On the 'special' status of emotional faces... Comment on Yang, Hong, and Blake (2010)

A wealth of literature suggests that emotional faces are given special status as visual objects: Cognitive models suggest that emotional stimuli, particularly threat-relevant facial expressions such as fear and anger, are prioritized in visual processing and may be identified by a subcortical “quick and dirty” pathway in the absence of awareness (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). Both neuroimaging studies (Williams, Morris, McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004) and backward masking studies (Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff, McInerney, & Lee, 1998) have supported the notion of emotion processing without awareness. Recently, our own group (Adams, Gray, Garner, & Graf, 2010) showed adaptation to emotional faces that were rendered invisible using a variant of binocular rivalry: continual flash suppression (CFS, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Here we (i) respond to Yang, Hong, and Blake's (2010) criticisms of our adaptation paper and (ii) provide a unified account of adaptation to facial expression, identity, and gender, under conditions of unawareness

How to watch television? Pedagogy and paedocracy in Beckett’s television plays

This article responds to scholarship on Beckett’s television plays that regards them as positive interventions which encourage the viewer to reconsider the conventions of the medium, and that raise the cultural standards of television drama. In making claims about how the plays address and educate their viewers, critical approaches shift between conceptions of audience. This analysis of Beckett’s plays on British television reconsiders their aesthetic strategies, their relationship with television culture, and the dominant assumptions of critical writing about them by examining the parallel between conceptions of the audience and conceptions of the child in writing about television and Beckett’s television plays.

Public debt indexation and denomination, the case of Brazil: a comment

In this work I analyze the model proposed by Goldfajn (2000) to study the choice of the denomination of the public debt. The main purpose of the analysis is pointing out possible reasons why new empirical evidence provided by Bevilaqua, Garcia and Nechio (2004), regarding a more recent time period, Önds a lower empirical support to the model. I also provide a measure of the overestimation of the welfare gains of hedging the debt led by the simpliÖed time frame of the model. Assuming a time-preference parameter of 0.9, for instance, welfare gains associated with a hedge to the debt that reduces to a half a once-for-all 20%-of-GDP shock to government spending run around 1.43% of GDP under the no-tax-smoothing structure of the model. Under a Ramsey allocation, though, welfare gains amount to just around 0.05% of GDP.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

A comment on a nonideal centrifugal vibrator machine behavior with soft and hard springs

This paper concerns a type of rotating machine (centrifugal vibrator), which is supported on a nonlinear spring. This is a nonideal kind of mechanical system. The goal of the present work is to show the striking differences between the cases where we take into account soft and hard spring types. For soft spring, we prove the existence of homoclinic chaos. By using the Melnikov's Method, we show the existence of an interval with the following property: if a certain parameter belongs to this interval, then we have chaotic behavior; otherwise, this does not happen. Furthermore, if we use an appropriate damping coefficient, the chaotic behavior can be avoided. For hard spring, we prove the existence of Hopf's Bifurcation, by using reduction to Center Manifolds and the Bezout Theorem (a classical result about algebraic plane curves).