Dynamics of settling charged particles in turbulence : theory and experiments

It has been proposed that inertial clustering may lead to an increased collision rate of water droplets in clouds. Atmospheric clouds and electrosprays contain electrically charged particles embedded in turbulent flows, often under the influence of an externally imposed, approximately uniform gravitational or electric force. In this thesis, we present the investigation of charged inertial particles embedded in turbulence. We have developed a theoretical description for the dynamics of such systems of charged, sedimenting particles in turbulence, allowing radial distribution functions to be predicted for both monodisperse and bidisperse particle size distributions. The governing parameters are the particle Stokes number (particle inertial time scale relative to turbulence dissipation time scale), the Coulomb-turbulence parameter (ratio of Coulomb ’terminalar speed to turbulence dissipation velocity scale), and the settling parameter (the ratio of the gravitational terminal speed to turbulence dissipation velocity scale). For the monodispersion particles, The peak in the radial distribution function is well predicted by the balance between the particle terminal velocity under Coulomb repulsion and a time-averaged ’drift’ velocity obtained from the nonuniform sampling of fluid strain and rotation due to finite particle inertia. The theory is compared to measured radial distribution functions for water particles in homogeneous, isotropic air turbulence. The radial distribution functions are obtained from particle positions measured in three dimensions using digital holography. The measurements support the general theoretical expression, consisting of a power law increase in particle clustering due to particle response to dissipative turbulent eddies, modulated by an exponential electrostatic interaction term. Both terms are modified as a result of the gravitational diffusion-like term, and the role of ’gravity’ is explored by imposing a macroscopic uniform electric field to create an enhanced, effective gravity. The relation between the radial distribution functions and inward mean radial relative velocity is established for charged particles.

Optimal game theoretic distributed control methodologies in small scale power systems

This dissertation presents the competitive control methodologies for small-scale power system (SSPS). A SSPS is a collection of sources and loads that shares a common network which can be isolated during terrestrial disturbances. Micro-grids, naval ship electric power systems (NSEPS), aircraft power systems and telecommunication system power systems are typical examples of SSPS. The analysis and development of control systems for small-scale power systems (SSPS) lacks a defined slack bus. In addition, a change of a load or source will influence the real time system parameters of the system. Therefore, the control system should provide the required flexibility, to ensure operation as a single aggregated system. In most of the cases of a SSPS the sources and loads must be equipped with power electronic interfaces which can be modeled as a dynamic controllable quantity. The mathematical formulation of the micro-grid is carried out with the help of game theory, optimal control and fundamental theory of electrical power systems. Then the micro-grid can be viewed as a dynamical multi-objective optimization problem with nonlinear objectives and variables. Basically detailed analysis was done with optimal solutions with regards to start up transient modeling, bus selection modeling and level of communication within the micro-grids. In each approach a detail mathematical model is formed to observe the system response. The differential game theoretic approach was also used for modeling and optimization of startup transients. The startup transient controller was implemented with open loop, PI and feedback control methodologies. Then the hardware implementation was carried out to validate the theoretical results. The proposed game theoretic controller shows higher performances over traditional the PI controller during startup. In addition, the optimal transient surface is necessary while implementing the feedback controller for startup transient. Further, the experimental results are in agreement with the theoretical simulation. The bus selection and team communication was modeled with discrete and continuous game theory models. Although players have multiple choices, this controller is capable of choosing the optimum bus. Next the team communication structures are able to optimize the players’ Nash equilibrium point. All mathematical models are based on the local information of the load or source. As a result, these models are the keys to developing accurate distributed controllers.

Theory and Practice: A Matter of Words. Language, Knowledge and Professional Community in Social Work

The relation between theory and practice in social work has always been controversial. Recently, many have underlined how language is crucial in order to capture how knowledge is used in practice. This article introduces a language perspective to the issue, rooted in the ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge and in Wittgenstein’s late work. According to this perspective, the meaning of categories and concepts corresponds to the use that concrete actors make of them as a result of on-going negotiation processes in specific contexts. Meanings may vary dramatically across social groups moved by different interests and holding different cultures. Accordingly, we may reformulate the issue of theory and practice in terms of the connections between different language games and power relationship between segments of the professional community. In this view, the point is anyway to look at how theoretical language relates to practitioners’ broader frames, and how it is transformed while providing words for making sense of experience.

Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies. Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency

Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new ‘balance of power’ between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market – and also the penal system. These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime. Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970-2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific effects. Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies to a certain extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime. As expected, the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies generally prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime. Nevertheless, we conclude that the new cult of the individual undermines the effectiveness of conservative and social-democratic integration strategies and drives societies towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as well as punitive elements.

Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory

A limited but accumulating body of research and theoretical commentary offers support for core claims of the “institutional-anomie theory” of crime (IAT) and points to areas needing further development. In this paper, which focuses on violent crime, we clarify the concept of social institutions, elaborate the cultural component of IAT, derive implications for individual behavior, summarize empirical applications, and propose directions for future research. Drawing on Talcott Parsons, we distinguish the “subjective” and “objective” dimensions of institutional dynamics and discuss their interrelationship. We elaborate on the theory’s cultural component with reference to Durkheim’s distinction between “moral” and “egoistic” individualism and propose that a version of the egoistic type characterizes societies in which the economy dominates the institutional structure, anomie is rampant, and levels of violent crime are high. We also offer a heuristic model of IAT that integrates macro- and individual levels of analysis. Finally, we discuss briefly issues for the further theoretical elaboration of this macro-social perspective on violent crime. Specifically, we call attention to the important tasks of explaining the emergence of economic dominance in the institutional balance of power and of formulating an institutional account for distinctive punishment practices, such as the advent of mass incarceration in the United States.

Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training

Although interest in monopsonistic influences on labor market outcomes has revived in recent years, only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on this topic. In this article, the authors analyze the effect of monopsony power on pay structure, using a direct measure of labor market thinness. The authors find evidence of monopsony power, as firms facing fewer local competitors offer lower wages to skilled labor and trainees, but not to unskilled labor. The findings have important implications for the economic theory of training, as most recent models assume monopsonistic pay-setting for skilled labor, but not for trainees.

The power of emotional valence – from cognitive to affective processes in reading

The comprehension of stories requires the reader to imagine the cognitive and affective states of the characters. The content of many stories is unpleasant, as they often deal with conflict, disturbance or crisis. Nevertheless, unpleasant stories can be liked and enjoyed. In this fMRI study, we used a parametric approach to examine (1) the capacity of increasing negative valence of story contents to activate the mentalizing network (cognitive and affective theory of mind, ToM), and (2) the neural substrate of liking negatively valenced narratives. A set of 80 short narratives was compiled, ranging from neutral to negative emotional valence. For each story mean rating values on valence and liking were obtained from a group of 32 participants in a prestudy, and later included as parametric regressors in the fMRI analysis. Another group of 24 participants passively read the narratives in a three Tesla MRI scanner. Results revealed a stronger engagement of affective ToM-related brain areas with increasingly negative story valence. Stories that were unpleasant, but simultaneously liked, engaged the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which might reflect the moral exploration of the story content. Further analysis showed that the more the mPFC becomes engaged during the reading of negatively valenced stories, the more coactivation can be observed in other brain areas related to the neural processing of affective ToM and empathy.

From Similes to Allegory: The Deconstruction of Chariot Imagery in Early Buddhist Texts, Analyzed with Cognitive Metaphor Theory

The presentation will start by unfolding the various layers of chariot imagery in early Indian sources, namely, chariots as vehicles of gods such as the sun (sūrya), i.e. as symbol of cosmic stability; chariots as symbols of royal power and social prestige e.g. of Brahmins; and, finally, chariots as metaphors for the “person”, the “mind” and the “way to liberation” (e.g., Kaṭ.-Up. III.3; Maitr.-Up. II. 6). In Buddhist and non-Buddhist sources, chariots are in certain aspects used as a metaphor for the (old) human body (e.g., Caraka-S., Vi.3.37-38; D II.100; D II.107); apart from that, there is, of course, mention of the “real” use of chariots in sports, cults, journey, and combat. The most prominent example of the Buddhist use of chariot imagery is its application as a model for the person (S I.134 f.; Milindapañha, ed. Trenckner, 26), i.e., for highlighting the “non-substantial self”. There are, however, other significant examples of the usage of chariot imagery in early Buddhist texts. Of special interest are those cases in which chariot metaphors were applied in order to explain how the ‘self’ may proceed on the way to salvation – with ‘mindfulness’ or the ‘self’ as charioteer, with ‘wisdom’ and ‘confidence’ as horses etc. (e.g. S I. 33; S V.7; Dhp 94; or the Nārada-Jātaka, No. 545, verses 181-190). One might be tempted to say that these instances reaffirm the traditional soteriology of a substantial “progressing soul”. Taking conceptual metaphor analysis as a tool, I will, in contrast, argue that there is a special Buddhist use of this metaphor. Indeed, at first sight, it seems to presuppose a non-Buddhist understanding (the “self” as charioteer; the chariot as vehicle to liberation, etc.). Yet, it will be argued that in these cases the chariot imagery is no longer fully “functional”. The Buddhist usage may, therefore, best be described as a final allegorical phase of the chariot-imagery, which results in a thorough deconstruction of the “chariot” itself.

A feasible theory of truth over combinatory algebra

We define an applicative theory of truth TPT which proves totality exactly for the polynomial time computable functions. TPT has natural and simple axioms since nearly all its truth axioms are standard for truth theories over an applicative framework. The only exception is the axiom dealing with the word predicate. The truth predicate can only reflect elementhood in the words for terms that have smaller length than a given word. This makes it possible to achieve the very low proof-theoretic strength. Truth induction can be allowed without any constraints. For these reasons the system TPT has the high expressive power one expects from truth theories. It allows embeddings of feasible systems of explicit mathematics and bounded arithmetic. The proof that the theory TPT is feasible is not easy. It is not possible to apply a standard realisation approach. For this reason we develop a new realisation approach whose realisation functions work on directed acyclic graphs. In this way, we can express and manipulate realisation information more efficiently.

Career adaptability development in adolescence: Multiple prdictors and effect on sense of power and life satisfaction

This longitudinal panel study investigated predictors of career adaptability development and its effect on development of sense of power and experience of life satisfaction among 330 Swiss eighth graders. A multivariate measure of career adaptability consisting of career choice readiness, planning, exploration, and confidence was applied. Based on Motivational Systems Theory four groups of predictors were assessed: positive emotional disposition, goal decidedness, capability beliefs and social context beliefs. Influence of gender, age, immigration background, parental educational level, and college-bound or vocational education plans were also assessed. Perceived social support and positive emotional disposition, non-immigration background, and continuing to vocational education were single significant predictors of more career adaptability development over the school year. Supporting the connection of career adaptability and positive youth development, increase in career adaptability over time predicted increase in sense of power and experience of life satisfaction.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.