Patterns in financial markets: Dynamic time warping

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business model analysis of Mobitto: How to solve the chicken and egg problem of a multi-sided platform?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Carbon prices. Dynamic analysis of European and Californian markets

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Alterações Climáticas e Políticas de Desenvolvimento Sustentável

Financial depth, stock markets and economic growth in the EU-15 countries

The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of financial depth on economic growth in the EU-15 countries from 1970 until 2012, using the two-step System GMM estimator. Even though it might be expected a positive impact, the results show it is negative and sometimes even negative and statistically significant. Among the reasons presented for this, the existence of banking crises seems to better explain these results. In tranquil periods, financial deepening appears to have a positive impact, whereas in banking crises it is persistently negative and statistically significant. Also, after an assessment of the impact of stock markets on economic growth, it appears that more developed countries in the EU-15 have an economy more reliant on this segment of the financial system rather than in bank intermediation.

Mycotoxin contamination of Maize and Guinea corn from markets in Plateau State, Nigeria

Maize (Zea mays) and guinea corn (Sorghum bicolor) are major food items in Plateau state, Nigeria. A multistage sampling technique was used to select the markets and store/warehouses used for this study; sample collection employed a simple random sampling method from different sampling points within designated areas. A total of 18 representative samples were collected and analyzed for the following mycotoxins: aflatoxins (Aflatoxin B1 - AFB1, Aflatoxin B2 - AFB2, Aflatoxin G1 - AFG1 and Aflatoxin G2 - AFG2), fumonisins (Fumonisin B1 - FB1 and Fumonisin B2 - FB2 ) and cyclopiazonic acid (CPA). Out of 12 samples analyzed for Aflatoxins, AFB1 was detected in 5, AFB2 in 1, AFG1 in 1 and AFG2 in 6 samples respectively. The highest concentration of AFB1 and AFG2 were found in maize samples from Pankshin market. Only maize samples from Mangu market were contaminated with AFB2 and also harboured the lowest concentration of AFG2. AFG1 contamination occurred in only guinea corn from Shendam market. and FB1 was detected in all 18 samples analyzed. The mycotoxin CPA was not detected in any of the samples. Aflatoxins levels in analyzed samples were regarded as safe based on Nigerian and European Union maximum permissible levels of 4g/kg. With the exception of two samples, FB1 levels in analyzed maize samples were within European Union maximum permissible levels of 1,000 to 3000g/kg. The health and food safety implications of these results for the human and animal population are further discussed.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Pecuniary Externality through Credit Constraints: Two Examples without Uncertainty

This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on constrained inefficiencies in economies with financial frictions. The purpose is to present two simple examples, inspired by the stochastic models in Gersbach-Rochet (2012) and Lorenzoni (2008), of deterministic environments in which such inefficiencies arise through credit constraints. Common to both examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset price. In the second example, a simple transfer between two groups of agents can bring about a Pareto improvement. In a first best economy, there are no pecuniary externalities because marginal productivities are equalised. But when agents face credit constraints, there is a wedge between their marginal productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents. The wedge is the source of the pecuniary externality: economies with these kinds of imperfections in credit markets are not second-best efficient. This is akin to the constrained inefficiency of an economy with incomplete markets, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).

Fiscal multipliers in a two-sector search and matching model

This paper evaluates the effects of policy interventions on sectoral labour markets and the aggregate economy in a business cycle model with search and matching frictions. We extend the canonical model by including capital-skill complementarity in production, labour markets with skilled and unskilled workers and on-the-job-learning (OJL) within and across skill types. We first find that, the model does a good job at matching the cyclical properties of sectoral employment and the wage-skill premium. We next find that vacancy subsidies for skilled and unskilled jobs lead to output multipliers which are greater than unity with OJL and less than unity without OJL. In contrast, the positive output effects from cutting skilled and unskilled income taxes are close to zero. Finally, we find that the sectoral and aggregate effects of vacancy subsidies do not depend on whether they are financed via public debt or distorting taxes.

Co-Movement, Spillovers and Excess Returns in Global Bond Markets

This paper investigates global term structure dynamics using a Bayesian hierarchical factor model augmented with macroeconomic fundamentals. More than half of the variation in bond yields of seven advanced economies is due to global co-movement, which is mainly attributed to shocks to non-fundamentals. Global fundamentals, especially global inflation, affect yields through a ‘policy channel’ and a ‘risk compensation channel’, but the effects through two channels are offset. This evidence explains the unsatisfactory performance of fundamentals-driven term structure models. Our approach delineates asymmetric spillovers in global bond markets connected to diverging monetary policies. The proposed model is robust as identified factors has significant explanatory power of excess returns. The finding that global inflation uncertainty is useful in explaining realized excess returns does not rule out regime changing as a source of non-fundamental fluctuations.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Simulating the Impact of Sectorial Productivity Gains on Two Regional Economies: Key Sectors from a Supply Side Perspective

In this paper we simulate and analyse the economic impact that sectorial productivity gains have on two regional Spanish economies (Catalonia and Extremadura). In particular we study the quantitative effect that each sector’s productivity gain has on household welfare (real disposable income and equivalent variation), on the consumption price indices and factor relative prices, on real production (GDP) and on the government’s net income (net taxation revenues of social transfers to households). The analytical approach consists of a computable general equilibrium model, in which we assume perfect competition and cleared markets, including factor markets. All the parameters and exogenous variables of the model are calibrated by means of two social accounting matrices, one for each region under study. The results allow us to identify those sectors with the greatest impact on consumer welfare as the key sectors in the regional economies. Keywords: Productivity gains, key sectors, computable general equilibrium