The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)

Discrete analysis of dividend payments in a non-life insurance portfolio

The process of free reserves in a non-life insurance portfolio as defined in the classical model of risk theory is modified by the introduction of dividend policies that set maximum levels for the accumulation of reserves. The first part of the work formulates the quantification of the dividend payments via the expectation of their current value under diferent hypotheses. The second part presents a solution based on a system of linear equations for discrete dividend payments in the case of a constant dividend barrier, illustrated by solving a specific case.

Report on a review of certain Unemployment Insurance payments made by Iowa Workforce Development during the period January 1, 2006 through March 15, 2011

Report on a review of certain Unemployment Insurance payments made by Iowa Workforce Development during the period January 1, 2006 through March 15, 2011

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD) MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefit systems for the period April 16, 2012 through May 4, 2012

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD) MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefit systems for the period April 16, 2012 through May 4, 2012

Consumer Advisory: Navigating the New Health Insurance Marketplace, September 2013

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Navigating the New Health Insurance Marketplace

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development’s MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefits systems for the period April 29, 2013 through May 10, 2013

Report on a review of selected general and application controls over the Iowa Department of Workforce Development’s MyIowaUI and Unemployment Insurance Benefits systems for the period April 29, 2013 through May 10, 2013

Iowa Department of Commerce, Iowa Insurance Division Performance Report, FY 2004

Agency Performance Report

Iowa Department of Commerce, Iowa Insurance Division Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report

Iowa Department of Commerce, Iowa Insurance Division Performance Report, FY 2006

Agency Performance Report