Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

European Neighbourhood Policy Package - Conclusions for the Eastern Partners. OSW Commentary No. 78, 2012-05-25

In 2011 the European Union began a process aimed at reforming its policy on the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. The change in circumstances in neighbouring countries following the Arab Spring, along with the lack of significant progress regarding Eastern Europe’s integration with the EU, formed the main driving force behind this process. The prime objective of the changes to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the need to introduce new incentives for partner countries to modernise and integrate more closely with the EU Another aim was to increase the flexibility of EU instruments (by adapting them to the specific context of each partner state). One year later, on 15 May 2012, the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published the European Neighbourhood Policy Package which reported on the progress made in the implementation of the ENP over the preceding year and set out the aims and Action Plans for 20131. An analysis of the outcomes of changes made to the EU policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus suggests that the aim of the revision was aimed more at addressing the changing political landscape in the region rather than at the implementation of a substantial reform of the neighbourhood policy. The ENP is largely based on bureaucratic procedures (the negotiation of bilateral agreements, the implementation of support programmes). These have only a limited capacity to bring about lasting change in the region, as has been exemplified by the deterioration of democratic standards in a number of countries; this was highlighted in EU’s own reports. This problem is particularly clear in the case of Ukraine; until recently it was seen as the leader of European integration but is now raising much concern due to a deterioration in the state of democracy there. EU instruments have a limited influence on the situation in Eastern Partnership countries and the region’s significance on the EU’s agenda is falling (the priority is now given to counteracting the economic crisis, and prominence in the neighbourhood policy has been given to the Southern Mediterranean). In response to this EU policy on Eastern Europe will focus to a larger extent on technical and sectoral cooperation.

Has the European ICT sector a chance to be competitive? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 14/2006

In this paper we try to present the main trends of evolution of the ICT sector. Its dynamics, supported by a constant technical progress in ICs, compounded with “non convexities” such as network effects and high sunk costs, may either lead to a Schumpeter Mark I or Schumpeter Mark II competition regime. This means that in some segments, the market will be more competitive (Mark I), while in other it will be more monopolistic (Mark II). But a key trend is also the so called “convergence”. But digitization makes it cost effective to integrate different communications, information processing and entertainment systems and devices. Hence, Schumpeter Mark II grows at the core where software production dominates, while Schumpeter Mark I is established at the periphery. In this context, the European ICT industry is potentially smashed between two forces: the cost advantages of Asian countries on one hand, the inventiveness and dynamism of the US industry on the other hand. The way out of this very difficult situation is to create in Europe the conditions of restoring knowledge accumulation in a key sub-sector of ICT, that is software production. To do this, Europe can rely on its tradition of cooperation and knowledge sharing and on a set of institutions that have shown their ability to stimulate inter-regional cooperation. By concentrating on an ambitious project of open source software production in embarked systems and domestic networks, Europe could reach several objectives: to make freely accessible an essential facility, to stimulate competition, to help reaching the Lisbon objectives and to restore the European competitiveness in ICT.

The Determinants of Investment in Information and Communication Technologies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 16/March 2010

In this paper we investigate the determinants of ICT investment at the macro level for a panel of ten countries over the period 1992-2005. We argue that, since ICT is a General Purpose Technology, its diffusion can be understood only considering the interaction with institutional and structural factors. The empirical results are in line with this view: facilitating factors such as changes in regulation, human capital and the sectoral composition of the economy are relevant determinants for increasing ICT investment.

EU Sanctions: A Relevant Foreign Policy Tool? EU Diplomacy Paper No. 3, May 2014

This paper examines an instrument which establishes an explicit link between economic power and foreign policy of the European Union (EU): restrictive measures or sanctions. As the EU is increasingly confronted with situations requiring a firm response, sanctions – arguably the EU’s ‘hardest’ tool – have become somewhat of a standard reaction. To what extent are sanctions a relevant tool for EU external action? By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 autonomous EU sanction cases, this paper acknowledges the many internal and external difficulties the EU faces when using the sanctions tool. However, it also shows that despite those challenges, the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless make it a relevant foreign policy tool which allows the EU to react to external crises.

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China.

Offshoring of Information-intensive Services: Structural Breaks in Industry Life Cycles. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

The emergence of widespread offshoring of information-intensive services is arguably one of the more impactful phenomena to transform business in the last ten years. A growing body of research has examined the firm-level drivers andlocation factors (i.e., the why's and where's) of services offshoring. However, little empirical research has examined the maturation sequencing (or when's) of services offshoring. Adopting industry life cycle theory as a framework, the key research questions examined in the paper are: when do different categories of offshoring services provision change from being emergent sectors to more mature ones, and how does the timing of this sequence relate to the type of service offshored. Using a database of 1420 offshore services FDI projects, we find that the value-add as well as the information sensitivity of the service category are related to when the service categories progress through the industry life cycle. Implications for future waves of service offshoring are discussed.

