Performance of Long-Term Care Systems in Europe. ENEPRI Research Report No. 117, 21 December 2012

This report evaluates the performance of long-term care (LTC) systems in Europe, with a special emphasis on four countries that were selected in Work Package 1 of the ANCIEN project as representative of different LTC systems: Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. Based on a performance framework, we use the following four core criteria for the evaluation: the quality of life of LTC users, the quality of care, equity of LTC systems and the total burden of LTC (consisting of the financial burden and the burden of informal caregiving). The quality of life is analysed by studying the experience of LTC users in 13 European countries, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Older persons with limitations living at home have the highest probability of receiving help (formal or informal) in Germany and the lowest in Poland. Given that help is available, the sufficiency of the help is best ensured in Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands. The indirectly observed properties of the LTC system are most favourable in France. An older person who considers all three aspects important might be best off living in Belgium or Switzerland. The horizontal and vertical equity of LTC systems are analysed for the four representative countries. The Dutch system scores highest on overall equity, followed by the German system. The Spanish and Polish systems are both less equitable than the Dutch and German systems. To show how ageing may affect the financial burden of LTC, projections until 2060 are given for LTC expenditures for the four representative countries. Under the base scenario, for all four countries the proportions of GDP spent on public and private LTC are projected to more than double between 2010 and 2060, and even treble in some cases. The projections also highlight the large differences in LTC expenditures between the four countries. The Netherlands spends by far the most on LTC. Furthermore, the report presents information for a number of European countries on quality of care, the burden of informal caregiving and other aspects of performance. The LTC systems for the four representative countries are evaluated using the four core criteria. The Dutch system has the highest scores on all four dimensions except the total burden of care, where it has the second-best score after Poland. The German system has somewhat lower scores than the Dutch on all four dimensions. The relatively large role for informal care lowers the equity of the German system. The Polish system excels in having a low total burden of care, but it scores lowest on quality of care and equity. The Spanish system has few extreme scores. Policy implications are discussed in the last chapter of this report and in the Policy Brief based on this report.

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

A more effective structure for the Commission. EPC Commentary, 7 March 2014

The changeover in the European Commission in autumn of this year will be one of the key factors that will determine the direction of the European Union for the coming years. The question of who will get what job, how far the European Parliament elections can influence the appointment of the Commission President (and the impact this has on the relationship between EP and the Commission), and what the new focus of the Commission will be in terms of policy priorities will all have a strong influence on EU policy for some time to come.

Energy and climate - What is the new European Commission thinking? EPC Commentary, 30 September 2014

A visible change of priorities and re-structuring of portfolios in the new European Commission have raised questions about related policy implications especially for climate and energy policies. On the one hand, it is seen that the new structure with Vice Presidents as team leaders for groups of Commissioners could encourage much needed policy coordination between policy areas, such as climate and energy policies. At the same time there are questions over what this could mean for political priorities, to what extent the Vice Presidents will be able to guide policy-making and how responsibilities will be divided. No matter what the structure of the Commission, it is in the EU’s interest to ensure that its climate and energy policies form a framework for action that helps to reduce global emissions, fight climate change locally and globally, secure energy supplies, promote wider socio-economic interests and increase competitiveness – all at the same time.

Do Too Many Chefs Really Spoil the Broth? The European Commission, Bureaucratic Politics and European Integration, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 09.2, 5 August 1999

There is a puzzling, little-remarked contradiction in scholarly views of the European Commission. On the one hand, the Commission is seen as the maestro of European integration, gently but persistently guiding both governments and firms toward Brussels. On the other hand, the Commission is portrayed as a headless bunch of bickering fiefdoms who can hardly be bothered by anything but their own in­ ternecine turf wars. The reason these very different views of the same institution have so seldom come into conflict is quite apparent: EU studies has a set of relatively autonomous and poorly integrated sub­ fields that work at different levels of analysis. Those scholars holding the "heroic" view of the Com­ mission are generally focused on the contest between national and supranational levels that character­ ized the 1992 program and subsequent major steps toward European integration. By contrast, those scholars with the "bureaucratic politics" view are generally authors of case studies or legislative his­ tories of individual EU directives or decisions. However, the fact that these twO images of the Commis­ sion are often two ships passing in the night hardly implies that there is no dispute. Clearly both views cannot be right; but then, how can we explain the significant support each enjoys from the empirical record? The CommiSSion, perhaps the single most important supranational body in the world, certainly deserves better than the schizophrenic interpretation the EU studies community has given it. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution toward the unraveling of this paradox. In brief, the argument I make is as follows: the European Commission can be effective in pursuit of its broad integration goals in spite of, and even because of, its internal divisions. The folk wisdom that too many chefs spoil the broth may often be true, but it need not always be so. The paper is organized as follows. 1 begin with an elaboration of the theoretical position briefly out­ lined above. 1 then tum to a case study from the major Commission efforts to restructure the computer industry in the context of its 1992 program. The computer sector does not merely provide interesting, random illustrations of the hypothesis 1 have advanced. Rather, as Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman have stressed, the Commission's efforts on informatics formed one of the most crucial parts of the en­ tire 1992 program, and so the Commission's success in "Europeanizing" these issues had significant ripple effects across the entire European political economy. I conclude with some thoughts on the fol­ lowing question: now that the Commission has succeeded in bringing the world to its doorstep, does its bureaucratic division still serve a useful purpose?

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?

The EEOC's performance in enforcing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [microform] : hearing before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, second session, Washington, DC, June 23, 24, 1988.

"Serial no. 100-24."

Biennial report of the Alabama Public Service Commission.

Mode of access: Internet.

Art treasures of Belgium.

Vol. 2, with subtitle, Sculpture, published as Art, life and science in Belgium, 2nd ser., no.3.

The Welsh Land Commission : a digest of its report /

D. Lleufer Thomas: Secretary to the Welsh Land Commission.

Interstate Commerce Commission reports. decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States /

Mode of access: Internet.

Semiannual report of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Issued also in the Congressional series as Senate documents.