743 resultados para Politics partys
Resumo:
The Social Politics of Fatherhood in Spain and France: A Comparative Analysis of Parental Leave and Shared Residence The article provides a comparative analysis of policy developments on leaves for fathers and joint custody in Spain and France in the last decade. These two types of measures have been selected because they are both widely recognised as main instruments to promote new fathering styles and consequently more gender equality in the European Union. While the rhetoric of choice has been developed in both countries in relation to maternal employment and childcare, with better results in France than in Spain, it remains to be seen to what extent choice will also be extended to fathers. Keywords: Fatherhood. Family. Comparative social policy. Parental leave. Joint custody.
Resumo:
This work analyses the political news of eight Spanish television channels in order to see what image is built of politics, and particularly how the news of corruption affects the image of politics in Spanish news broadcasts. Different cases of corruption such as Gürtel, Palma Arena and those associated with judge Baltasar Garzón in his final stage in office, occupy part of the study. A new methodology is therefore proposed that enables the quality of the political information emitted from inside and outside the political content of the news programmes to be observed. Particular attention is paid to the news broadcasts of Televisión Española and Cuatro as those which offer a more balanced view of politics, and channels such as La Sexta, which give priority to a narrative construction of politics in the news programmes around causes of corruption.
Resumo:
Peer-reviewed
Resumo:
Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.
Resumo:
Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties.
Resumo:
This article assesses whether changes in government choice for policy concertation with trade unions and employers are better explained by international or domestic factors. We compare patterns of corporatist governance in a strongly Europeanized policy domain (labor migration policy) and in a weakly Europeanized policy domain (welfare state reforms) over the last 20 years in Austria and Switzerland. We show that there is no systematic difference in patterns of concertation between the two policy sectors and that factors linked to party politics play a bigger role in the choice of governments for concertation. If the base of party support for policies is divided, governments are more prone to resort to corporatist concertation as a way to build compromises for potentially controversial or unpopular policies. By contrast, ideologically cohesive majority coalitions are less prone to resort to concertation because they do not need to build compromises outside their base of party support.