Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

May 1994: Statewide Library Network Urged; WPA and Libraries in S.C.; Library Directors' Forum

Inside this Issue: WPADirector's ForumArchivesM. L King LibraryElectronic Info

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

Nineteenth meeting of national customs directors of Latin America, Spain and Portugal

First meeting on European soil. The Nineteenth Meeting of National Customs Directors of Latin America, Spain and Portugal was held in Palma, Mallorca, Spain, from 2 to 6 November 1998. The opening session stressed the importance of this being the first meeting held on European soil, and members were urged to pool their efforts to develop closer cooperative ties between the region's customs services.

Seventeenth meeting of national customs directors of Latin America, Spain and Portugal

The seventeenth Meeting of National Customs Directors of Latin America, Spain and Portugal was held in Santa Cruz, Bolivia from 27 to 31 January 1997. The meeting was attended by representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay and Venezuela. Observers from Australia, France, Japan and the United States were also present. Representatives of the following international organizations also attended the meeting: Association of Customs Agents of Uruguay, International Association of Professional Customs Agents (ASAPRA), Latin American Integration Organization (LAIA), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Latin American Convention of Courier Enterprises (CLADEC), Central American Institute of Business Administration (INCAE), Board of the Cartagena Agreement (JUNAC), Organization of American States (OAS), World Customs Organization (WCO), and Postal Union of the Americas, Spain and Portugal (PUASP).

Twentieth meeting of national customs directors of Latin America, Portugal and Spain

The twentieth Meeting of National Customs Directors of Latin America, Spain and Portugal was held from 26 to 29 October 1999 in Cancún, Quinta Roo, Mexico. Working groups discussed issues relating to control, harmonization of customs procedures, strategic alliances for combating commercial fraud, integrity and the impact of the year 2000 computer problem on customs services. At the plenary meeting of this session, agreement was reached on 30 points.Uruguay, headquarters for the twenty-first meeting: The delegation of Uruguay's offer to host the twenty-first meeting in October 2000 was accepted.

Hostile takeover by Plasmodium: reorganization of parasite and host cell membranes during liver stage egress

The protozoan parasite Plasmodium is transmitted by female Anopheles mosquitoes and undergoes obligatory development within a parasitophorous vacuole in hepatocytes before it is released into the bloodstream. The transition to the blood stage was previously shown to involve the packaging of exoerythrocytic merozoites into membrane-surrounded vesicles, called merosomes, which are delivered directly into liver sinusoids. However, it was unclear whether the membrane of these merosomes was derived from the parasite membrane, the parasitophorous vacuole membrane or the host cell membrane. This knowledge is required to determine how phagocytes will be directed against merosomes. Here, we fluorescently label the candidate membranes and use live cell imaging to show that the merosome membrane derives from the host cell membrane. We also demonstrate that proteins in the host cell membrane are lost during merozoite liberation from the parasitophorous vacuole. Immediately after the breakdown of the parasitophorous vacuole membrane, the host cell mitochondria begin to degenerate and protein biosynthesis arrests. The intact host cell plasma membrane surrounding merosomes allows Plasmodium to mask itself from the host immune system and bypass the numerous Kupffer cells on its way into the bloodstream. This represents an effective strategy for evading host defenses before establishing a blood stage infection.