Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark-up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent 30 years, little progress has been made, due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. The debate is resumed by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to ensure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of 12 construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Copyright exceptions and contract in the UK: the impact of recent amendments

In June and October 2014 a number of amendments to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 came into effect, introducing new copyright exceptions and amending several existing exceptions. Whilst following recent judicial review the private copying exception has been quashed, many of the remaining new exceptions significantly alter the relationship between copyright exceptions and contract, making contractual terms unenforceable where those terms restrict users from taking advantage of an exception. This paper explores the rationale for the UK amendments and considers whether the changes, as implemented, prevent rightsholders from contracting out of exceptions and whether they increase the clarity of the copyright system.

Crocodiles in the regulatory swamp: navigating the dangers of outsourcing, SaaS and shadow IT

Corporates are entering the brave new world of the internet and digitization without much regard for the fine print of a growing regulation regime. More traditional outsourcing arrangements are already falling foul of the regulators as rules and supervision intensifies. Furthermore, ‘shadow IT’ is proliferating as the attractions of SaaS, mobile, cloud services, social media, and endless new ‘apps’ drive usage outside corporate IT. Initial cost-benefit analyses of the Cloud make such arrangements look immediately attractive but losing control of architecture, security, applications and deployment can have far reaching and damaging regulatory consequences. From research in financial services, this paper details the increasing body of regulations, their inherent risks for businesses and how the dangers can be pre-empted and managed. We then delineate a model for managing these risks specifically focused on investigating, strategizing and governing outsourcing arrangements and related regulatory obligations

Describing Web Service Architectures through Design-by-Contract

Architectural description languages (ADLs) are used to specify a high-level, compositional view of a software application, specifying how a system is to be composed from coarse-grain components. ADLs usually come equipped with a formal dynamic semantics, facilitating specification and analysis of distributed and event-based systems. In this paper, we describe the TrustME, an ADL framework that provides both a process and a structural view of web service-based systems. We use Petri-net descriptions to give a dynamic view of business workflow for web service collaboration. We adapt the approach of Schmidt to define a form of Meyer's design-by-contract for configuring workflow architectures. This serves as a configuration-level means of constructing safer, more robust systems.

Trust-By-Contract: Modelling, Analysing and Predicting Behaviour in Software Architectures

Architecture description languages (ADLs) are used to specify high-level, compositional views of a software application. ADL research focuses on software composed of prefabricated parts, so-called software components. ADLs usually come equipped with rigorous state-transition style semantics, facilitating verification and analysis of specifications. Consequently, ADLs are well suited to configuring distributed and event-based systems. However, additional expressive power is required for the description of enterprise software architectures – in particular, those built upon newer middleware, such as implementations of Java’s EJB specification, or Microsoft’s COM+/.NET. The enterprise requires distributed software solutions that are scalable, business-oriented and mission-critical. We can make progress toward attaining these qualities at various stages of the software development process. In particular, progress at the architectural level can be leveraged through use of an ADL that incorporates trust and dependability analysis. Also, current industry approaches to enterprise development do not address several important architectural design issues. The TrustME ADL is designed to meet these requirements, through combining approaches to software architecture specification with rigorous design-by-contract ideas. In this paper, we focus on several aspects of TrustME that facilitate specification and analysis of middleware-based architectures for trusted enterprise computing systems.

Modelling and Administration of Contract-Based Systems

Mirroring the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, electronic contracts offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on agent behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. However, where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all; computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this paper, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, etc. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace example.

Towards a Monitoring Framework for Agent-Based Contract Systems

The behaviours of autonomous agents may deviate from those deemed to be for the good of the societal systems of which they are a part. Norms have therefore been proposed as a means to regulate agent behaviours in open and dynamic systems, and may be encoded in electronic contracts in order to specify the obliged, permitted and prohibited behaviours of agents that are signatories to such contracts. Enactment and management of electronic contracts thus enables the use of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agent behaviours comply with the encoded norms. To facilitate such mechanisms requires monitoring in order to detect and explain violation of norms. In this paper we propose a framework for monitoring that is to be implemented and integrated into a suite of contract enactment and management tools. The framework adopts a non-intrusive approach to monitoring, whereby the states of a contract with respect to its contained norms can be inferred on the basis of messages exchanged. Specifically, the framework deploys agents that observe messages sent between contract signatories, where these messages correspond to agent behaviours and therefore indicate whether norms are, or are in danger of, being violated.

A contract-based system for aerospace aftercare

The logistics of the aerospace aftermarket raises a number of very interesting challenges from the perspective of electronic contracting. This is a highly dynamic domain, where contracts are established between airlines and engine manufacturers, as well as between engine manufacturers all the way down the supply lines, providing a particularly illustrative showcase for the technologies developed in the CONTRACT project. In this paper, we describe such a domain, as well as our modelling of it as a multiagent simulator where the CONTRACT framework has been used to monitor for compliance with norms.

Monitoring and Explanation of Contract Execution: A Case Study in the Aerospace Domain

In the domain of aerospace aftermarkets, which often has long supply chains that feed into the maintenance of aircraft, contracts are used to establish agreements between aircraft operators and maintenance suppliers. However, violations at the bottom of the supply chain (part suppliers) can easily cascade to the top (aircraft operators), making it difficult to determine the source of the violation, and seek to address it. In this context, we have developed a global monitoring architecture that ensures the detection of norm violations and generates explanations for the origin of violations. In this paper, we describe the implementation and deployment of a global monitor in the aerospace domain of [8] and show how it generates explanations for violations within the maintenance supply chain. We show how these explanations can be used not only to detect violations at runtime, but also to uncover potential problems in contracts before their deployment, thus improving them.

Case studies for contract-based systems

Of the ways in which agent behaviour can be regulated in a multiagent system, electronic contracting – based on explicit representation of different parties' responsibilities, and the agreement of all parties to them – has significant potential for modern industrial applications. Based on this assumption, the CONTRACT project aims to develop and apply electronic contracting and contract-based monitoring and verification techniques in real world applications. This paper presents results from the initial phase of the project, which focused on requirements solicitation and analysis. Specifically, we survey four use cases from diverse industrial applications, examine how they can benefit from an agent-based electronic contracting infrastructure and outline the technical requirements that would be placed on such an infrastructure. We present the designed CONTRACT architecture and describe how it may fulfil these requirements. In addition to motivating our work on the contract-based infrastructure, the paper aims to provide a much needed community resource in terms of use case themselves and to provide a clear commercial context for the development of work on contract-based system.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Essays on industrial organization

Esta tese compõe-se de três ensaios que versam sobre o formato, em termos de estrutura de governança, das indústrias e como a estrutura interna das mesmas in fluenciam esses formatos e seus produtos. O primeiro capítulo apresenta um modelo de como a qualidade institucional, confiança e incompleteza contratual afetam as decisiões das firmas sobre a melhor forma de se organizarem internacionalmente. O segundo capítulo vai na mesma direcão de explicar a organização das indústrias, mas com foco no efeito da transmissão de informação entre as unidades constituintes das organizações sobre o formato ótimo das mesmas. Ambos trabalhos usam modelos dinâmicos. O terceiro capítulo se utiliza da modelagem de organização industrial para mostrar como a estrutura interna de uma indústria in fluencia no risco de crédito consignado.