The phenomenology of mind.

Translation of Phänomenologie des Geistes.

Study of population and immigration problems. Administrative presentations (III): Admission of aliens into the United States for temporary employment and "Commuter Workers"; presentations by the Dept. of Labor and the Dept. of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service) [to] Subcommittee No. 1.

"Special series no. 11."

To revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code. Hearings before the Committee on immigration and naturalization, House of representatives, Seventy-sixth Congress, first session, on H. R. 6127, superseded by H. R. 9980, a bill to revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code. January 17, February 13, 20, 27, 28, March 5, April 11, 16, 23, May 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 14, and June 5, 1940 ...

Samuel Dickstein, chairman.

Syllabus of the naturalization law.

Mode of access: Internet.

Syllabus of the naturalization law: an aid to public-school teachers in the instruction of aliens in the requirements of the naturalization law.

Mode of access: Internet.

The phenomenology of minority-majority status:effects on innovation in argument generation

In three experiments, we manipulated participants' perceived numerical status and compared the originality and creativity of arguments generated by members of numerical minorities and majorities. Independent judges, blind to experimental conditions, rated participants' written arguments. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants assigned to a numerical minority generated more original arguments when advocating their own position than did numerical majorities. In Study 3, an equal-factions control group was included in the design, and all participants were instructed to argue for a counter-attitudinal position. Those in the numerical minority generated more creative arguments than those in both the majority and equal-factions conditions, but not stronger arguments. We propose cognitive and social processes that may underlie our obtained effects and discuss implications for minority influence research.

A phenomenology of crack abuse

The aim of this dissertation is to identify, describe, and explain the common experiences defining the crack abuser's life-world. Its method is phenomenological. Using basic cybernetic premises, a neurophysiologically oriented phenomenological framework concerning the constitution of thoughts, memories, and perceptions is first written. The framework is designed to hypothetically represent the neuropathology of crack abuse within a perspective that prescinds and describes the constitution, flow, and interdependence of experience. After the framework is written, the dissertation outlines the neuro-psychopharmacology of crack abuse and delimits crack abusers as a specific group within the more general population of cocaine users. It then represents the neuropathology of crack abuse within its phenomenological framework and uses the first-person accounts of forty-two crack dependents to actualize a phenomenological sketch of the crack abuser's life-world. The ethnographies afford the possibility of writing a “thick” description of the crack abuser's daily life—one that communicates the substance, order, and subjective and cultural dimensions of the dependent's defining experiences. ^ The dissertation's goals are successfully realized. The framework written and the ethnographies recorded and transcribed, the dissertation is able to identify, describe, and to a certain extent explain some of the common experiences defining the crack abusers life-world. The dissertation concludes that the crack abuser's life-world is organized around three primary and four secondary experiences. His primary experiences include: (1) an almost complete, yet fleeting, satisfaction of the ego's innate insufficiency and sublime, erotic-like stimulation of its core, (2) a fundamental inclination and expansion of the uniquely oriented euphoria-dysphoria dynamic that vivifies and orients the flow of consciousness, and (3) a change in the ego's innate structure. His secondary experiences include: (a) a characteristic aiming of projects, actions, and conduct toward the procurement and consumption of crack, (b) a denigration in the hold of legitimations and institutionalizations on the thematic field, (c) a strict alignment and a contraction in the scope of logical types pointing to the salient experiences within the stock of knowledge, and (d) for some crack abusers, ontological insecurity, despair, and exhaustion. ^

A hermeneutic phenomenology of graduate education students' understandings of instructor power in a higher education classroom

