Jeux et Enjeux des couleurs dans le champ sociopolitique camerounais

La scene politique camerounaise est l'objet de nombre de contradictions, d'absurdites qui font que le motif ''irregularite'' ou celui de ''fraude'' sont toujours presents à l'issue d'echeance electorale. Parmi les causes de ces irregularites figure lecaractere deloyal des scrutins au Cameroun. Qui s'observe dans l'organisation le deroulement et le depouillement des voix. Cependant, dans ce travail, il est plus question de l'occupation spatiale des differents partis à travers les affiches de campagnes et la representation de ces partis dans l'imaginaire collectif des Camerounais. Que ce soit au niveau du dimensionnement des affiches, du temps d'antennes dans les medas chauds aloué à chaque parti, tout se dispose en sorte que le parti au pouvoir demeure.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Jeux sur mobile: les développeurs et le rôle des plates-formes de logiciels

Les jeux sur mobile sont un exemple majeur à la fois d'une application réussie sur les mobiles et du nombre croissant de plates-formes pour les médias et les industries de loisirs. Explorant cette convergence, l'article analyse les caractéristiques principales du marché des jeux sur mobile et de son écosystème industriel, ses activités et acteurs principaux. L'article se concentre sur le rôle des différentes plates-formes de logiciels et sur les défis et opportunités futures pour les développeurs de jeux sur mobile dans un nouveau scénario dominé par les plates-formes de mobile.

L’empire vidéoludique : comment les jeux vidéo ont conquis l’univers de Star Wars

Il est difficile de discuter des développements intermédiaux de Star Wars sans évoquer la vision de l'instigateur de cet univers de science-fiction en constante expansion, George Lucas, qui a su mesuer l'importance qu'allait prendre le jeu vidéo (et, plus généralement, le phénomène des produits dérivés). Au-delà des considérations purement économiques,c'est d'abord par fascination personnelle que Lucas vient au 10e art. [...]

Dictionnaire de l'industrie, ou, Collection raisonnée des procédés utiles dans les sciences et dans les arts : contenant nombre de secrets curieux & intéressants pour l'économie & les besoins de la vie : l'indication de différentes expériences à faire : la description de plusieurs jeux très singuliers & très amusants : les notices de découvertes & inventions nouvelles : les détails nécessaires pour se mettre à l'abri des fraudes & falsifications dans plusieurs objets de commerce & de fabrique : ouvrage également propre aux artistes, aux négociants & aux gens du monde /

The article "Jeux" contains descriptions of experiments with electricity (v. 2, p. 288-352); the article "Oiseaux" contains music illustrating bird songs (v. 3, p. 55-56).

Encyclopédie méthodique : Dictionnaire des jeux, faisant suite au tome III des Mathématiques.

Mode of access: Internet.

Académie universelle des jeux : contenant les regles de tous les jeux, avec des instructions faciles pour apprendre à les bien jouer ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Académie universelle des jeux : contenant les regles de tous les jeux, avec des instructions faciles pour apprendre à les bien jouer ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Les jeux des anciens : leur description, leur origine, leurs rapports avec la religion, l'histoire, les arts et les moeurs /

Mode of access: Internet.

Essai d'analyse sur les jeux de hazards.

Mode of access: Internet.

Traité des jeux et des divertissemens : qui peuvent être permis ou qui doivent être dèfendus aux Chrêtiens selon les regles de l'Eglise et le sentiment des peres /

Mode of access: Internet.

Académie universelle des jeux : contenant les régles de tous les jeux de quadrille, & quinquille, de l'hombre à trois, du piquet, du réversis, des echecs, du trictrac, & de tous les autres jeux ... avec des instructions faciles pour apprendre à les bien jouer

Mode of access: Internet.

The Spirit of the public journals : being an impartial selection of the most exquisite essays and jeux d'esprits, principally prose, that appear in the newspapers and other publications.

Half wine colored calf, original paper label preserved at the end, top edges gilt, and others trimmed.