On governance structures for the cloud computing services and assessing their effectiveness

This research suggests information technology (IT) governance structures to manage the cloud computing services. The interest in acquiring IT resources as a utility from the cloud computing environment is gaining momentum. The cloud computing services present organizations with opportunities to manage their IT expenditure on an ongoing basis, and access to modern IT resources to innovate and manage their continuity. However, the cloud computing services are no silver bullet. Organizations would need to have appropriate governance structures and policies in place to manage the cloud computing services. The subsequent decisions from these governance structures will ensure the effective management of the cloud computing services. This management will facilitate a better fit of the cloud computing services into organizations’ existing processes to achieve the business (process-level) and the financial (firm-level) objectives. Using a triangulation approach, we suggest four governance structures for managing the cloud computing services. These structures are a chief cloud officer, a cloud management committee, a cloud service facilitation centre, and a cloud relationship centre. We also propose that these governance structures would relate directly to organizations cloud computing services-related business objectives, and indirectly to cloud computing services-related financial objectives. Perceptive field survey data from actual and prospective cloud computing service adopters suggest that the suggested governance structures would contribute directly to cloud computing-related business objectives and indirectly to cloud computing-related financial objectives.

Examining corporate governance disclosures of listed companies in Fiji

In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - introduced the Code of Corporate Governance (the Code). The Code is ‘principle-based’ and requires companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) and the financial intermediaries to disclose their compliance with the Code’s principles. While compliance with the Code is mandatory, the nature and extent of disclosure is at the discretion of the complying entities. Agency theory and signalling theory suggest that firms with higher expected levels of agency costs will provide greater levels of voluntary disclosures as signals of strong corporate governance. Thus, the study seeks to test these theories by examining the heterogeneity of corporate governance disclosures by firms listed on SPSE, and determining the characteristics of firms that provide similar levels of disclosures. We conducted a content analysis of corporate governance disclosures on the annual reports of firms from 2008-2012. The study finds that large, non-family owned firms with high levels of shareholder dispersion provide greater quantity and higher quality corporate governance disclosures. For firms that are relatively smaller, family owned and have low levels of shareholder dispersion, the quantity and quality of corporate governance disclosures are much lower. Some of these firms provide boilerplate disclosures with minimal changes in the following years. These findings support the propositions of agency and signalling theory, which suggest that firms with higher separation between agents and principals will provide more voluntary disclosures to reduce expected agency costs transfers. Semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders further reinforce the findings. The interviews also reveal that complying entities positively perceive the introduction of the Code. Furthermore, while compliance with Code brought about additional costs, they believed that most of these costs were minimal and one-off, and the benefits of greater corporate disclosure to improve user decision making outweighed the costs. The study contributes to the literature as it provides insight into the experience of a small capital market with introducing a ‘principle-based’ Code that attempts to encourage corporate governance practices through enhanced disclosure. The study also assists policy makers better understand complying entities’ motivations for compliance and the extent of compliance.

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

Enterprise Business Technology Governance: Three Competencies to Build Board Digital Leadership Capability.

The competent leadership of digital transformation needs to involve the board of directors. The reported lack of such capability in boards is becoming a pressing issue. A part of leadership in such transformation is the board of director’s competence to lead Enterprise Business Technology Governance (EBTG). In this paper we take the position that EBTG competencies are essential in boards, because competent EBTG has been shown to contribute to increased revenue, profit, and returns. We update and expand on the results of a multi-method approach to the development of a set of three board of director competencies needed for effective EBTG.

Turnbull : generating undue expectations of the corporate governance role of audit committees

Following an initial consultation draft (Turnbull 1999a), the Internal control Working Party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, chaired by Nigel Turnbull, executive director of Rank Group plc. has published Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Listed companies Incorporated in the UK (Turnbull, 1999b). The guidance is commonly referred to as the Turnbull Report. This paper outlines the key recommendations of the report and discusses some of its implications, particularly in the context of the increasing emphasis on a broader corporate governance role for audit committees. The paper suggests that the increasing role envisaged of audit committees for example lately in the UK by Turnbull, may generate undue expectations are premised on an unsubstantiated notion of the contribution of audit committees.

