Impact of the Economic Recession on Toll Highway Concessions in Spain

After joining the European Union in 1986, Spain experienced steady economic growth that enabled the country to grow at a greater pace than other European countries. During this period, the government of Spain opted for major investments in public infrastructure by taking advantage both of the funding provided by the European Union and of several types of public-private-partnership (PPP) approaches. Within this framework, the government of Spain between 1996 and 2004 procured a series of toll highway concessions. These concessions entered into operation a few years before the global economic recession made itself felt in Spain. The concession contracts signed between the government and some private consortia allocated most of the risks (expropriation, construction, and traffic) to the private sector. In this paper the impact that the economic recession has had on the business performance of the concessionaires is assessed, and the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the government to help the concessionaire to avoid bankruptcy is analyzed. It was found that some of the guarantees offered by the legal framework to the concessionaires in case of bankruptcy are prompting an outcome that could negatively affect the users. In addition to that, some suggestions as to how to better allocate risk in toll highway concessions in the future are provided.

Traffic uncertainty in toll motorway concessions in Spain

This study assessed the inaccuracy of the traffic estimates for toll motorway concessions in Spain. It was found that the estimates conducted by both the government and the concessionaire showed a significant bias towards overestimating traffic. The level of overestimation in Spain is even greater than that reported by other studies based on worldwide data. The notorious levels of overestimation entail severe burdens to the economics of the concessionaires that often prompt renegotiations of the contracts, which are often accepted by the government. These renegotiations usually end up with toll changes or extension of the concession terms, which have to be ultimately borne by future motorway users. It is postulated herein that the bias towards overestimating traffic in toll motorways in Spain is mostly caused by strategic issues rather than by modelling errors.