some reachable objects that are never used. We prove that this result holds of our language, and we extend this result to allow the collection of weakly-referenced reachable garbage without incurring the computational overhead sometimes associated with collecting weak bindings (e.g. the need to recompute a memoized function). Lastly we use extend the semantic framework to model the key/value weak references found in Haskell and we prove the Haskell is semantics equivalent to a simpler semantics due to the lack of side-effects in our language.

A Formal Semantics for Weak References

A weak reference is a reference to an object that is not followed by the pointer tracer when garbage collection is called. That is, a weak reference cannot prevent the object it references from being garbage collected. Weak references remain a troublesome programming feature largely because there is not an accepted, precise semantics that describes their behavior (in fact, we are not aware of any formalization of their semantics). The trouble is that weak references allow reachable objects to be garbage collected, therefore allowing garbage collection to influence the result of a program. Despite this difficulty, weak references continue to be used in practice for reasons related to efficient storage management, and are included in many popular programming languages (Standard ML, Haskell, OCaml, and Java). We give a formal semantics for a calculus called λweak that includes weak references and is derived from Morrisett, Felleisen, and Harper’s λgc. λgc formalizes the notion of garbage collection by means of a rewrite rule. Such a formalization is required to precisely characterize the semantics of weak references. However, the inclusion of a garbage-collection rewrite-rule in a language with weak references introduces non-deterministic evaluation, even if the parameter-passing mechanism is deterministic (call-by-value in our case). This raises the question of confluence for our rewrite system. We discuss natural restrictions under which our rewrite system is confluent, thus guaranteeing uniqueness of program result. We define conditions that allow other garbage collection algorithms to co-exist with our semantics of weak references. We also introduce a polymorphic type system to prove the absence of erroneous program behavior (i.e., the absence of “stuck evaluation”) and a corresponding type inference algorithm. We prove the type system sound and the inference algorithm sound and complete.

Towards Formalizing Java's Weak References

Weak references provide the programmer with limited control over the process of memory management. By using them, a programmer can make decisions based on previous actions that are taken by the garbage collector. Although this is often helpful, the outcome of a program using weak references is less predictable due to the nondeterminism they introduce in program evaluation. It is therefore desirable to have a framework of formal tools to reason about weak references and programs that use them. We present several calculi that formalize various aspects of weak references, inspired by their implementation in Java. We provide a calculus to model multiple levels of non-strong references, where a different garbage collection policy is applied to each level. We consider different collection policies such as eager collection and lazy collection. Similar to the way they are implemented in Java, we give the semantics of eager collection to weak references and the semantics of lazy collection to soft references. Moreover, we condition garbage collection on the availability of time and space resources. While time constraints are used in order to restrict garbage collection, space constraints are used in order to trigger it. Finalizers are a problematic feature in Java, especially when they interact with weak references. We provide a calculus to model finalizer evaluation. Since finalizers have little meaning in a language without side-effect, we introduce a limited form of side effect into the calculus. We discuss determinism and the separate notion of uniqueness of (evaluation) outcome. We show that in our calculus, finalizer evaluation does not affect uniqueness of outcome.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.