Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

spotlight europe 20120/05, August 2012: Confronting the crisis

The euro crisis has not gone away on holiday. In fact, it continues to generate a never-ending string of horrific headlines. Where is it all going to end? In this article we describe the proposed remedies that are currently being discussed, and what blue and red eurobonds, euro bills, FIRE and the debt redemption fund can actually achieve.

spotlight europe #2012/05, August 2012: Der Krise die Stirn bieten = Confronting the crisis

No abstract.

The implications for the EU and national budgets of the use of EU instruments for macro-financial stability. CEPS Special Report, 4 September 2012

The euro crisis has forced member states and the EU institutions to create a series of new instruments to safeguard macro-financial stability of the Union. This study describes the status of existing instruments, the role of the European Parliament and how the use of the instruments impinges on the EU budget also through their effects on national budgets. In addition, it presents a survey of other possible instruments that have been proposed in recent years (e.g. E-bonds and eurobonds), in order to provide an assessment of how EU macro-financial stability assistance could evolve in the future and what could be its impact on EU public finances.

The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

The role of competition and state aid policy in financial and monetary law

During the financial crisis, companies and lenders found themselves in distressed situations. Competition authorities across the globe had to deal with controversial issues such as the application of the failing firm defence in merger transactions as well as assessment of emergency aid granted by states. This article considers competition policy in periods of crisis, in particular the failing firm defence in merger control and its state aid policy.

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

IS capabilities for supporting post crisis regulatory compliance

The financial crisis of 2007-2009, has precipitated large scale regulatory change. Financial organizations are faced with implementing new regulations of considerable breadth and depth. Firms are faced with engaging in complex and costly change management programs at a time when profits are diminished. Furthermore, investors are becoming increasingly focused on compliance are seeking to ensure that organizations can demonstrate robust compliance practices as part of their due diligence process .The role of IS in underpinning stable, is paramount. IS allows the stable and consistent controls for meeting regulations in order to ensure long term effective compliance. Consequently, our study explores the IS capabilities which support the post crisis regulatory landscape. We identify eight key capabilities: Managing Internal Controls, Measuring Monitoring and Reporting Transactions, IS Development and Procurement, Managing Third Parties, Sharing and Selecting Best Practice, IS Leadership, Data Management and Enabling Cultural Change.

Building post crisis watchtowers: investment management Systems and new institutional logics for regulatory compliance

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has precipitated large scale regulatory change. Tight deadlines for implementation require organizations to start working on remediation projects before final drafts of regulations are crystalized. Firms are faced with engaging in complex and costly change management programs at a time when profits are diminished. As a consequence of these factors, pre-crisis logics for organizing compliance practices are being questioned and new approaches introduced. Our study explores the use of Investment Management Systems (IMS) in facilitating compliance arrangements. Our motivation is to understand the new logics and the part played by IMS in supporting these approaches. The study adopts an institutional logics perspective to explore the use of such systems at eight financial organizations. The study found new logics for organizing compliance include consolidation, centralization, harmonization and consistency and that the IMS plays an important role in supporting and enabling related activities.

Institutional pressures on financial services firms: the role of information systems in regulatory compliance

The financial crisis of 2008 led to new international regulatory controls for the governance, risk and compliance of financial services firms. Information systems play a critical role here as political, functional and social pressures may lead to the deinstitutionalization of existing structures, processes and practices. This research examines how an investment management system is introduced by a leading IT vendor across eight client sites in the post-crisis era. Using institutional theory, it examines changes in working practices occurring at the environmental and organizational levels and the ways in which technological interventions are used to apply disciplinary effects in order to prevent inappropriate behaviors. The results extend the constructs of deinstitutionalization and identify empirical predictors for the deinstitutionalization of compliance and trading practices within financial organizations.

