996 resultados para European Integration
Resumo:
With the end of the Cold War, which for central and eastern Europe in many respects meant the real political end to the Second World War, Germany regained its central position in the region. The Federal Republic quickly established itself as a major political and economic partner for both the Czech Republic and Poland. More importantly, due to its support for the idea of EU and NATO enlargement. Germany also became the most active western advocate of the Czech and Polish 'return to Europe'. The question remains, however, of whether Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic can mature into a close axis like that enjoyed between Paris and Bonn/Berlin, or whether they will continue to develop along the lines of 'strategic congruence' but 'emotional mistrust and reserve'. The research here looked at three aspects of this question. First it considered the idea of a link between perceptions of Germany and broader considerations of European integration in Poland and the Czech Republic and outlined the ways in which Germany has motivated Czech and Polish activities and policies on EU membership. The team then focused upon on-going Czech and Polish EU integration strategies and sought to identify the actual ways in which Germany's advocacy of EU enlargement in manifest in cooperation 'on the ground'. The group concluded by considering prospects for Czech/German and Polish/German cooperation in the context of the enlarged European Union.
Resumo:
The European integration process mainly consists of the development of a European Single Market. Its political regulation is contradictory and conflicting as it is managed by a committee of the governments which - on a different level - operate against each other as representatives of competing nations. Beyond market and states the national citizens expect a culture of consent-orientated acknowledgement from a European civil society. This expectation has been very distinct in those countries which joined the European Union in 2004. In this contribution results are reported from a survey on representatives of Middle and East European networks of social work. They had been questioned about their experiences with aspects of the eastward expansion of the EU. It becomes apparent that the promises of the civil society are overdone and that it comes down to a balance of civil liberty, welfare state and the self-regulation of the civil society.
Resumo:
The deep economic recession that hit Sweden and Finland at the beginning of the 90s, and the fall in public revenues and rapidly growing public debts that followed on it, triggered a development of cutbacks and restructuring measures which has resulted in a scientific debate over what this has meant for these countries’ systems of social policy, traditionally resting on the Nordic welfare state paradigm. In this connection, questions of to what extent changes made can be ascribed mainly to the economic constraints posed by the recession at all, or rather, to other more long-term societal trends or phenomena, including globalisation, European integration and/or ideational or ideological shifts among influential (elite) groups, have often been touched upon. Applying an ideas-centred approach, this paper attempts to contribute to the knowledge on the reasoning of influential elite societal groups in social policy issues before, during and after the 90’s recession, by empirically analysing their statements on social security made in the press. A distinction is made between three different levels of proposed policy changes, reaching from minor alterations of single programs to changes of the policy paradigm. Results show that the 1990s did not only mean the emergence of suggestions for minor cutbacks in and alterations of prevailing programmes. The share of suggestions implying de facto a (further) departure from the basic features of the social security system also showed that the model was under continuous pressure throughout the 90s. However, many of the changes suggested were not justified by any clear references to a policy paradigm in either country (or not justified at all). Instead, references to “purely” structural justifications did become more common over time. In this respect, as regards social security, our results cannot confirm the fairly popular notion among many researchers of a clearly ideological attack on the welfare state. However, it remains uncertain whether and to what extent the increased proportion of references to “structural realities” in the 90s should be interpreted as an indication of a change in the idea of what the welfare state is and what the goals behind it are. Results further show that the patterns of the discussion in the two countries studied bore a remarkable resemblance at a general level, whereas there are indications of differences in the driving forces behind suggestions for similar reforms in these two countries.
Resumo:
Obwohl der Ursprung der europäischen Einigungsgeschichte im wirtschaftlichen Bereich lag, hatte die Integration von Beginn an auch politischen Charakter. Schon die römischen Verträge enthielten Ansätze einer Konstitutionalisierung und auch die Bezeichnung der Verträge als Verfassung wurde seit den 60er-Jahren unter Rechtswissenschaftlern immer gebräuchlicher, auch wenn dies stets umstritten war. Unabhängig vom Streit über den Verfassungsbegriff hat die von den Verträgen gebildete Rechtsordnung jedenfalls inhaltlich Verfassungscharakter. Sie enthält Regelungen, die man gemeinhin mit einer Staatsverfassung verbindet. Die europäische Integration war stets von verfassungsrechtlichen Idealen getragen, weshalb man die Mitgliedstaaten auch als eine Verfassungsrechtsgemeinschaft bezeichnen kann. Bedeutende Weiterentwicklungen erfuhr der Konstitutionalisierungsprozess mit der Konventsmethode und der Erarbeitung der Grundrechte-Charta. Fortgesetzt wurde dieser Prozess mit dem Entwurf über den Verfassungsvertrag für Europa. Da in ihm typische Gehalte einer Verfassung verkörpert sind, verdient er durchaus auch diese Bezeichnung. Auf seiner Basis sollte ein schlanker, übersichtlicher und verständlicher Verfassungstext geschaffen werden, der die Reform und Integration Europas weiter führt und ein Instrument der Identitätsstiftung sein kann.