Toward international peace and security: Addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation in a globalized world. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic.

The role of EU Special Representatives in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system: A renaissance? IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/02/June 2012

Summary. EU Special Representatives have been deployed since 1996 in order to contribute to the EU’s crisis management efforts in various crisis regions. As they are not part of the formal hierarchy of the European External Action Service and thus a rather flexible foreign policy instrument at the disposal of the Member States, new special representatives have been appointed in 2011 and 2012. This Policy Brief argues that the representatives’ autonomy must not necessarily lead to ‘clashes of competence’ with the EU’s diplomatic service.

Reviewing the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures. IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/04/November 2012

Summary. The ongoing review of the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures warrants attention. What passes as an update of an arcane and technical document masks a profoundly political debate concerning what the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should be about. This policy brief summarises the main proposals and formulates a set of critical reflections. It calls for replacing the bureaucratic scheming with a more forthright political debate, and warns against sacrificing incompatible organisational cultures on the altar of the comprehensive approach. At a time when European security and prosperity trends are increasingly pointing downwards, the EEAS and the member states must look to the future and embrace, rather than resist, change.

Strategic Insurance: The Future of the Belgian Armed Forces. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/04/May 2014

Summary. Belgium is on the cusp of its next defence reform. While the security landscape throughout Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond deteriorates, the armed forces face numerous challenges. Most importantly, the next defence plan needs to recalibrate the force structure in function of political ambitions and budgetary realities. This Policy Brief argues that Belgium must embrace a nimble but broad-spectrum force. Any future structure must encompass agile land forces as well as a modern combat air force, without neglecting the need to safeguard a sizeable navy and invest in cyber capabilities. European cooperation should be pursued wherever possible while recognising that this necessitates budgetary convergence. For Belgium this means the investment budget needs to grow significantly in order to acquire interoperable but self-owned assets. Such a choice can be justified on the recognition that defence is not just about expeditionary operations, but also economic stimulus, intergenerational solidarity and strategic insurance: maintaining the ability to respond to whatever the future may bring.

Financing European Defence: Time to Call the European Investment Bank? IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/05/July 2014

Summary. Financing research and development programmes have never been more expensive in Europe. Defence budgets are on the wane, international competition is fierce and high-end technologies are increasingly expensive. Europe’s defence-industrial base is under significant strain, and options are needed to fund elements of a sector that is still crucial to Europe’s security and industry. This Policy Brief argues that the European Investment Bank could play a much greater role in Europe’s defence sector. As a public-private institution the Bank could serve as a life-line to defence R&D, dual-use projects and support for SMEs, especially where regional clusters are involved.

EU Foreign Policy Between the Revolution and the Status Quo. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/09/November 2014

Summary. When a new High Representative takes office, an opportunity presents itself to take a look at existing EU external policies and assess whether these are still sufficient to safeguard Europe’s interests in light of recent events. New strategic priorities have to be defined where necessary, not on each and every topic of foreign policy, but on those big issues that European nations can only deal with collectively, through the EU. How to pursue these strategic priorities is an equally important question. Looking for the right balance between a far-reaching reform agenda and a status quo policy, both of which can be detrimental to its interests, the EU can opt for pragmatic idealism as the new strategic concept for its foreign policy.

Russia and Turkey - What does their partnership mean for the EU? EPC Policy Brief, 13 February 2015

Russia and Turkey have, over the past two decades, developed a very constructive relationship across a wide variety of policy areas. Imperial rivals during much of the Cold War, both countries have since then found common interests in matters of energy, trade and even defence. Besides their growing interdependence, it is hard not to notice the similarities between the two leaders of these countries, especially when it comes to the conspiracy mind-set of blaming dissent at home on foreign meddling. But does this mean that Turkey is fundamentally realigning its foreign policy strategy, away from the EU and towards Russia? And is the EU facing the emergence of an “axis of the excluded”? Not so according to Dimitar Bechev. In this Policy Brief, he argues that the ties between Russia and Turkey are driven by pragmatism and realpolitik. Contentious issues – such as the war in Syria - may be insulated from areas of overlapping interest, but deeper examination shows the glue holding the two countries together – their energy interdependence – is slowly weakening. Bechev believes the EU should take advantage of this divergence and try to (re-)anchor Turkey to its own initiatives and policies.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.