Can Early Intervention Policies Improve Well-being? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial

Many authors have proposed incorporating measures of well-being into evaluations of public policy. Yet few evaluations use experimental design or examine multiple aspects of well-being, thus the causal impact of public policies on well-being is largely unknown. In this paper we examine the effect of an intensive early intervention program on maternal well-being in a targeted disadvantaged community. Using a randomized controlled trial design we estimate and compare treatment effects on global well-being using measures of life satisfaction, experienced well-being using both the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) and a measure of mood yesterday, and also a standardized measure of parenting stress. The intervention has no significant impact on negative measures of well-being, such as experienced negative affect as measured by the DRM and global measures of well-being such as life satisfaction or a global measure of parenting stress. Significant treatment effects are observed on experienced measures of positive affect using the DRM, and a measure of mood yesterday. The DRM treatment effects are primarily concentrated during times spent without the target child which may reflect the increased effort and burden associated with additional parental investment. Our findings suggest that a maternal-focused intervention may produce meaningful improvements in experienced well-being. Incorporating measures of experienced affect may thus alter cost-benefit calculations for public policies.

Measuring Tax Complexity

This paper critically examines a number of issues relating to the measurement of tax complexity. It starts with an analysis of the concept of tax complexity, distinguishing tax design complexity and operational complexity. It considers the consequences/costs of complexity, and then examines the rationale for measuring complexity. Finally it applies the analysis to an examination of an index of complexity developed by the UK Office of Tax Simplification (OTS).

Computing Markov-Perfect Optimal Policies in Business-Cycle Models

Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In the context of a business cycle model in which a scal authority chooses government spending and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods, we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include a risk-sensitive scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We show that the risk-sensitive scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation, reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.

Activation of HTLV-I transcription in the presence of Tax is independent of the acetylation of CREB-2 (ATF-4).

We have previously demonstrated that the bZIP transcription factor CREB-2, also called ATF-4, trans-activates, in association with the viral protein Tax, the human T-cell leukemia virus type I (HTLV-I) promoter. In this study, we have examined whether CREB-2 acetylation affects transcriptional activation mediated by Tax. We present evidence that CREB-2 is acetylated in vitro and in vivo. CREB-2 is acetylated in two regions: the basic domain of the bZIP (from amino acid residue 270 to 300) and the short basic domain (from 342 to 351) located downstream from the bZIP. We also demonstrate that CREB-2 is acetylated by p300/CBP but not by p/CAF. Moreover, replacement of lysine by arginine in the basic domains decreases the trans-activating capacity of CREB-2. However, in the presence of Tax, the HTLV-I transcription remains fully activated by these CREB-2 mutants. Although we cannot totally exclude that the mutations could also affect CREB-2 structure and activity independent of acetylation, our results suggest that activation of the viral promoter in the presence of Tax is independent of the CREB-2 acetylation.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

The Evolution of adaptation policies in Britain

Adaptació de habitatge al Regne Unit. Ponència presentada al "2º Espacio de Encuentro Rehabilitación y Adaptación Funcional de la Vivienda" (Sant Sebastià, 2 Juny 2010)

Juridical double taxation by cross border transactions: the Block Case (C-67/08)