A review of Islamic mutual funds’ financial performance and investment style in Muslim and non-Muslim countries

Islamic finance has grown beyond its reputation of providing small-scale banking options and now provides investment and financing options for complex large-scale commercial transactions. Islamic investments are one area that has attracted the attention of investors due to its performance, especially during the economic downturn. The Shari’ah compliance nature of Islamic funds provides an opportunity for those Muslim investors to be part of the global investment sector who have previously been reluctant to invest in conventional mutual funds. The fact that the funds’ managers are prohibited from investing in activities such as weapons production, alcohol production and interest-bearing finance operations, makes Islamic mutual funds also attractive for those Non-Muslim investors who wish to invest ethically. Today there are hundreds of Islamic equity indices offered by Dow Jones, FTSE, MSCI and S&P. Despite the growing importance of Islamic funds, there have been limited studies exploring the performance of Islamic funds worldwide. Due to very limited data sets and not too rigorous analytical methods, these existent studies have neither investigated Islamic funds’ financial performance in noticeable detail nor analysed the investment style of more than six funds. For instance, relevant questions such as the financial performance of Islamic mutual funds’ beyond their investment styles or a difference in performance between funds from Muslim and non-Muslim countries have nearly not been investigated at all. Very recently, a study by Hoepner, Rammal and Rezec (2011) analysed the financial performance and investment style of 262 Islamic equity funds from 20 countries in five regions (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Gulf Cooperative Council-GCC, and North America). As comparison, previous studies did not even analyse 60 funds. Hoepner et al.’s study sampled a period of two decades and was therefore able to test the performance of the funds during economic booms as well as economic downturns. The findings of the study provide new insights into the performance of Islamic mutual funds in Muslim and Western markets and during financial crisis.

Evaluation of contagion or interdependence in the financial crises of Asia and Latin America, considering the macroeconomic fundamentals

This article investigates the existence of contagion between countries on the basis of an analysis of returns for stock indices over the period 1994-2003. The economic methodology used is that of multivariate GARCH family volatility models, particularly the DCC models in the form proposed by Engle and Sheppard (2001). The returns were duly corrected for a series of country-specific fundamentals. The relevance of this procedure is highlighted in the literature by the work of Pesaran and Pick (2003). The results obtained in this paper provide evidence favourable to the hypothesis of regional contagion in both Latin America and Asia. As a rule, contagion spread from the Asian crisis to Latin America but not in the opposite direction

The influence of the global crisis on the slowdown of the emerging markets

A presente dissertação investiga a relação empírica entre a crise financeira de 2007-2009, a crise da dívida soberana de 2010-2012 e a recente desaceleração dos mercados de capitais nos mercados emergentes. A exposição dos mercados emergentes à crise nos desenvolvidos é quantificada através de um modelo de interdependência de factores. Os resultados mostram que estes sofreram, de facto, um choque provocado por ambas as crises. No entanto, este foi um choque de curta duração enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos ainda lutavam com as consequências resultantes das sucessivas crises financeiras. A análise do modelo mostra ainda que após a crise da divida soberana, enquanto os mercados desenvolvidos iniciam a sua recuperação, os emergentes desaceleram o seu crescimento. De forma a completar a análise do modelo foi efectuado um estudo sobre a influência dos fluxos de capitais entre os mercados emergentes e desenvolvidos na direcção do seu crescimento, revelando que existe uma relação entre estes dois eventos.

The importance of firms' strategic resources and capabilities in crisis situations

The general idea of this research is to analyze overall firm performance before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The main question is: What kind of strategies did companies adopt that led to positive business performance after the crisis? Are there any particular competitive advantages that bring better performance in the case of an economic downturn? This research focuses on competitive advantage gained by resource-based view attributes of a product (quality, durability and prestige) and dynamic capabilities (strategic flexibility in product development and technological innovation ability). The economic crisis setting provides a proper background to analyze the competitive advantage strategies in a dynamic, low-probability environment to determine which are most worth adopting in the business world. I employ an OLS regression analysis in order to measure the business performance of 136 Brazilian firms across four years – 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012. The findings indicate that even though all of the strategic resources and capabilities positively influence firm performance in expansionary periods, only the superior product characteristics are pertinent in surviving an economic downturn.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.