Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. ^ Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. ^ Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.^

Non-competition covenants in acquisition deals

We study the changes in the consumers’ and producers’ surplus associated with acquisition deals where there is a non-competition covenant that forbids the seller from re-entering the market over a given time period. We find that these cquisition deals can lead to significant negative (positive) changes in the producers’ consumers’) surplus, which decrease significantly with the time period of the covenant. We also show that the effect of the time period of the covenant on the welfare change can be positive or negative. It depends largely on the market conditions, such as the profit uncertainty and growth rate.

Regional diversity and economic performance

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four individual papers. In each paper the relationship between some form of spatial diversity and economic performance is analyzed. Diversity is treated as a potential source of externality effects, mainly in the form of knowledge spillovers. The first paper studies the impact of a broad range of spatial externalities on the productivity of manufacturing plants. While finding positive effects of specialization and competition, there is no support for positive spillovers of either related or unrelated industry diversity. The second paper argues that relatedness should be framed at the level of individuals and consequently should be measured in terms of, for example, education and occupation rather than industry belonging. The results show that educational- and occupational related diversity matter for regional productivity growth, while related industry diversity is positively related to employment growth. The third paper analyzes the importance of neighborhood related diversity, in terms of both industries and education, and internal human capital for firms’ propensity to innovate. The findings support that education and skills are strongly related to firm innovation. Additionally, firms in metropolitan regions are more innovative in neighborhoods with more related diversity in industries, while firms in rural regions seem to benefit more from related diversity in education. In the fourth paper, the location factor of interest is segregation, which may be regarded as inverse diversity. The results show that neighborhood segregation has a negative effect on individual employment. However, it is not the spatial separation of individuals with different backgrounds that causes lower employment but rather the distress of segregated neighborhoods.