Cabeceiras do Rio Pardo: ocupação e formação da região de Caconde-SP (1765-1820)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Absorção/adsorção de cádmio, cromo e chumbo por Agaricus blazei

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

The role of the State and the quality of the public sector

Sectoral policies make explicit and implicit assumptions about the behaviour and capabilities of the agents (such as dynamic responses to market signals, demand-led assistance, collaborative efforts, participation in financing); which we consider to be rather unrealistic. Because of this lack of realism, policies that aim to be neutral often turn out to be highly exclusive. They fail to give sufficient importance to the special features of the sector -with its high climatic, biological and commercial risks and its slow adaptation- or to the fact that those who take decisions in agriculture are now mostly in an inferior position because of their incomes below the poverty line, their inadequate training, their traditions based on centuries of living in precarious conditions, and their geographical location in marginal areas, far from infrastructure and with only a minimum of services and sources of information. These people have only scanty and imperfect access to the markets which, according to the prevailing model, should govern decisions and the (re);distribution of the factors of production. In our opinion, this explains the patchy and lower-than-expected growth registered by the sector after the reforms to promote the liberalization of markets and external openness in the region. In view of the results of the application of the new model, it may be wondered whether Latin America can afford a form of development which excludes over half of its agricultural producers; what the alternatives are; and what costs and benefits each of them offers in terms of production and monetary, social, spatial and other aspects. The article outlines the changes in policies and their results at the aggregate level, summarizes the arguments usually put forward to explain agricultural performance in the region, and proposes a second set of explanations based on a description of the agents and the responses that may be expected from them, contrasting the latter with the supposedly neutral nature of the policies.

Exchange-rate variations and the rate of inflation in emerging economies

This paper develops a structural general equilibrium model to analyse the reactions of the nominal exchange rate and the domestic price level to three types of external shock in emerging economies that have limited access to world capital markets. Although the results depend crucially on the type of external shock, each of the two national balance-sheet parameters considered here —the risk premium and the ratio of external indebtedness— exacerbates the reactions of the two endogenous variables without altering the degree of exchange-rate pass-through (erpt). Moreover, flatter Phillips curves, as observed today in many economies, tend to increase erpt. On the basis of these results, the authorities of emerging economies seeking to stabilize markets and limit erpt are advised to minimize the two risk parameters by applying a flexible inflation-targeting regime.

Narcotráfico na metrópole: das redes ilegais à “territorialização perversa” na periferia de Belém

A expansão do crime organizado em escala global, sobretudo, atrelado ao narcotráfico vem contribuindo nos últimos anos para que a Amazônia seja inserida na lógica de organização das redes ilegais. Assim, a sua localização geográfica juntos aos principais produtores de cocaína e ao mesmo tempo a sua proximidade em relação aos mercados da Europa e EUA despertam o interesse da economia do tráfico de drogas. Por outro lado, a droga que atravessa a Amazônia também abastece os mercados locais de suas metrópoles, a exemplo de Belém, aonde o narcotráfico vem se espacializando e se territorializando em áreas periféricas da cidade, envolvendo a metrópole na dinâmica economica da geográfica do crime organizado. Assim, os bairros periféricos do Guamá e da Terra Firme, abarcados pela bacia do Tucunduba, estão envolvidos por uma espécie de territórios-rede em que o tráfico local está associado às redes do tráfico global, e ao mesmo tempo, em escala local, convivem com a presença de territórios-zona, onde o tráfico se fecha para comandar sua atuação. Nesse sentido, a criminalidade vem se expandindo na forma de uma territorialização perversa, pois o tráfico de drogas impõe os seus limites pelo uso força e pela lógica do medo como estratégias de dominação.

Campesinato e abastecimento na Zona Bragantina (1880–1960)

Historicamente constituído por trabalhadores livres que ocuparam o território nas imediações de Bragança, o campesinato bragantino contribuiu significativamente para o abastecimento dos circuitos comerciais e das atividades industriais desenvolvidas no Pará. A articulação teórica e conceitual, que fundamentou a interpretação das transformações na Zona Bragantina, coloca-se numa perspectiva crítica, cujas concepções tratam das categorias como elementos dinâmicos, portanto inseridos num contexto histórico-materialista. Critica as interpretações que atribuíram ao campesinato a responsabilidade pela degradação ambiental, pelas crises de abastecimento do Pará e pela produção agrícola frequentemente designada como decadente, estas sempre colocando o campo em relação à cidade. Observaram-se a ocupação da Bragantina e sua expansão, as transformações por que passou a estrada de Bragança e a contribuição dos núcleos produtores engendrados pelas colônias. Em que pese o caráter excludente das ações do governo imperial, na fase republicana o campesinato passou por processos de transformação social, cuja perspectiva crítica o recoloca na história como responsável por parte do abastecimento da Amazônia. Em função do encurtamento do período de pousio, os camponeses engendraram uma mudança técnica que evidencia sua sensibilidade aos mercados. Assim, a produção de gêneros alimentícios diversos, e também de produtos para a agroindústria, fundamentou seus processos reprodutivos, orientados não só para o atendimento das necessidades da unidade familiar, mas também para o atendimento das demandas do mercado. Constatou-se que a Zona Bragantina, em que pese ter recebido investimentos capitalistas, ainda configura-se como uma fronteira camponesa, e, em última análise, o argumento da decadência pode ser substituído pela diversidade.

Qualificação de produtores rurais em boas práticas agrícolas visando adesão a sistemas de certificação socioambiental

Pós-graduação em Ciência Florestal - FCA

Associação genética entre o perfil de ácidos graxos e outras características da carcaça e carne de bovinos da raça Nelore

Pós-graduação em Genética e Melhoramento Animal - FCAV

Carne Bovina: Produtividade Vs Qualidade

Bovine meat exerts an important contribution to the human diet, mainly by its high biological value. For this reason the productivity and the quality of beef are so discussed. Productivity is defined as the ratio between production and the factors of production used and quality defined as an adjective given to the product that suits the consumer implicit and explicit. Brazil is the world leader in tonnage exported bovine meat, however the country has a relatively low income, since no exports to the markets of greater added value. Quantify the degree of importance of these two factors in a capitalist market is not easy, so knowing the science that involves this product is vital for both factors. We must know that there is a wide variability in the markets importers and Brazil should seek to be the leader everywhere, whether carcass with better conformation and degree of finish, is lean beef, organic meat is even

Modernização da agricultura e reestruturação produtiva da atividade leiteira

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Socio-economía de los recursos pesqueros de la isla de Gran Canaria

Máster en Gestión Sostenible de Recursos Pesqueros

The Law and Economics of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparison between the U.S. and the EU

This doctoral dissertation seeks to assess and address the potential contribution of the hedge fund industry to financial instability. In so doing, the dissertation investigates three main questions. What are the contributions of hedge funds to financial instability? What is the optimal regulatory strategy to address the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability? And do new regulations in the U.S. and the EU address the contribution of hedge funds to financial instability? With respect to financial stability concerns, it is argued that despite their benefits, hedge funds can contribute to financial instability. Hedge funds’ size and leverage, their interconnectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), and the likelihood of herding behavior in the industry can potentially undermine financial stability. Nonetheless, the data on hedge funds’ size and leverage suggest that these features are far from being systemically important. In contrast, the empirical evidence on the interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs and their herding behavior is mixed. Based on these findings, the thesis focuses on one particular aspect of hedge fund regulation: direct vs. indirect regulation. In this respect, a major contribution of the thesis to the literature consists in the explicit discussion of the relationships between hedge funds and other market participants. Specifically, the thesis locates the domain of the indirect regulation in the inter-linkages between hedge funds and prime brokers. Accordingly, the thesis argues that the indirect regulation is likely to address the contribution of hedge funds to systemic risk without compromising their benefits to financial markets. The thesis further conducts a comparative study of the regulatory responses to the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability through studying the EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) and the hedge fund-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.

La Cooperativa Arroceros Villa Elisa, un buen ejemplo de la tradición cooperativista de Entre Ríos (Argentina)

Así como la Historia reconoce a Entre Ríos como cuna de la colonización, es también en esta provincia donde desde el comienzo del siglo XX se desarrolla el cooperativismo agrario que presta importantes servicios al asociado en materia de abastecimiento, comercialización y transformación. Prestación que se traduce en un uso más racional de la tierra, un mayor volumen de negocios, el mejoramiento en la calidad del producto, la utilización eficiente del capital, el aumento de la demanda por la ampliación de los mercados y la introducción de servicios que cada agricultor por si sólo no podría alcanzar. El presente artículo se propone analizar la trayectoria de una cooperativa arrocera -fundada en la década de 1970- ubicada en la localidad entrerriana de Villa Elisa que en mayor o menor media ha ido cumpliendo con esas prestaciones y que hoy se posiciona como el tercer exportador nacional de arroz y el primero de gestión cooperativa. Más allá de las cuestiones económicas, se prestará especial atención a la articulación interinstitucional de la empresa y a los cambios introducidos a nivel organizacional