Higher education is a distribution center of knowledge and economic, social, and cultural power (Cervero & Wilson, 2001). A critical approach to understanding a higher education classroom begins with recognizing the instructor's position of power and authority (Tisdell, Hanley, & Taylor, 2000). The power instructors wield exists mostly unquestioned, allowing for teaching practices that reproduce the existing societal patterns of inequity in the classroom (Brookfield, 2000). ^ The purpose of this hermeneutic phenomenological study was to explore students' experiences with the power of their instructors in a higher education classroom. A hermeneutic phenomenological study intertwines the interpretations of both the participants and the researcher about a lived experience to uncover layers of meaning because the meanings of lived experiences are usually not readily apparent (van Manen, 1990). Fifteen participants were selected using criterion, convenience, and snowball sampling. The primary data gathering method were semi-structured interviews guided by an interview protocol (Creswell, 2003). Data were interpreted using thematic reflection (van Manen, 1990). ^ Three themes emerged from data interpretation: (a) structuring of instructor-student relationships, (b) connecting power to instructor personality, and (c) learning to navigate the terrains of higher education. How interpersonal relationships were structured in a higher education classroom shaped how students perceived power in that higher education classroom. Positive relationships were described using the metaphor of family and a perceived ethic of caring and nurturing by the instructor. As participants were consistently exposed to exercises of instructor power in a higher education classroom, they attributed those exercises of power to particular instructor traits rather than systemic exercises of power. As participants progressed from undergraduate to graduate studies, they perceived the benefits of expertise in content or knowledge development as secondary to expertise in successfully navigating the social, cultural, political, and interpersonal terrains of higher education. Ultimately, participants expressed that higher education is not about what you know; it is about learning how to play the game. Implications for teaching in higher education and considerations for future research conclude the study.^

Playing the Game: A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Graduate Education Students’ Perceptions of Instructor Power in a Higher Education Classroom

The purpose of this hermeneutic phenomenological study was to explore students’ experiences with the power of their instructors in a higher education classroom. This study provides a deeper understanding of instructor power from student perspectives to inform teaching practices in the higher education classroom.

The gift of the ungiven: Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness facing Levinas’ “there is”

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness constitutes one of the most outstanding attempts to set up a universal theory of the phenomenologically given as a whole within the framework of contemporary philosophical thought. The aim of the present study is to apply the main categories of this phenomenological theory concerning gift to the singular type of phenomenon represented by the pure indeterminate and anonymous being to which Emmanuel Levinas refers by the name of il y a (“there is”) in his early writings (and also subsequently). Therefore, this concerns examining the multiple specific modes of giveness proper to the impersonal “there is” and also its paradoxical relationship both with the donor and with the receiver of such gift in order to show the possibility of a “third way” of phenomenological investigation. This is a way equally distant from the western traditional concept of Being as “stable presence” and from Levinas’ proposal geared to substitute ontology for ethics as “first philosophy”.

Is Merleau-Ponty's position in phenomenology of perception a new type of transcendental idealism?

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.

A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIMETIC LEARNING AND MULTIMODAL COGNITION: INTEGRATING EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE INTO PROGRAMS IN RHETORIC, COMPOSITION, AND TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION

My dissertation emphasizes a cognitive account of multimodality that explicitly integrates experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many composition and technical communication programs. In these disciplines, multimodality is widely conceived in terms of what Gunther Kress calls “socialsemiotic” modes of communication shaped primarily by culture. In the cognitive and neurolinguistic theories of Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff, however, multimodality is described as a key characteristic of our bodies’ sensory-motor systems which link perception to action and action to meaning, grounding all communicative acts in knowledge shaped through body-engaged experience. I argue that this “situated” account of cognition – which closely approximates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, a major framework for my study – has pedagogical precedence in the mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical training, and I reveal that training’s multimodal dimensions through a phenomenological exegesis of the concept mimesis. Plato’s denigration of the mimetic tradition and his elevation of conceptual contemplation through reason, out of which developed the classic Cartesian separation of mind from body, resulted in a general degradation of experiential knowledge in Western education. But with the recent introduction into college classrooms of digital technologies and multimedia communication tools, renewed emphasis is being placed on the “hands-on” nature of inventive and productive praxis, necessitating a revision of methods of instruction and assessment that have traditionally privileged the acquisition of conceptual over experiential knowledge. The model of multimodality I construct from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, ancient Sophistic rhetorical pedagogy, and current neuroscientific accounts of situated cognition insists on recognizing the significant role knowledges we acquire experientially play in our reading and writing, speaking and listening, discerning and designing practices.

Book review : intending the world : a phenomenology of international affairs

Book review of Intending the World: A Phenomenology of International Affairs by Ralph Pettman.

Merleau-Ponty's conception of dialectics in phenomenology of perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.