RAIMOUEST : la pêcherie française de raies dans le golfe normand-breton

The landing ban of Raja undulata has raised misunderstanding for French fishermen, particularly for those fishing in the Norman‐Breton gulf (Southeast of ICES Division VIIe) where this species is very abundant. In this context, the RAIMOUEST project was launched as a professional and scientist partnership in order to enhance fisheries data on the main ray species caught in the Norman-Breton Gulf (Raja undulata, Raja brachyura, Raja clavata, Raja montagui and Raja microocellata). The French ray fisheries fleet was identified and a sample of fishermen involved in rays fishing was interviewed. Landings and effort data (logbooks), auctions sales and sampling at sea aboard professional fishing vessels were analysed. This working document presents the current results of this study. The French fleet concerned by ray fishing in the Normand-Breton Gulf in 2012 was composed of 289 vessels, mainly coastal trawlers/dredgers and small length size netters and longliners. R. undulata is the main ray species in this area. This species seems to form a local stock in the Normand-Breton Gulf with some continuity in the Eastern English Channel and the Western part of the Western English Channel. Three ways of analysis were used to provide an indicative level of R. undulata stock: French landings before 2009 were estimated at least at 300 tons in the Western English Channel (VIIe) and 160 tons in the Normand-Breton Gulf; sales at auctions of the Basse-Normandie fleet before 2009 were estimated at 235 tons in the western English Channel and 35 tons in the eastern English Channel (VIId); discards by the French bottom trawl fleet in ICES Division VIIe in 2012 and 2013 were estimated at 750 tons. Information on the spatial distribution of the other ray species in the English Channel was also provided. The coastal localisation of nursery for R. undulata and R. clavata was highlighted.

Provable Security for Cryptocurrencies

The past several years have seen the surprising and rapid rise of Bitcoin and other “cryptocurrencies.” These are decentralized peer-to-peer networks that allow users to transmit money, tocompose financial instruments, and to enforce contracts between mutually distrusting peers, andthat show great promise as a foundation for financial infrastructure that is more robust, efficientand equitable than ours today. However, it is difficult to reason about the security of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin is a complex system, comprising many intricate and subtly-interacting protocol layers. At each layer it features design innovations that (prior to our work) have not undergone any rigorous analysis. Compounding the challenge, Bitcoin is but one of hundreds of competing cryptocurrencies in an ecosystem that is constantly evolving. The goal of this thesis is to formally reason about the security of cryptocurrencies, reining in their complexity, and providing well-defined and justified statements of their guarantees. We provide a formal specification and construction for each layer of an abstract cryptocurrency protocol, and prove that our constructions satisfy their specifications. The contributions of this thesis are centered around two new abstractions: “scratch-off puzzles,” and the “blockchain functionality” model. Scratch-off puzzles are a generalization of the Bitcoin “mining” algorithm, its most iconic and novel design feature. We show how to provide secure upgrades to a cryptocurrency by instantiating the protocol with alternative puzzle schemes. We construct secure puzzles that address important and well-known challenges facing Bitcoin today, including wasted energy and dangerous coalitions. The blockchain functionality is a general-purpose model of a cryptocurrency rooted in the “Universal Composability” cryptography theory. We use this model to express a wide range of applications, including transparent “smart contracts” (like those featured in Bitcoin and Ethereum), and also privacy-preserving applications like sealed-bid auctions. We also construct a new protocol compiler, called Hawk, which translates user-provided specifications into privacy-preserving protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs.

Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.