Becoming private property: custom, law, and the geographies of ‘ownership’ in 18th- and 19th-century England

The making private of hitherto public goods is a central tenet of neoliberalism. From land in Africa, Asia, and South America to the assertion of property rights over genes and cells by corporations, the process(es) of making private property matters more than ever. And yet, despite this importance, we know remarkably little about the spatial plays through which things become private property. In this paper I seek to address this imbalance by focusing upon the formative context of 18th- and early-19th-century England. The specific lens is wood, that most critical of all ‘natural’ things other than land in the transition to market-driven economies. It is shown that the interplay between custom, law, and local practices rendered stable and aspatial definitions of property impossible. Whilst law was the key technology through which property was mediated, the cadence of particular places gave these mediations distinctive forms. I conclude that not only must we take property seriously, but we must also take the conditions and contexts of its making seriously too.

Sex Offender Registration: Some Observations on ‘Megan’s Law’ and the Sex Offenders Act 1997

“Megan’s Law” in the United States and Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 in the United Kingdom, make provision for the creation of a register which will record the names and addresses of all persons convicted or cautioned for a sexual offence. Arguments expounded in favour of the legislation include the supposedly high recidivism among sex offenders, the inadequacy of supervision provisions, and the resulting need to ‘track’ the dangerous offender for public protection. In practice, however, there are a plethora of obstacles, such as cost and inadequate policing resources, which may impede its effectiveness in aiding law enforcement and reduce it to symbolic significance only. In addition, there are an array of ethical objections to the legislation, such as it breaches civil liberties and constitutes ‘double jeopardy’, which may prevent meaningful imposition.