La formació d'una política exterior per a l'Índia. La visita de Nehru a l'Espanya republicana durant la Guerra Civil

L'objectiu ha estat posar en relació dues realitats que fins al moment havien estat considerades completament alienes, com són l’Índia i Espanya. La recerca de fonts per a les relacions bilaterals de tot tipus es va iniciar al segle XIX. A partir d’aquest moment apareixen tres camps fonamentals on aprofundir. D’una banda tenim les relacions diplomàtiques i la seva vessant política a partir del segle XX. El desenvolupament de representacions consulars té a veure amb el creixement de l’activitat econòmica amb l’Índia britànica, especialment en el camp del proveïment de primeres matèries (cotó i jute). En aquest sentit, la recuperació de les relacions econòmiques va ser clau per al posterior mutu reconeixement diplomàtic el 1957 quan l’Índia ja era un estat independent. Entre mig queden anys de malvolença degut a la vinculació de Nehru amb el govern republicà durant la Guerra Civil i la posició de l’Índia en el cas d’Espanya a l’ONU. Un altre camp d’interès per a les relacions bilaterals es centra en la missió de Bombay que a partir de 1920 fou administrada per jesuïtes catalans, valencians i aragonesos. Finalment, un seguiment de la premsa i la intel•lectualitat espanyola mostra com l’Índia es va convertir a partir de 1920 en un nou focus d’interès informatiu i pel món acadèmic, com no ho havia estat fins llavors. Aquest descobriment de l’Índia per part de viatgers, artistes i periodistes obra una nova via d’intercanvi que es veurà trucada per la Guerra Civil i el posterior establiment d’un règim que destruí el teixit intel•lectual del país.

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

War and Natural Resource Exploitation

We build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour (i.e., fighting efforts) and for endogenous natural resource exploitation (i.e., speed, ownership, and investments). While depletion is spread in a balanced Hotelling fashion during peace, the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction, as this lowers the stakes of future contest. This voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue, especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government's weapon advantage is weak. Some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons. The shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction, as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee. Furthermore, the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation, which leads to more government turnover. Without credible commitment to future fighting efforts, private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government's non-oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful, which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe.