Vote of the Corporation continuing the salary of the President up to the next commencement,

This folder contains two nineteenth-century handwritten copies of the vote.

Vote of the Corporation accepting Kirkland's resignation,

This folder contains a nineteenth-century handwritten copy of the vote.

Answer to vote of Corporation,

This folder contains a nineteenth-century copy of Kirkland's original letter.

Copy of the Corporation vote regarding the death of Francis Sales, 1854 February 25

One-page handwritten copy of the Harvard Corporation vote of condolence following the death of Francis Sales.

Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decision-making in the EU. IHS Political Science Series No. 132, February 2013

The EU has tried to bridge decision making by qualified majority and unanimity over the years by expanding qualified majorities (consensus) or by making unanimities easier to achieve. I call this decision-making procedure q-“unanimity” and trace its history from the Luxembourg compromise to the Lisbon Treaty, and to more recent agreements. I analyze the most recent and explicit mechanism of this bridging (article 31 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty) and identify one specific means by which the transformation of qualified majorities to unanimities is achieved: the reduction of precision or scope of the decision, so that different behaviors can be covered by it. I provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism by analyzing legislative decisions. Finally, I argue that this bridging is a ubiquitous feature of EU institutions, used in Treaties as well as in legislative decision-making.