A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

FFA Fisheries Trade Briefing, Vol. 1, Issue 8 & 9, pp. 1-12, July-August 2008

Contents: Fisheries Subsidies. Status of fisheries subsidies talks at the WTO. Preferential Free Trade Agreements. Collapse of Doha Round results in rise of FTAs Update on EU Generalised System of Preferences regime Fisheries Trade-related Regulation. Soltai encounters quality problems. Update on Fiji seafood export ban to the EU. EU sanitary inspections in other developing countries Tuna Markets. Developments in the US debate on the mercury content of tuna. Other developments in the US market. Japanese tuna fisheries and seafood markets. Greenpeace tuna campaign moves to the UK. Thai Union predicts growth for 2008. (PDF contains 12 pages)

Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep Trade Agenda

The EU is considered to be one of the main proponents of what has been called the deep trade agenda—that is, the push for further trade liberalization with an emphasis on the removal of domestic non-tariff regulatory measures affecting trade, as opposed to the traditional focus on the removal of trade barriers at borders. As negotiations on the Doha Development Round have stalled, the EU has attempted to achieve these aims by entering into comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) that are not only limited exclusively to tariffs but also extend to non-tariff barriers, including services, intellectual property rights (IPRs), competition, and investment. These FTAs place great emphasis on regulatory convergence as a means to secure greater market openings. The paper examines the EU's current external trade policy in the area of IP, particularly its attempts to promote its own regulatory model for the protection of IP rights through trade agreements. By looking at the IP enforcement provisions of such agreements, the article also examines how the divisive issues that are currently hindering the progress of negotiations at WTO level, including the demands from developing countries to maintain a degree of autonomy in the area of IP regulation as well as the need to balance IP protection with human rights protection, are being dealt with in recent EU FTAs.

The EU Deep Trade Agenda: Law and Policy

Providing the first comprehensive examination of the key regulatory disciplines included in the new generation of EU free trade agreements (FTAs), this book investigates the EU's supposed deep trade agenda through a legal analysis of these FTAs. In doing so, Billy A. Melo Araujo determines whether there is any substance behind the EU's foreign policy rhetoric regarding the need to introduce regulatory issues within the remit of international trade law.

At a time when the EU is busily negotiating so-called 'mega-FTAs', such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), Melo Araujo offers a timely insight into the important questions raised by such FTAs, in particular concerning the future of the multilateral trade system, the loss of policy autonomy, and the democratic legitimacy of regulating through treaty-making. The book provides a detailed analysis of the regulatory disciplines included in the more recent EU FTAs and explores the possible implications of such disciplines. Offering a significant contribution to a wider debate, this is a must read for those interested in the legal dimension of the EU's deep trade agenda.

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers.

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.

A Study on India’s Trade Relationship with SAARC Countries with Special Reference to SATA

The present study reveals that there are enormous opportunities for forging closer economic relations among SAARC countries. These opportunities could be fully utilized through the twin processes of trade liberalization and industrial restructuring which are complementary to each other. The SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) is the first step in trade liberalization. However, the scope of SAPTA has to be sufficiently widened in order to derive substantial benefits from preferential trading agreements. It is suggested that the SAARC countries adopt a combined approach for tariff elimination, tariff reduction and preferential or concessional tariffs. This process will help in moving quickly towards the creation of a Free Trade Area in the SAARC region. It is necessary to emphasis that, in any regional organization, smaller countries may feel that greater trade co-operation with their larger neighbors may result in larger countries taking over their economies. India occupies 70% of the SAARC region, both geographically and economically, and the remaining 6 nations of the SAARC borders only with India and not with each other. As the biggest, and the most industrialized trading partner among the SAARC countries, India has to recognize that a special responsibility devolves on her and take a lead in making the Regional Economic Co-operation a reality in South Asia.