Resumo:
On the role of parties as important channels for people to voice their preferences there is a sound consensus in the literature. Traditional socio-economic concerns have been more and more displaced by culturally fought issues such as immigration and European integration. Scholarly works, however, have paid less attention how, if at all, parties combine different cultural issues. The primary aim of the analysis is to investigate if and under which conditions parties link immigration and European integration issues to address the growing discontent in the population with these issues. Our expectation is that parties endorse different strategies depending on the party competition, in particular the presence of a populist challenger. The analysis is based on a quantitative content analysis of press releases and newspapers articles published in the 12 weeks preceding the 2014 EP election in five European countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
Resumo:
The deepest financial crisis to strike the global economy since the Great Depression has unceremoniously called into question the very foundations of the Western economic model. The liberalisation of capital flows and the growing internationalisation of financial markets outpaced global regulatory and supervisory efforts. The repercussions of the financial crisis have given new dynamism to the reform of financial regulation both globally and within the European Union (EU). The Eurozone, by way of its own failings, has emerged as a stronger conceptual and legitimate entity since the onset of the crisis, but to what extent does this equate to a greater external role, in particular in the reform of international financial regulation? This paper argues that the Eurozone is currently not in a position to play an important role in the reform of international financial regulation, as it is a weak actor in the context of the EU financial architecture, which is still largely characterised by differing national regimes, a prevailing influence from the UK and fragmented external representation. The key finding from this study is that internal tensions in the EU are at the very heart of the Eurozone’s difficulties in playing a role in the reform of international financial regulation. Surmounting these tensions is a pre-requisite for the Eurozone if it is to overcome its structural weakness in international financial politics. However, the implications of such evolutions to the Eurozone, as an entity, and to European integration are far-reaching.
Resumo:
Criticisms are often voiced at the fact that there is no well-informed European public. However, as the process of European integration has advanced, the media have been devoting more resources and space to the coverage of European affairs. At the same time, the national media have gone from being mere transmitters of information to having their own voice on European issues. In this respect, the media have emerged as actors capable of influencing the opinions of citizens, thereby contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere. The present study analyzes whether a Europeanization of the national media has taken place by studying how national newspapers provide information in Europe and whether a European public sphere is emerging. The results reveal that some European topics have experienced a certain Europeanization, but there is still an absence of European debate in the respective national public spheres.
Resumo:
The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.
Resumo:
This Policy Brief argues that too much effort and political capital is being spent by the Commission and member states on being seen to be doing something quickly about youth unemployment when, in fact, the structural measures proposed will only have long-term effects. Expectations of immediate relief are running well above what can be delivered, especially at the EU level. Given the macroeconomic situation, no policy option will deliver a significant dent in either youth unemployment or unemployment in general. The EU policies on the table that are supposed to have an immediate effect, such as increased lending from the European Investment Bank to SMEs for the hiring of young people, will only have a very marginal impact on youth unemployment. Moreover, this impact will come mostly to the detriment of older unemployed persons excluded from such a scheme. Given the perceived need to ‘be seen to be doing something’, we fear that policies subsidising young workers de facto at the expense of older workers or, even worse, policies that subsidise older workers for not taking young people’s jobs, will proliferate. In fact, it is not at all clear that young people suffer more from being unemployed than older people, or even disproportionately more than older unemployed individuals. In particular, it is not clear that the much-publicised notion of a ‘lost generation’ with permanent ‘scars’ is relevant only to the young generation. The paper ends by highlighting the much-neglected policy option of encouraging labour mobility within the internal market. Although the Commission is ‘upgrading and modernising’ its tools, much more could be done in this area – to the benefit of the individuals concerned, the member states, and European integration in general.
Resumo:
There has been an increasing use of direct democracy in the form of referendums on aspects of European integration. Two such referendums have been held in Ireland in 2008 and 2009 with the outcome changing from a No to a Yes vote. This paper addresses the question of what explains the change in outcome in two referendums on essentially the same document. It will do so by looking at the role of the campaign in providing information and hence reducing uncertainty, the importance of issue frames and the impact of domestic considerations on vote choice. It is suggested that there has not been a change in underlying attitudes but a change in how the Irish electorate weighed the same factors differently at both referendums. In addition, a change in economic conditions at the time of the second referendum also had an effect on how voters decided the second time around.
Resumo:
The year 2010 will be remembered in the European Union (EU) circles of governmental Spain as a crucial milestone regarding the role of the country in one of the most important alliances of world history. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain had previously been scheduled to hold the rotating presidency as done since the times of the inception of the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, on June 12, Spain would be ready to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively acceding to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was set to occur, the new Reform Treaty (“of Lisbon”) was set to be implemented as a substitute for the failed constitutional text floated during the first years of the new century. Moreover, these spectacular events unraveled in the middle of one of the worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most especially, Spain. This paper will review the background, context and impact of particular novel aspects of the new treaty governing the EU and several milestones regarding the experience of Spain in the European process.
Resumo:
In addition to the euro crisis the EU faces a second, more existential crisis, in the form of an ill-defined notion of the Union’s global role. This contribution argues that the euro crisis should not redefine perceptions of the EU on the global stage, which it is in danger of doing. Instead, the EU and its members should embark upon a strategic reassessment in order to define three core interrelated factors. First, the nature of the EU’s actorness remains ill-defined and it is therefore necessary to explain, both within and beyond the Union, what its global role is. Second, in order to facilitate the joining up of the myriad of sub-strategies in EU external relations, the notion of ‘red lines’ should be considered which define specific aspects of behaviour that are mainstreamed throughout the EU’s external actions and, more importantly, upheld. Third, in spite of the rapid development of the harder elements of the EU’s actorness over the last decade or so, there remains a worrying gap between rhetoric and reality. This aspect is of particular concern for the United States and will affect perceptions of the EU’s ability to be a genuine strategic partner at a time of dramatic change in the international system. By engaging in what will inevitably be a difficult debate, the EU and its members will not only help give purpose and strategic direction to the Union’s actions on the international scene, it will also speak to the euro crisis since both are fundamentally about the future shape and direction of European integration.