Optimal intelligent supervisory control system in cyber-physical intelligence

This paper studies Optimal Intelligent Supervisory Control System (OISCS) model for the design of control systems which can work in the presence of cyber-physical elements with privacy protection. The development of such architecture has the possibility of providing new ways of integrated control into systems where large amounts of fast computation are not easily available, either due to limitations on power, physical size or choice of computing elements.

Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

Urban containment: An effective tool for environmental protection?

This paper examines the effectiveness of urban containment policies to protect forestland from residential conversion and to increase the provision of forest public goods in the presence of irreversible investments and policy uncertainty. We develop a model of a single landowner that allows for switching between competing land uses (forestry and residential use) at some point in the future. Our results show that urban containment policies can protect (even if temporarily) forestland from being developed but must be supplemented with policies that influence the length and number of harvesting cycles if the goal is to increase nontimber benefits. The threat of a development prohibition creates incentives for preemptive timber harvesting and land conversion. In particular, threatened regulation creates an incentive to shorten rotation cycles to avoid costly land-use restrictions. However, it has an ambiguous effect on forestland conversion as the number of rotation cycles can also be adjusted to maximize the expected returns to land. Finally, in the presence of irreversibility, forestland conversion decisions should be done using real option theory rather than net present value analysis

Innovation and environmental policy: Clean vs. dirty technical change

We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations. We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages research toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increasing the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one.

Optimal choice between even- and uneven-aged forestry: the case of non-industrial private forest owners

An infinite-horizon discrete time model with multiple size-class structures using a transition matrix is built to assess optimal harvesting schedules in the context of Non-Industrial Private Forest (NIPF) owners. Three model specifications accounting for forest income, financial return on an asset and amenity valuations are considered. Numerical simulations suggest uneven-aged forest management where a rational forest owner adapts her or his forest policy by influencing the regeneration of trees or adjusting consumption dynamics depending on subjective time preference and market return rate dynamics on the financial asset. Moreover she or he does not value significantly non-market benefits captured by amenity valuations relatively to forest income.

Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: in depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures

NIPE - WP 02/2016

Seguros Income Protection: análise segundo o sexo e a classe profissional dos segurados

Dissertação de mestrado em Economia Monetária, Bancária e Financeira

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Pareto-improving optimal capital and labor taxes

We show a standard model where the optimal tax reform is to cut labor taxes and leave capital taxes very high in the short and medium run. Only in the very long run would capital taxes be zero. Our model is a version of Chamley??s, with heterogeneous agents, without lump sum transfers, an upper bound on capital taxes, and a focus on Pareto improving plans. For our calibration labor taxes should be low for the first ten to twenty years, while capital taxes should be at their maximum. This policy ensures that all agents benefit from the tax reform and that capital grows quickly after when the reform begins. Therefore, the long run optimal tax mix is the opposite from the short and medium run tax mix. The initial labor tax cut is financed by deficits that lead to a positive long run level of government debt, reversing the standard prediction that government accumulates savings in models with optimal capital taxes. If labor supply is somewhat elastic benefits from tax reform are high and they can be shifted entirely to capitalists or workers by varying the length of the transition. With inelastic labor supply there is an increasing part of the equilibrium frontier, this means that the scope for benefitting the workers is limited and the total benefits from reforming taxes are much lower.

Optimal feedback control rules sensitive to controlled endogenous risk-aversion

The objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the theoretical literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (see, Jacobson, 1973, Karp, 1987 and Whittle, 1981, 1989, 1990, among others) or to the classic context of risk-neutral decision-makers (see, Chow, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1993). More realistic and attractive, this new approach is placed in the context of a time-varying endogenous risk-aversion which is under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong qualitative implications on the agent's optimal policy during the entire planning horizon.

Parental Leave and Mothers' Careers: The Relative Importance of Job Protection and Cash Benefits

Job protection and cash benefits are key elements of parental leave (PL) systems. We study how these two policy instruments affect return-to-work and medium-run labour market outcomes of mothers of newborn children. Analysing a series of major PL policy changes in Austria, we find that longer cash benefits lead to a significant delay in return-to-work, particularly so in the period that is job-protected. Prolonged parental leave absence induced by these policy changes does not appear to hurt mothers' labour market outcomes in the medium run. We build a non-stationary model of job search after childbirth to isolate the role of the two policy instruments. The model matches return-to-work and return to same employer profiles under the various factual policy configurations. Counterfactual policy simulations indicate that a system that combines cash with protection dominates other systems in generating time for care immediately after birth while maintaining mothers' medium-run labour market attachment.

DQB1 locus alone explains most of the risk and protection in narcolepsy with cataplexy in Europe.

STUDY OBJECTIVE: Prior research has identified five common genetic variants associated with narcolepsy with cataplexy in Caucasian patients. To replicate and/or extend these findings, we have tested HLA-DQB1, the previously identified 5 variants, and 10 other potential variants in a large European sample of narcolepsy with cataplexy subjects. DESIGN: Retrospective case-control study. SETTING: A recent study showed that over 76% of significant genome-wide association variants lie within DNase I hypersensitive sites (DHSs). From our previous GWAS, we identified 30 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) with P < 10(-4) mapping to DHSs. Ten SNPs tagging these sites, HLADQB1, and all previously reported SNPs significantly associated with narcolepsy were tested for replication. PATIENTS AND PARTICIPANTS: For GWAS, 1,261 narcolepsy patients and 1,422 HLA-DQB1*06:02-matched controls were included. For HLA study, 1,218 patients and 3,541 controls were included. MEASUREMENTS AND RESULTS: None of the top variants within DHSs were replicated. Out of the five previously reported SNPs, only rs2858884 within the HLA region (P < 2x10(-9)) and rs1154155 within the TRA locus (P < 2x10(-8)) replicated. DQB1 typing confirmed that DQB1*06:02 confers an extraordinary risk (odds ratio 251). Four protective alleles (DQB1*06:03, odds ratio 0.17, DQB1*05:01, odds ratio 0.56, DQB1*06:09 odds ratio 0.21, DQB1*02 odds ratio 0.76) were also identified. CONCLUSION: An overwhelming portion of genetic risk for narcolepsy with cataplexy is found at DQB1 locus. Since DQB1*06:02 positive subjects are at 251-fold increase in risk for narcolepsy, and all recent cases of narcolepsy after H1N1 vaccination are positive for this allele, DQB1 genotyping may be relevant to public health policy.

When is Monetary Policy All we Need?

We consider optimal monetary and scal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need - analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, rstly, that this is even when true when allowing for in ation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as long as there is no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative prices rather than demand.

Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be imposed over a very long future. The conventional claim by environmental economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have this degree of commitment. We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the environment. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect. Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently governments may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.