Re-Framing Trade

Given the substantial and increasing encroachment of trade agreements into almost every aspect of economic and social life, there is a pressing need for research that provides a more coherent framework for understanding the source and effectiveness of organised labour ’s power and capacity to influence international trade policy. Taking the union protests against the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a case study, this research uses core concepts derived from social movement theory to analyse the opportunities that existed for unions to influence these trade negotiations and their capacity to identify and take advantage of such opportunities. Importantly, it adds a power analysis designed to reveal the sources of power that unions draw on to take action. The research demonstrates that even where unions faced considerable constraints they were able to re-frame trade issues in a way that built broad support for their position and to utilise opportunities in the trade negotiation process to mobilise resistance against the GATS and further liberalisation of services. The theoretical framework developed for the research provides conceptual tools that can be developed for improving strategic campaign planning and for analytical assessment of past campaigns. The theoretical framework developed for this research has potential for further application as an analytical and strategic planning tool for unions.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)

The United States of America and the European Union are currently negotiating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It is one of the most ambitious free trade and investment initiatives, going much further than eliminating tariffs. TTIP mainly aims at reducing “non-tariff barriers”. While tariffs on goods have been imposed with an eye to foreign competition, most of the non-tariff barriers are the laws and regulations that are the result of social struggles for the protection of consumers and workers. It is therefore certain that TTIP will impact workers. This volume provides a preliminary assessment of the likely consequences for labor by: - providing an overall introduction to the TTIP negotiations; -assessing the reliability of the studies claiming employment gains; - highlighting specific problematic proposals such as the investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism; - presenting the position of organized labor from both sides of the Atlantic. / Among the contributors are Stefan Beck (Kassel), Lance Compa (Ithaca, New York), Pia Eberhardt (Brussels) and Werner Raza (Vienna).

The post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament in the EU's Common Commercial Policy: Implications for bilateral trade negotiations. EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2012, July 2012

This paper sets out to conduct an empirical analysis of the post-Lisbon role of the European Parliament (EP) in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy through an examination of the ‘deep and comprehensive’ bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently negotiated as part of the EU’s Global Europe strategy. The EU-Korea and EU-India FTAs are used as case studies in order to determine the implications of the EP’s enhanced trade powers on the processes, actors and outcomes of EU bilateral trade policy. The EP is now endowed with the ‘hard power’ of consent in the ratification phase of FTAs, acting as a threat to strengthen its ‘soft power’ to influence negotiations. The EP is developing strategies to influence the mandate and now plays an important role in the implementation of FTAs. The entry of this new player on the Brussels trade policy field has brought about a shift in the institutional balance of power and opened up the EP as a new point of access for trade policy lobbyists. Finally, increased EP involvement in EU trade policy has brought about a politicisation of EU trade policy and greater normative outcomes of FTAs.

Effects of trade policy on technology adoption and investment

This paper studies the consequences of trade policy for the adoption of new technologies. It develops a dynamic international trade model with two sectors. Workers in manufacturing decide if new technologies are used, capital owners then choose investment. We analyze three different arrangements: free trade, tariffs, and quotas. In the model economy, free trade as well as tariffs guarantee that the most productive technology available will be used. In contrasL under a quota the most productive technology available will not be used at all times. Further, in the latter case investment and the capital stock are smaller than in the former one. Finally, there exists parameter values for which the computed difference in GDP is a factor of thirty.

Are the antiglobalizers right?: the issue of trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

This paper analyzes the determinants of expectational coordination on the perfect foresight equilibrium of an open economy in the class of one-dimensional models where the price is determined by price expectations. In this class of models, we relate autarky expectational stability conditions to regional integration ones, providing an intuitive open economy interpretation ofthe elasticities condition obtained by Guesnerie [11]. There, we show that the degree of structural heterogeneity trades-off the existence of standard efficiency gains -due to the increase in competition (spatial price stabilization)- and coordination upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium (stabilizing price expectations). This trade-off provides a new rationale for an exogenous price intervention at the international levei. Through the coordinational concern of the authority, trading countries are ab]e to fully reap the bene:fits from trade. We illustrate this point showing that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advise integration between two expectationally stable economies.

Opportunities for trade and investment between Latin America and Asia-Pacific: the link with APEC

Includes bibliography

The United States and Latin America and the Caribbean: Highlights of economics and trade

Foreword by Alicia Bárcena

Recent trade performance of Caribbean countries

Includes bibliography

Cooperation on competition policy in Latin American and Caribbean bilateral trade agreements

Incluye Bibliografía