Treaty Establishing the European Community, operative until December 1st 2009, had already established in its article 2 the mission of the up until then European Community and actual European Union is to promote an harmonious, equilibrated and sustainable development of the economic activities of the whole Community. This Mission must be achieved by establishing a Common Market, an Economic and Monetary Union and the realization of Common Policies. One of the instruments to obtain these objectives is the use of free circulation of people, services and capitals inside the Common and Interior Market of the European Union. The European Union is characterized by the confirmation of the total movement of capitals, services and individuals and legal peoples’ freedom; freedom that was already predicated by the Maastricht Treaty, through the suppression of whatever obstacles which are in the way of the objectives before exposed. The old TEC in its Title III, now Title IV of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, covered the free circulation of people, services and capitals. Consequently, the inclusion of this mechanism inside one of the regulating texts of the European Union indicates the importance this freedom supposes for the European Union objectives’ development. Once stood up the relevance of the free movement of people, services and capitals, we must mention that in this paper we are going to centre our study in one of these freedoms of movement: the free movement of capital. In order to analyze in detail the free movement of capital within the European framework, we are going to depart from the analysis of the existent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The use of jurisprudence is basic to know how Community legislation is interpreted. For this reason, we are going to develop this work through judgements dictated by the European Union Court. This way we can observe how Member States’ regulating laws and the European Common Law affect the free movement of capital. The starting point of this paper will be the Judgement C-67/08 European Court of Justice of February 12th 2009, known as Block case. So, following the argumentation the Luxemburg Court did about the mentioned case, we are going to develop how free movement of capital could be affected by the current disparity of Member States’ legislation. This disparity can produce double taxation cases due to the lack of tax harmonized legislation within the interior market and the lack of treaties to avoid double taxation within the European Union. Developing this idea we are going to see how double taxation, at least indirectly, can infringe free movement of capital.

Is the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax incompatible with the free movement of workers and capital?: The reasoned opinion of the EU Commission IP/10/513

The aim of my speech is answering to the question if the Spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax is incompatible with the free movement of workers and capital. We are going to pay special attention to the European Commission’s request to Spain to change its Inheritance and Gift Tax provisions for Non-Residents or Assets held abroad. In order to answer to the question mentioned above five points will be explained. At first place I am going to describe the infrengement procedure established in the Article 258 that the EU Commission can follow when a Member State doesn’t comply with Community Law. At second place, we are going to explain what is the content of the EU Commission delivered on 5th of may 2010 regarding the spanish Inheritance and Gift Tax. Then, we will analise what establishes the Community Law regarding the freedom of workers and capital and how they are understood by the EU Court of Justice in similar cases. Finally, we are going to provide possible amendments that Spain could undertake.

Jurisdictional immunity in tax haven countries

El següent projecte conté informació sobre què són els paradisos fiscals, els seus avantatges, i on s'ubiquen. També s'analitza el procés que algú ha de seguir per anar a un paradís fiscal i avalua com la gent rica i les grans empreses operen els seus negocis a través dels paradisos fiscals i prenen avantatge d'ells reduint les seves obligacions fiscals de manera significativa. El projecte també considera la qüestió del secret bancari, que ha estat un gran conflicte entre els països en els darrers anys.

The Impact of democratization: a preliminary investigation on social policies and political violence in Latin America

The recent strides of democracy in Latin America have been associated to conflicting outcomes. The expectation that democracy would bring about peace and prosperity have been only partly satisfied. While political violence has been by and large eradicated from the sub-continent, poverty and social injustice still prevail and hold sway. Our study argues that democracy matters for inequality through the growing strength of center left and left parties and by making political leaders in general more responsive to the underprivileged. Furthermore, although the pension reforms recently enacted in the region generated overall regressive outcomes on income distribution, democratic countries still benefit from their political past: where democratic tradition was stronger, such outcomes have been milder. Democratic tradition and the specific ideological connotations of the parties in power, on the other hand, did not play an equally crucial role in securing lower levels of political violence: during the last wave of democratizations in Latin America, domestic peace was rather an outcome of political and social concessions to those in distress. In sum, together with other factors and especially economic ones, the reason why recent democratizations have provided domestic peace in most cases, but have been unable so far to solve the problem of poverty and inequality, is that democratic traditions in the subcontinent have been relatively weak and, more specifically, that this weakness has undermined the growth of left and progressive parties, acting as an obstacle to redistribution. Such weakness, on the other hand, has not prevented the drastic reduction of domestic political violence, since what mattered in this case was a combination of symbolic or material concessions and political agreements among powerful élites and counter-élites.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain. The Role of the Courts

Overview of the Tax Coordination of the Regions in Spain from the point of view of the role of the Courts in developing the present system