The corporate governance effects of audit committees

Arguments associated with the promotion of audit committees in many countries are premised on their potential for alleviating weaknesses in corporate governance. This paper provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is argued that there is only limited and mixed evidence of effects to support claims and perceptions about the value of audit committees for these elements of governance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behaviour. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (i) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (ii) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (iii) complementing extant research methods with field studie, and; (iv) investigation of unintended (behavioural) as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

Convergence in the ownership and governance of East Asian firms

In the past decade, policymakers in over 70 markets have introduced corporate governance codes or best practice guidelines. In East Asia, they have been introduced in Hong Kong in 1999 and 2006, Indonesia in 2000 and 2007, Malaysia in 2000 and 2007, the Philippines in 2002, Singapore iu 2001 and 2005, South Korea in 2003, Taiwan iu 2002 and Thailand iu 2006. The common focus of these codes is to encourage but not force companies to improve their corporate governance practices to a specified target level, e.g., board independence of 30%. Another commonality is that the guidelines apply to all listed companies regardless of their ownership structure or other characteristics.

Exploring the usefulness of structural–functional approaches to analyse governance of planning systems

Existing planning theories tend to be limited in their analytical scope and often fail to account for the impact of many interactions between the multitudes of stakeholders involved in strategic planning processes. Although many theorists rejected structural–functional approaches from the 1970s, this article argues that many of structural–functional concepts remain relevant and useful to planning practitioners. In fact, structural–functional approaches are highly useful and practical when used as a foundation for systemic analysis of real-world, multi-layered, complex planning systems to support evidence-based governance reform. Such approaches provide a logical and systematic approach to the analysis of the wider governance of strategic planning systems that is grounded in systems theory and complementary to existing theories of complexity and planning. While we do not propose its use as a grand theory of planning, this article discusses how structural–functional concepts and approaches might be applied to underpin a practical analysis of the complex decision-making arrangements that drive planning practice, and to provide the evidence needed to target reform of poorly performing arrangements.

On the efficacy of key corporate governance recommendations in mid-tier companies : window-dressing or value-adding?

This paper examins the relationship between firm performance and key board and audit committee variables in a sample of mid-tier listed Australian firms. Unlike the UK where the corporate governance Code specifically outlines special arrangements for companies outside the FTSE 350 index, the ASX Corporate Governance recommendations make no special provisions for mid-tier companies. Consequently, mid-tier Australian companies may be expending scarce resources in conforming with recommendations that are not value-creating.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Convergence in European corporate governance : the audit committee concept

This paper analyses recent corporate governance codes issued by 20 countries for evidence of convergence in corporate governance systems in Europe. The analysis shows that there has been a degree of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as the audit committee concept is widely accepted in countries with both unitary and two-tier governance systems. Further, the latest audit committee recommendations in countries that have issued several governance codes show a strengthening of the recommendations for an audit committee over time in line with the Anglo-Saxon audit committee concept and convergence with the debate in the US and UK on issues such as the independence and financial expertise of members. However, consistent with the literature on the convergence of European corporate governance systems, at an operational level there is limited consistency in the recommended structure and role of audit committees.

Volunteering and recent governance reforms

The regulatory reforms touching volunteer governs over the last 25 years are identified and analysed. BOth direct reforms such as the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission's (ACNC) governance standards and society--wide indirect reforms to workplace health and safety, civil liability and deemed liability provisions are discussed in this chapter.

The ACNC's new governance rules

Australian charities have a new regulator in the form of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) which began operations in December 2012; and new governance rules which applied from 1 July 2013. While there is some uncertainty over the ACNC's future, the new legislative framework currently applies to approximately 58,000 charities which seek federal tax concessions and other benefits, and includes governance standards that apply across charitable organisational forms (company, trust and association) with some exceptions. The governance standards are a minimum benchmark that many charities will already meet, if they are companies or incorporated associations.

Corporate governance and bankruptcy risk

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge, and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit services fees

This paper extends prior research on the relationship between governance quality and auditor remuneration.We examine the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE), a proxy for governance quality, on audit fees (AF) and non-audit services fees (NASF) using a new composite measure comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. We find that after controlling for board of director characteristics, there is a significant positive association between ACE and AF only for larger clients. Our results indicate that effective audit committees undertake more monitoring which results in wider audit scope and higher audit fees. Contrary to our expectations, we find the association between ACE and NASF to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggests that larger clients are more likely to purchase non-audit services (NAS) even in the presence of effective audit committees probably due to the complexity of their activities. Overall, our findings support regulatory initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance quality.