Una nueva rábita en la playa de Guardamar del Segura: la rábita de El Moncayo

Se publican las noticias que ha arrojado la excavación en 2004 de unos muros situados en la denominada playa de El Moncayo. Los hallazgos se sitúan a unos 3 kilómetros al Sur del casco urbano de Guardamar del Segura; a unos 135 m. en dirección Norte está la Torre del Descargador (torre almenara de los siglos IV/X y V/XI), a unos 3,5 kilómetros se localiza El Castillo de Guardamar (de los siglos VIII a.C. al XIX) y, un poco más al Norte, a unos 4 kilómetros, en las proximidades de la desembocadura del Segura, los oratorios o rábitas de las dunas de Guardamar. Se dan a conocer los restos arquitectónicos y cerámicos aparecidos en la excavación del 2004 que se interpretan como de restos del recinto de una rábita o mezquitilla (cuando se excave más se verá si está aislada o hay más edificios similares), se presentan unos apuntes al hilo de la orientación de la rábita de El Moncayo y un estudio de la moneda andalusí hallada en la excavación de El Moncayo (datables entre en 429/1037-8 y 433/1041-2).

Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible. OSW Commentary No. 63, 2011-10-14

When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF reform only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis. For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conservative and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankruptcy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduction of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the new, poorer members of the eurozone.

Grexit 2015: A primer. CEPS Commentary, 22 January 2015

In the run-up to the Greek elections on January 25th and the subsequent renegotiation of the country's economic adjustment programme with the troika, Daniel Gros writes in this Commentary that "nobody officially wants Grexit": not Syriza, which wants Greece to stay in the euro. It is ‘only’ asking for a reduction in Greece���s official debt and an end to austerity. The German government also does not favour Grexit because European unification remains the central project for German policy-makers across all mainstream parties. Only some protest parties and vocal economists think Greece (and Germany) would better off with a new Drachma. In his view, the substantive issues are thus the demands for a reduction of the official debt of Greece and an end to austerity, both of which he describes as eminently fudgeable. In any event, change in policy will be minor if a Syriza government is as successful in fulfilling its promise to spend as the previous government was in promising not to spend.

A Greek way out? CEPS Commentary, 5 February 2015

In his analysis of the basic compromise that is emerging between the new left-wing government of Greece and its European partners, Daniel Gros emphasises that the key element will be how the real problem, namely liquidity, is dealt with.

A Greek tragedy in the making. EPC Commentary, 6 July 2015

One thing is clear: the Greek people have emphatically voted ‘No’, providing a boost to Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and plunging Greece and the Eurozone even more into uncertainty. But it might, at the end of the day, prove to be a hollow victory for the Greek Prime Minister: the vote cannot compel the rest of the Eurozone to open their coffers and provide the funds Greece so desperately needs. It is certainly not a victory for democracy: it is highly questionable whether the Greek people could form an informed opinion, given the short time frame, the unclear question relying on a proposal no longer on the table, and the high level of misinformation on the potential consequences of the vote. This is no victory, neither for Greece nor the EU and its members: in the end, it increases the danger of Greece leaving the Eurozone – and potentially even an eventual exit from the EU –, which the people of Greece clearly do not want, as 75-80 per cent of citizens firmly want the country to stay in the euro.

The shipwreck /

Mode of access: Internet.

La bataille de Salamine,

At head of title: Les Guerres médiques.

Ein beitrag zur darstellung der schlacht bei Salamis ...

Lebenslauf.

Hē en Salamini naumachia.

Romanized record.

Gret︠s︡īi︠a︡ v vi︠e︡k Perikla.

Translation of: Greece in the age of Pericles.

Athens, the violet-crowned,

Athens, the violet-crowned.--Saunterings and suprises.--The Acropolis.--The Eleusinian mysteries.--The story of Dr. Schliemann.--The archæological schools in Athens.--Greek sculpture and philosophy.--Contemporary literature in Greece.--Ethical poetry of Greece.--The charm of Corfu.--The royal family of Greece.--The progress of Greece.--The first century of Greek independence.

Tradiciones infundadas : examen de las que se refieren al pendón morado de Castilla, las joyas de Isabel la Católica, las naves de Cortés, el salto de Alvarado, la Virgen de Lepanto, el estandarte de Don Juan de Austria y otras /

Includes bibliographical references ([663]-677).

Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe

Nation-building processes in the Orthodox commonwealth brought together political institutions and religious communities in their shared aims of achieving national sovereignty. Chronicling how the churches of Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia acquired independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the wake of the Ottoman Empire’s decline, Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe examines the role of Orthodox churches in the construction of national identities. Drawing on archival material available after the fall of communism in southeastern Europe and Russia, as well as material published in Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Russian, Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe analyzes the challenges posed by nationalism to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the ways in which Orthodox churches engaged in the nationalist ideology.

A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis

The euro area‘s sovereign debt crisis continues though significant steps have been taken to resolve it. This paper proposes a comprehensive solution to the crisis based on three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness in the whole euro area, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis -including a revision of EU assistance facilities and a reduction of the Greek public debt- and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.

Tanulságok a gazdasági és monetáris unió számára a 2008-as világgazdasági válság kapcsán (Lessons for the Economic and Monetary Union from the 2008 global economic crisis)

Írásunkban a 2008-ban kitört világgazdasági válságnak a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unióra gyakorolt hatásait elemezzük. Tanulmányunkban rávilágítunk a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió két olyan problémájára, amelyek a válság után váltak igazán nyilvánvalóvá. Egyrészt a görög államcsődveszély, illetve egyes, korábban jól teljesítő országok botladozása jelzi, hogy a Monetáris Unió intézményrendszere legalábbis hiányos. A másik kérdés összefügg az előzővel, és azon országok szemszögéből érdekes, amelyek csatlakozni kívánnak a GMU-hoz: felerősödtek azok a vélemények, amelyek a csatlakozás elhalasztása mellett foglalnak állást. Tanulmányunk második részében ezt a kérdést járjuk körbe. / === / In our paper we are analyze the effects of the economic crisis of 2008 on the Economic and Monetary Union. We are focusing on two core problems of the EMU which came to surface only after the outbreak of the crisis. First, we address the fiscal problems of Greece and other member states which performed well before the crisis. These problems show that there are major institutional shortcomings in the Monetary Union. The second question is connected to the first one and concerns the new member states of the European Union and their strategies to join the Euro zone. After the crisis more and more voices in the new member states suggest postponing EMU membership.